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The thesis I am putting forward is that Locke, when he talked about
identity, was in reality discussing two quite different notions.

One of

them is the concept of identity; the other is that of "genetic identity,"
the relation which holds between temporal, parts that axe distinct from

each other, but which belong to a single, temporally extended whole.
Locke never possessed a clear grasp of this distinction; consequently he
assimilated both of these relations to that of identity.

But some of his

views about the nature of identity can be more sensibly interpreted if we
take him to be talking about genetic identity than is possible if we regard him as laying down a teaching concerning identity simply.

Thus

Locke held that all significant assertions of identity must compare an
object as it exists at one time with itself
stated, this is a false teaching.

it exists at another.

As

It is sufficient to make an identity

statement significant that the objects being identified are picked out by

means of predicates expressing ’distinct properties; it is not necessary
that these predicates contain references to times which are different.

But if, when speaking of significant identity statements, Locke really
intended to talk about the relation holding between different temporal

parts of a whole which persists through time, then it is obvious that the
singular terms picking out these parts will have to include references

vi

to different times.

Similarly, Locke was apparently committed tc the

doctrine that statements having the form "A is the same F as E, A and 3
are both G's, but A is not the same G as

E'

5

may be true.

This proble-

matic teaching makes far better sense when interpreted as the weaker

claim that A and B may be temporal parts of a single individual of kind
F, but fail to be parts of a single individual of kind. G, even although

A and B both do belong to some individual of kind G„
Many of Locke’s so-called "criteria of identity" for entities of

particular sorts are best understood as criteria of genetic identity.

They are persistence criteria that stipulate the essential properties
which an individual of a certain sort must retain if
exist.

it.

is to continue to

A reinterpretation along these lines is especially important in

the case of Locke’s "criterion of personal identity."

Although Locke

officially subscribed to the doctrine ox the soul as an immaterial substance, he did not identify the person or the self with that soul.

His

denial that the self is a substan.ce led him to identify the self with
thought or experience or with states of consciousness.

What unifies a

series of states of consciousness existing at different mimes and makes
one person out of them?

Because of his failure to distinguish between

identity and genetic identity, Locke mistakenly answers this question by
-

saying that a person
person, P,

,

,

P ot existing at a later time is iden tical with a

existing at an earlier time if and only if

remembering experiences of
Biit

.

P-,

is capable of

This principle leads to contradictions.

it may be reinterpreted as a theory that a temporal series of states

of consciousness constitutes a person just in case the last state in the

vii

series is such that it can remember experiences included in the earlier
states*

Given certain modifications and clarifications, this is a logi-

cally coherent theory*

However, it does entail many consequences re-

garding the nature of persons that are counter-intuitive.
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CHAPTER

I

IDENTITY AND PERSISTENCE THROUGH Tlx®

The purpose of this essay is to examine Locke's general theory of
identity together with the particular criteria which he puts forward for
the identity of entities of various sorts.

I

shall be particularly con-

cerned with his conception of the person and the account he gives of

personal identity.
gree obscure.

Locke's views on all of these topics are to some de-

Particularly where the subject of personal identity is

concerned, many commentators from the eighteenth century to the present

day have accused him of maintaining an inconsistent and incoherent doctrine.

These criticisms may well be sound when directed against the

theory as it was explicitly formulated by Locke.

It will be my conten-

tion, however, that his views are reconstructible in such a way as to
free them from contradictions.

1.

The Nature of Identity

Locke appears to maintain two very general theses regarding the
nature of identity, both of which are highly controversial.

First, he

makes the claim that all non-trivial assertions of identity are statements concerning the sameness of an object considered as existing at one
time with itself considered as existing at another time.

Second, he

seems to hold a theory concerning the relativity of identity which is

remarkably similar to that recently put forward by certain contemporary

,1
T
„
writ si's, of whom the best known representative may be Peter Geacru
Locke holds in effect that statements asserting the identity of A with B

2
must be understood as abbreviations or incomplete versions of statements

having the form "A is the same F as 3" where "F" is regarded as replaceable by an expression designating a kind or sort.

His comments in this

connection have been interpreted, and not without good reason, as com-

mitting him to the much debated vi ew that identity, like the relation
"better than," is fundamentally a "relative" relation.”

The textual

evidence strongly suggests that Locke believed, where "F" and "G" are

replaced by expressions designating different sorts, it is possible that
A and B may be the same F and yet fail to be the same G,

Let us examine

these crucial claims in more detail.
a.,.

Identity as a tempor al relation .

Xu the opening statement of hi

chapter on identity and diversity Locke puts forward the contention that

identity is to be understood primarily as a relation holding between an
object as existing at one time and that same object existing at another
time.

Another occasion the mind often takes of comparing is the very
being of things, when, considering anything as existing at an y
determined time end place , we compare it with itself existing
at another_time, and thereon form the ideas of identity and
diversity.Locke does not deny that an object considered at a single instant
of time may intelligibly be declared to be the same as itself.

When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time,
we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and
not another which at that same time exists in another place, how
like and undiptinguishable soever it may be in all other
respects
Indeed, he seems to conceive of this sameness with itself, which is so

certainly manifested by every object in a given place at a given instant

^

5

of time, as a kind of paradigm of the identity relation.

But appar-

ently he does not regard the question as to the self-identity of such
an object as being of any conceivable interest to us.

Non-trivial

questions regarding identity are raised only when we ask if an object
existing at one time is the same as an object existing at another time,
. ... and in this consists identity, when the ideas it is
attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment
wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we
compare the present. ... When therefore we demand whether
anything be the same or not, it refers always to something
that existed such a time in such a place, which it was certain, at that instant, was the same with itself, and no
other.

That is to say, when we ask whether something is the same, we are
asking whether it is the same as an object previously existing in a
given place at a given time, about whose self-identity there was no
doubt.

Clearly these ideas of Locke’s concerning the relation of identity

differ significantly from those of the contemporary logician.

Yet it is

not difficult to understand the considerations that underlie his

thinking.

'To

many philosophers it has appeared as though statements of

identity must be either trivial or false ,

0

Locke is certainly not alone

in his attempt to find a way between the horns of this apparent dilemma.

The question "Is the person now standing before me identical with the
person now standing before me?" appeared to him, as indeed it does to
us all, an example of an utterly trivial query.

But it neither seems,

nor is it trivial for someone to inquire if the person now standing be-

fore him is identical with some individual with whom at a previous

„

point in his life he was acquainted.

,

Such a question may have immense

practical significance, a fact attested to by the existence in 'literature of many famous "recognition" scenes

The notion that questions of identity become interesting, and at
the same time problematic, when and only when they involve the compari-

son of an object as it exists at one time with itself existing at

another time makes its appearance in the writings of Hobbes.

The

latter clearly exercised an important influence on Locke's ideas concerning identity, and through Locke upon the ideas of his successors in
the Empiricist tradition.

Hobbes divides his essay on "Identity and

Difference" into an earlier section which discusses the comparison of
one body with another, and a later one which is devoted to the compari-

son of the same body at different times with itself.

In the earlier

section he says,
it is manifest that no tv/o bodies are the s ame ; for seeing
they are two, they are in tv/o places at the same time; as that,
which is the same, is at the same rime in one and the same place.

/

Clearly this comment is the genesis of the passage already quoted
from Locke in which he asserts that any object seen to be in a given

place at a given time can be known with absolute certainty to be identi'
cal with itself and to be non- identical with any merely qualitatively

similar object existing in another place.

The second section of Hobbes' discussion begins with a statement
that is apparently the source of Locke's conception of a non- trivial

question of identity.
But the same body may at different times be compared with
itself. And from hence springs a great controversy among
philosophers about the beginning of xnd3.vidv.atj.ont namely

5

in what sense it may be conceived that a body is at one
time the same, at another time not the same it was
formerly „ Fcr example, whether a man grown old be the
same man he was whilst he was young, or another man; or
whether a city in different ages the same, or another
city. 0

Hobbes equates the more interesting question about identity with
that of individuation.

At the same time he points out that it is pre-

cisely when an object changes, that is, manifests at a later time a

property or properties different from those it displayed at an earlier
date, that the question of whether it has remained the same object

throughout the change tends to be one of special significance and
interest.

Although Locke does not stress this point in the opening

paragraphs of his chapter on identity, it becomes apparent from his

discussion as a whole that he does not disagree with Hobbes on this
issiie.

And this brings us to see how misleading is his initial state-

ment in the paragraph recently quoted, namely:
.... and in this consists identity , when the ideas it is
attributed to vary not at all from what they were that
moment wherein we consider their former existence, and
to which we compare the present.

This is one of many passages in the Essay where Locke does not do
justice to his real views.

In the first place, he surely means to say

that identity is attributed, not to cur juleas of the object, of which

there are typically a plurality and which clearly may differ from each
other in many significant ways, but rather to the object itself which

the ideas represent.
other- that the

And it is just when the ideas do vary from each

question of whether they represent one thing or many

things becomes ox greatest interest.

What we are really concerned to

know is whether that which is depicted by varying ideas varies irom

6

itself "not at all."

Although identity questions may be of special

interest when the object under investigation has shown marked qualitative change over a period of time, they remain significant even in the

absence of such change whenever an interval of time has elapsed between
the obtaining of the first idea of the object and that of the second
idea.

For no matter how qualitatively similar these ideas may be,

there will always be the possibility that they are not ideas of one and
the same object.

With these considerations in mind we can understand

why Locke believes that all non-trivial identity statements are of the
form, "B at tp = A at

where "t^" and "tp" are tc be understood as

referring to distinct times.
It does not seem to have occurred to Locke, or to Hobbes either for

that matter, that it might also be of interest to inquire whether

different properties or qualities are uniquely and simultaneously

instantiated by a single object.

Locke simply has not considered the

possibility of identity statements having a form such as "the capital
of Japan is (identical with) the largest city in the Far East."

When we

make assertions such as these we clearly are net comparing an object

existing at a determined time and place with itself existing at another
time.

What we are doing, described in Lockian terminology

,

is consider-

ing two simultaneously presented ideas which vary greatly from each
other, and asking if nevertheless they both apply (at the present time)

to the same object.

The position of Locke and the British Empiricists in general with
regard to the problem of identity may be described as follows.

They had

a partial , a very partial and limited glimpse oi the tregean insight

7

that if an identity statement is to be both true and significant, it
must equate expressions having different senses but only one denota-

tion or reference.

What they perceived instead of this general rule is

in fact a special case of the Fregean principle, namely the case in

which the expressions to be equated are descriptions with times or
dates attached to them such that the times are different.

This differ-

ence in the time or date suffices, of course, to guarantee that the

descriptions will have different senses.

The property of being the

President of the United States on August 9 % 197^ » is not the same as the

property of being the President on August 10, 197^ •

Thus Locke,

following in the footsteps of Hobbes, came to think of the significant

identity statement as one which compared an object as existing at one
time with itself as existing at another time.

Needless to say, this had

a profound effect both upon his treatment of identity in general and

upon his criteria of identity for entities of various sorts.
b.

The relativity of identit y.

Let us turn to a consideration of

Locke's views concerning the relativity of identity.

Once again, we can

see the genesis of Locke's thinking in the writings of Hobbes.

key utterance on this subject follows:
But we must consider by what name anything is called, when
we inquire concerning the identity of it. For it is one
thing to ask concerning Socrates, whether he be the same
man, and another to ask whether he be the same body; for
his body, when he is old, cannot be the same it was when
he was an infant, by reason of the difference of magnitude;
for one body has always one and the same magnitude; yet,
nevertheless, he may be the same man. "9
Here is Locke's version of the doctrine:

Hobbes'

,

It is not therefore unity of substance that comprehends all
sorts of identity, or will determine it in every case; but
to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what
idea the word it is applied to stands for; it being one
thing to be the same substance , another the same man , and
a third the same p erson , if p erson , man , and substance
,

—

are three names standing for three different ideas;
for
such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be
the identity

Locke clearly wants to deliver to his readers a message of the

following nature.

When you inquire whether A is identical with B,

don't imagine that you are necessarily asking whether A and B constitute a single substantial whole.

besides substantial unity.

There are other kinds of unity

For example, a person is a whole, an indi-

vidual, but he is not a substantial whole in the way that a mass of

matter is.

Therefore the requirements that must be met by an A and a B

before they are allowed to count as a single parson are not the same as
must be met by an A and a B that are candidates for being reckoned as a

single mass of matter.

If A and B are to count as the same mass of

matter they must be made up of exactly the same material particles; but
A and B could count as the same person, or even as the same human body
(i.e a

.

,

a man) without meeting this requirement, providing they displayed

an appropriate relationship of another kind.

A person is unified and

individuated by principles other than those that unify and individuate

substantial wholes.

It seems reasonably clear that Hobbes, using the

example of a body (mass of matter) and a man (living human organism)

was making a similar point.
The interesting question is whether Hobbes and Locke intend to
make an even stronger claim.

Bo they wish to uphold the thesis that

the terms "identical” and "numerically the same" are not employed uni-

9

vocally?

Does Locke wish to say that "is the same" denotes different

ideas cr has different meanings in expressions of the form "A is the
same substance as B," "A is the same man (i.e., human body) as B," and
"A is the same person as B"?

If so, then the terms "being the same

substance," "being the same man," and "being the same person" refer to
three distinct relations of sameness.

Nov/ it

seems that Locke does in~

deed hold this view, for he contends that it is possible for A and B to
be the same nan or bodily organism and yet not be the same person.

It

would be impossible for this contention to be true unless "being the
same man" and "being the same person" denoted distinct relations; for if

they denoted the same relation, the relation of identity simply, then A
and B would at the same time both stand in that relation and not stand
in it.

Similarly, Locke says it may be that A and E are the same

organism while failing to be the same mass of matter and, of course, the
same considerations apply here.

Locke then, subscribes to the view that it is entirely possible for
A to be the same F as B while failing to be the same G as B, where "F"

and "G" are replaceable by expressions designating sorts or kinds, such

as person, organism and substance.

Now there is a sense in which Locke's

claim can be regarded as a trivial truth.

If "A" and "B" name one and

the same individual , than it will be true that A is the same F as B

So if

just in case that individual, does have the property named by "F."

the individual referred to by "A" and by "B" is an F, but is not

a.

G,

then "A is the same F as B" will be true and "A rs the same G as 3
will be false.

(Miss Ambrose is the same female as Mrs. Lazerowitz, but

she is not the seme male.)

Locke, however, clearly intends to advance

10

a thesis much stronger and far more dubious than this.

He wishes to

maintain that where A and 3 are the same F, and A is a G and B is a G,
it is yet possible for A and B not to be the same G.

11

Thus, he says,

a small plant and a mature tree may be one and the same oak, but

although both the plant and the tree are masses of matter (collections
of material particles), they are not the same mass of matter.

In the state of living creatures, their identity depends not
on a mass of the same particles, but on something else. For
in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not
the identity: an oak growing from a plant to a great tree,
and then lopped, is still the same oak; and a colt grown up
to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes lean, is all the while
the same horse? though in both these cases., there may be a
manifest change of the parts; so that truly they are not
either of them the same masses of matter, though they be
truly one of them the same oak, and the other the same horse.
a mass of
The reason whereof is, that, in these two cases
identity is not applied to the
matter and a living body
same thing. 12

—

—

Similarly, Hobbes maintains that Old Socrates is the same man as Infant
Socrates, but not the same body, although, being a materialist, he

believes that both Old Socrates and Infant Socrates are bodies.

This contention on the part of Hobbes and Locke seems at first
sight extremely puzzling.

One would think it impossible for A and B to

be the same F without being the same simply,

their properties in common.

i T e.,

without having all

Can Black Beauty and Dark Sweetheart be

one and the same horse except on condition that every property of the
one is also a property of the other?
and.

But if A is a G and B is a G,

A and B are not the same G, then there must be some property that

the one has and the other lacks.

At the very leant it must be the

case that B has, and A lacks, the property of being the same G as B„
If this is so, it appears to contradict the claim that A and B are the

/

.

11

In defense, the relative identity theorist would no doubt pro-

same F.

test that it is precisely his view that an entity, A, may lack the prop-

erty of being the same G as B and yet possess that of being the same F

as B,

But we may ask, if A lacks the property of being the same G as B,

must not this lack be the consequence of some other property that A and
B fail to have in common?

Surely it cannot be the case that A and B

have all their properties in common except the property of being the
same G as B and that of being the same G as A.

Such a claim would seem

to violate the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, at least in

spirit.

Eut if, in addition to "being the same G as B," A fails to

possess still other properties belonging to B, is it reasonable to
suppose that A and B may be reckoned as one identical F?

At the outset,

then, there is some question as to whether the theory of identity which

Locke is putting forward is a coherent one.

Shortly we shall consider a

reinterpretation of his statements which renders what seem to be his
views concerning the relativity of identity far less px'oclematxe
Identity over Time and Temporal Parts

a.

Comp aring an obj ect with itself .

Locke's thesis that a signifi-

cant judgment of identity involves a comparison of an ooject as it

exists at one time with itself existing at another time has been challenged on grounds of unintelligibility .

Locke and Strawson, Michael Durrant says,

In a recent article criticizing
'’it

makes no sense to

comparing anything with itself ..." and goes on to assert:

i-al-k

of

"The logic of

comparison here demands that X's which are to be compared are indeed two

12

It follows from this, he seems to think, that the claim that "we

can genuinely talk about- something ’being the same with itself" is

deficient; presumably he means to refer to a logical deficiency.

Similarly, he denies that we can talk of any individual "being the thing
it is and not another."

14

Starting from these views, he then goes on to

attempt to discredit the notion of numerical, identity altogether.
A statement that am object is "the same with itself" appears to be
the Lockian equivalent of an assertion that it is self-identical.

When

Locke speaks of a thing "being the thing it is and not another," in

addition to attributing self-identity to the object he is presumably
saying that it is identical with itself alone .

Now even if it is true

that it is not logically possible to compare a thing with itself, the

deficiency of a claim that an object is self-identical follows only if
this claim cannot be posited without making such a comparison.
not immediately obvious that this is true.

Locke intends to assert it as true.

It is

It is not even certain that

For although Locke thinks that in

malting the interesting statements of identity we are comparing, or need

to compare, an object with itself, he does not say that we do this or

need to do this when we are sure, concerning an object which we see "to
be in any place in any instant of time," that "it is that very thing,

and not another ..." or, in an alternative formulation, when we are cer-

tain that it is "the same with itself and no other."

This certainty,

according to Locke, is not based on a comparison of the object with
itself, and a subsequent finding that it is identical with itself.
is founded instead on the following reasoning.

It

13

For we never finding nor conceiving it possible that two
things of the same kind should exist in the same place
at the same time, we rightly conclude that whatever exists
anywhere at any time, excludes all of the same kind, and
is there itself alone. ^-5
So even if Locke is wrong about the possibility of comparing an object
as it exists at one time with itself as it exists at another, this

would not vitiate the intelligibility or the truth of the assertion that
an object existing in a given place at a given time is identical with
itself and with itself alone.

Nor would this error on Locke's part ad-

versely affect his account of the way we come to know that such an
object is self-identical.

Nevertheless, if Currant is right in maintaining that the logic of

comparison excludes the possibility of comparing a thing with itself,

Locke's theory of significant identity judgments would seem at first
sight to be undermined.
is correct.

It is difficult to judge whether Durrant's claim

The notion of comparison does not seem to be sufficiently

precise to permit a clear answer to this question.
seem clear.

But one point does

No object can be found to differ from itself or to be in

any way dissimilar to itself.

If A differs from B, then A possesses

some property that B lacks, and vice versa.

But under these circum-

stances it is impossible for A to be identical with B

possess a property that it lacks.

,

for nothing can

This holds true, not only at a given

time, but for the entire time span of the object's existence.

Strictly

speaking, nothing that endures through time can gain or lose a property.

For let us assume that at
to be F.

b,

an object is F and that at t^ it has ceased

Then the thing that exists at

t.

and the thing that exists

fail to have all their properties in common.

at.

Consequently they can-
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not be one and the same thing.

loss of some property,

v/e

So if change entails the acquisition or

are left with the shocking conclusion that it

is impossible for anything to change and yet to continue in existence.

Motion, of course, will be one of the interdicted forms of change.

The

shock engendered by this remark will be considerably softened as soon as
we recognize that any entity may possess different dated properties, the

descriptions of which have the form respectively "F at t^" and
t.,V

fi

-F at

To say of an object that it possesses such properties is tanta-

mount to an assertion that it has changed or that it will change.

But

the key point is that it will have both these properties all through its

existence, so that at no point during that existence will it differ from
"I

itself."

6

When physical objects that persist through time are viewed in

this way, they turn out to be changeless four-dimensional entities, each
of them occupying a certain chunk of space time.

Thus the planet Venus

may be regarded as a four-dimensional spiral segment of space time.
b.

Comparing temporal parts .
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We now see that we must provide a re=

interpretation for statements which apparently assert that an object
existing, as Locke would say, at one time differs from itself as it

existed at another time.

Such statements seem to be making the claim

that there is some one object which has lost a property it formerly

But we

possessed and which has acquired a new property in its place.
have seen that this is impossible.

V/e

may reinterpret this claim along

Then we shall say that the object never

the lines already sketched.

differs from itself but that at all times it possesses two properties,
one of which is desc-ritable by a term having the

other by a term of the form '-F at
!

lorra

"F at t^

1
'

and the

But it is possible to give
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another kind of reinterpretation, perhaps under these circumstances a
more natural one, which preserves the notion of difference between the

thing that exists at an earlier time and the thing that exists at a
later time.

We may attribute F~ness and not F-ness, not to the indi-

vidual which persists through time and which is said to undergo change,
but to its temporal parts.

Thus a statement that an object has

changed would be paraphrased by saying a later part of it
that some earlier part lacks.

lias

a property

No contradiction is entailed by the

latter claim, since the parts of the object are distinct.

Temporal

parts, just like spatial parts, may differ from each other in a

variety of ways and hence the comparison of any two (or more) of them
is wholly unproblematic.

Thus the early temporal parts of a person in-

var iably possess the property of youthfulness; the last parts, in most

cases, lack that property.

Let us consider the lamentable case of a

devotee of Greta Garbo who meets her in person sometime after, let us
say, 1970.

her beauty.

He will no doubt make the sad observation that she has lost

We may say, if we wish, that he is considering a change-

less four-dimensional chunk of space time and attributing to that chunk
the property of being beautiful from 3-925 until. 19^5 and also the prop-

erty of being non-beautiful after 1970.

But he may also say "The Greta

of today bears l.ittle resemblance to the Greta of former years."

I-

the point of this assertion is that the object now being presented to

him is truly different from the object of bis previous acquaintance,
then indeed ha must be sjjeaking of two objects, not cne.

He must be

contrasting distinct temporal segments of a more inclusive bodily

v/noj.e.
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Now it is a fact that, except in the case of very short-lived entities, we normally perceive in any single act of perception, only a por-

tion of an object that persists through time.

When Greta's devotee

meets her at a cocktail party in 1971, clearly he does not perceive

Greta from her birth until her death.

He is able to perceive only that

temporal segment of Greta which is contemporaneous with the party.

It

is his unfortunate lot to compare this presently perceptible temporal

part of her with the earlier parts which he had so much admired, hut

which (except on celluloid) are no longer directly accessible to the
senses.

The relationship which holds between the part which is

presently perceptible and the formerly perceptible, presently remembered
part is the ground, not only for the contrast between them, but for the

ascription of them both to a single entity.

Such ascriptions of

distinct temporal parts to one inclusive temporal whole are sometimes

referred to as judgments of genetic identity or genidentity.
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A less

dramatic form of the situation confronting Garbo’s fan is one that

typically prevails whenever we re-encounter a physical object of which
we have had previous perceptual experience.

At the time of the new

encounter we perceive only a temporal segment of the enduring four-

dimensional object.

We compare this segment, as given in present per-

ception, with earlier segments, as given in memory.

It is this compar-

ison of the most recent segment with earlier ones that provides the

basis both for judgments of identity and genidentity.

Statements which

declare that distinct temporal parts belong to the same temporal whole

and statements which assert the existence of a single object having

properties describable by terms of the form "F at t^" and

1

G at t^" are

17

no doubt intertransiatable.

But in cases involving the recognition of

objects given in perception, both kinds of judgment appear to be epi-

stemically dependent on a comparison of temporal segments.
c.

Dated and undated properties .

Temporal parts may be conceived

of as "time-slices," that is, as momentary states without duration.

Then they are comparable to spatial points that lack magnitude „

Or

they may be thought of as "time-stretches" which last for some finite
period.
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In the latter case they may be of any duration which is less

than the lifespan of the object of which the segment is a part.

Conse-

quently temporal segments may overlap and may include other temporal
segments as their own proper parts.

The properties to which we attach a

date when we think of them as belonging to a temporally persistent whole

with a lifespan including that date as a proper part of itself, we
attribute, 'without the date, to the appropriate temporal segments.

Let

us consider the case of Jones, who was born on January 1, 1900, was

married on January 1, 1925, and who conveniently died on January 1, 1950.
Let us further assume, although somewhat unrealistically, that the period
in which a person is a new-born baby coincides exactly with the date of

his birth, the period in which he is a bridegroom with the day of his
•wedding, etc.

Then that temporal segment of Jones which coincides with

the date of his birth has the property cf being a new-born baby and so

does every segment which is entirely included as a proper part of the

birthday segment.

The temporal part which coincides with his v/edaing

day, and every proper part thereof, possesses the property of being a

bridegroom.

While lacking the properties of being a new-born baby

oi

other
bridegroom simply., Jones, the person who is the sum of these and

a.
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temporal parts, has the corresponding dated properties of being a new-

born baby on (or during) January 1, 1900, and of being a bridegroom on
January 1, 1925.

These properties attach to Jones throughout his life,

while the property of being a new-born baby simply belongs only to
those temporal segments which coincide with January 1, 1900 (or parts

thereof)

,

and the property of being a bridegroom simply to those which

coincide with January 1,

192.5,

and its parts.

For if on January 1, 1900,

Jones had possessed the property of being a new-born baby simply, he

would subsequently have lost that property.

The consequence would be

that after January 1, 1900, Jones would lack a property he had

possessed on that date.

From this it would follow that Jones on January

1, 1901, let us say, could not be the same person as Jones on January 1,

1900.

What is true of the person as a whole will also be true of tempo-

ral segments which contain either the day of Jones' birth or a portion
of that day as a proper temporal, part.

They will possess the dated prop-

erty of being a new-born baby on January 1, 1900.

For it is true of

every temporal, segment which persists over a period of time that it cannot gain

ox'

lose a property and yet remain identical with itself.

However, to the person as a whole we may attribute certain undated

properties®

It would be tempting to say that he possesses all and only

those undated properties which belong to each of his temporal segments.

For example, we might say he possesses the property of being human
simply, if and only if each of his temporal parts possesses it.

The

difficulty is that there are certain undated properties which belong to
all temporally persistent wholes, not themselves proper parts oi a more

inclusive whole, no matter what kind of entity they may happen to be,
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and which do not belong to any temporal parts, no matter what sort of whole

they belong to.

An obvious example of such a property is that of not

being a temporal part.

Similarly all temporal segments possess certain

properties, such as being a proper temporal part of a more persistent whole,

which belong to them in virtue of their nature as tempoi’al segments.

These

properties do not belong to any wholes which are not themselves temporal
segments.

But if we leave out of consideration these properties that flow

from the nature of temporal wholes and parts as such, then it seems we may

safely say that a temporal, whole has an undated property, P, if and only
if that property belongs to each of its temporal parts.

In the case of

Jones, such properties would undoubtedly include being human and being male

(assuming Jones does not visit Denmark).

They might or might not include a

characteristic such as being an American citizen.

If an undated property,

such as American citizenship, belongs to some temporal part or parts, but
not to others, the corresponding dated property will belong to the whole

composed of these parts.

Thus if Jones is born an American citizen, but

in 1925 formally shifts his allegiance to the Soviet Union, then he will

have the dated property of being a United States citizen from his birth
date in 1900 until the relevant day in 1925*

No one can be identical with

Jones tinless at every point in his existence he possesses all of the dated
and undated properties possessed by Jones at every point in his.
d,y

Express ion s of the form "A at t."

expressions such as
pretations.

!!

A.

It now becomes evident that

at t" are subject to at least two different inter-

They may be taken as definite descriptions which make refer-

ence, not to entities whose existence is confined to the time mentioned in

the description, but to entities with lifespans of which the time men-
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tioned in the description is merely a segment.

Thus "B at

may be

interpreted as "the person having the property of dying on January 1,
1950," while for "A at

t "

we may substitute "the person having the

property of being married on January 1, 1925."

Both of these descrip-

tions apply to Jones, the individual who came into existence on January
1, 1900, who continued to exist until January 1, 1950

s

and who had the

dated property of being married on January 1, 1925, and the dated property of dying on January 1, 1950, all his life long.

Thus "B at t^" and

"A at t^" can be regarded as expressions which specify their temporally

persistent referents through the mention of some dated property which
the object being denoted possesses during the entire span of its exis-

tence.

Let

"P^_"

be a dummy dated property name,,

"P^" will be replace-

able by expressions such as "the property of being born on January 1,

1900," or "the property of dying on January 1, 1950."

"A at t," as we

are now understanding it, is an abbreviation for "the A which has
It is a name for an entity, A, which exists, not merely at t, but at a

number of different times.

The reference to a time that appears in the

name is a .reference to the time at which there exists a temporal part of
A that possesses the undated property which we are using with a date

attached as a means to pick out A.

Let us replace "A at t" with "the

man who resigned the Presidency of the United States on August 9, 1974."
The whole expression refers to the temporally persistent individual,

Richard Nixon.

A

temporal part of Nixon, coinciding with August 9,

1974, had the undated property of resigning the Presidency.

We men-

tioned that prope.rty and the date coinciding with the temporal part ol

Nixon that possessed that property in order to pick out Nixon, the whole
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person, who includes that temporal segment as one of his proper parts.

When interpreted in this way, expressions such as "A at t" may properly
flank an identity sign.
the form "B at t

2

=

An example of a well-formed statement having

A at t^' is the assertion that the man who has the

property of resigning the Presidency on August 9, 1974, is identical

with the man who has the property of being re-elected as President on
the second Tuesday of November, 1972.

But there is another interpretation that may be given to the ex-

pressions "A at t^" and "B at t^."

They may be taken as dummy names for

temporal segments of persons or objects.

Thus "A at t" may be inter-

preted as a name for a temporal segment of A which coincides with
only with t.

and

But on the latter interpretation it is clear that state-

ments of the form "B at t^ = A at
For if

tity.

t

t

t^ "

are not genuine statements of iden-

and t^ are different times, and if A at t^ and B at t p

are both temporal segments of some object (whether the same or different)

such that A's existence coincides only with t^ and B's existence only

with

t. s

,

then A at t^ can never be identical with B at t^.

Under this

interpretation of these expressions, the claim that B at t^ is identical

with A at

t,

,

if it is to make sense at all, must be reformulated as the

contention that B at t

and A at

t.,

are both parts, although distinct

parts, of the same temporally persistent whole.
e«

Critic isms of the doctrine of temporal parts .

Before we pro-

ceed to reinterpret Locke’s assertions about identity as statements con-

cerning the relation holding between temporal stages, we must recognize
that the view that objects which persist through time are composed of

temporal parts or temporal segments has been subjected to attack.

In
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particular, it has been maintained that an object constituted out of

such parts cannot be a real unity.

The genesis of this attack has sorae-

times been attributed to Bishop Butler.
take.
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But this seems to be a mis-

Butler made a distinction between "a strict and philosophical"

sense of identity and "a loose and popular" sense.

He did not contend,

however , that an object composed of distinct temporal parts could not be
identical with itself in a strict and philosophical sense.

He maintained

merely that strict identity entails sameness of substance . material or
spiritual.

More accurately, where "A" and "B" are names of a material

object, Butler in effect stipulated that A is strictly or philosophically

identical with B if and only if there exists a substance such that A has
a spatial part of it and B

lias

a spatial part of it.

Or we may say more

simply that the strict identity of A and B requires that there be some

substance which A and B have in common.

seems

And this teaching, in turn,

to be founded on the notion that "the same property cannot be

transferred from one substance to another."

So if there is no substance

or part of a substance common to A and B, then "no one of their proper-

ties is the same."

Thus if a tree existing today and a tree existing in

the same place fifty years ago "have not one common particle of matter,"

"they cannot be the same tree in the proper philosophic sense of the

word same|" they can be identical, only in a loose and popular sense.
Strangely enough, Butler seems to leave open the possibility that A and B
might be strictly identical even if they had only a part of their sub-

stance in common and consequently shared only part of their properties.
Whatever the confusions in Butler's thinking, and there are plainly
a

number cf them, it does not seem reasonable to attribute to him tne
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belief that nothing which is composed of temporal parts can constitute a
genuine unity through time.

His concerns lie elsewhere.

Such a view,

however, has been espoused by Roderick Chisholm, most notably in his

essay on "Problems of Identity."

21

Chisholm argues, first, that the doc-

trine that persons possess or are composed of temporal parts "is not ade-

quate to the experience we have of ourselves" when we are aware of different experiences occurring over an interval of time.

He analyzes the ex-

perience of someone who hears the birdcall "Bob White" in the following
terms.

We will say, then, "There exists an x such that x hears 'Bob'
and then x hears 'White'." Jonathan Edwards and our metaphysician would say that the experience could be adequately
described by using two variables: "There exists a y and a z
such that y hears 'Bob' and z hears 'White'." But the latter
sentence is not adequate to the experience in question. The
man who has the experience knows not only (1) that there is
someone who hears 'Bob' and someone who hears 'White'. He
also knows (2) that the one who hear-s 'Bob' is identical with
the one who hears 'White . And, what is crucial to the
present problem, he knows (3) that his experience of hearing
•Bob' and his experience of hearing 'White were not also had
by two other things, each distinct from himself and from each
other .22
1

5

We may certainly agree with Chisholm that the statement "there exists a

^

and a z such that

^ hears

'Bob' and z hears 'White'" is not an ade-

quate analysis of the phenomenon in question.
be supplemented by the further assertion that

That statement needs to

^

and z axe temporal

parts of one and the sane person, so that the experience of hearing
"Bob” at one time and the experience of hearing "White" at a later time

are both experiences had by one individual.

Furthermore, if the bird-

call is to be experienced as a unity, then the part z which hears

"White" must remember the "Bob" heard by

jr.

But it seems that even
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when thus supplemented, the temporal part analysis of the "Bob White"
experience would not be acceptable to Chisholm.

For he not only wants

to say that the person who hears "Bob" is identical with the person who

hears "White;" he wishes to deny that, in addition to the person who

hears these two sounds, there are "two other things, each distinct from

himself and from each other" such that one of them hears "Bob" and the
other hears "White."

To make such a claim, he apparently believes,

would be to multiply entities beyond necessity.

Let us consider a

board, the right-hand half of which is painted red and the left-hand

half of which is painted blue.

Then there is a board which is painted

red and there is a board which is painted blue.

Furthermore it is true

that the board which is painted red is identical with the board which is

painted blue.
also

Shall we now affirm or deny the assertion that there are

two other things, namely the right-hand half of the hoard and the

left-hand half of the board, each distinct from the board and from each
other, such that the one is painted red and the other is painted blue?

Well, if for "thing" we may substitute only names that apply to whole

boards, so that the statement is thought to imply that in addition to the
board, half of which is painted red and haif of which is painted blue,

there are also two other whole boards, one of them red and the other
blue, then surely it will mislead us as to the facts.
one board, not three.

There is only

But if for "thing" we may substitute not only

names which are applicable to whole boards, but also to parts of boards,
then the statement seems unexceptionable.

The board clearly has

spatial parts and these parts are distinct from each other as well as
from the whole of which they are parts.

If we interpret "thing" in

this way, and if we also make the assumption that every spatial magnitude is infinitely divisible, it would not be incorrect to say that
v/herever there exists a single spatially extended thing, there also

exists an infinite number of such objects.

Let us assume that the

thing in question is a fi litely extended line.

Then each of its infi-

nite number of parts is also a line, so it is correct to say that in

addition to there being one line, there is also an infinite number of
them.

But there is something that differentiates each of the infinite

number of parts of the line from the line of which they are parts.

Only the latter line has the property of not being a proper part of a
line.

'There is just one line that has that property.

The situation

appears to be analogous with objects that are temporally extended.

Let

There is just one temporally

us consider the hearer of the birdcall.

extended person who has the property of not being a proper temporal
part of a person.

But he has an indefinite number of temporal segments

each of which does have the property of being a proper part of a person
and perhaps of being a person simply.
the person that hears

hears "Bob”

arid

When we say that in addition to

Bob White” there is an earlier person-part that

,i

a later person-part that hears "White," it is important

to remember that we are not affirming that there are three persons, all
of them with the property of not being a proper part of a person.

And

if we do keep this point in mind, the accusation that we are multi-

plying entities appears less formidable.
Chisholm gees on to criticize

-what he

considers to be the case for

the doctrine of temporal parts, that is, "the doctrine according to

which, for every period of time during which an individual thing

,
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exists, there is a temporal part of that thing which is unique to that

period of time."
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What is this case? It is based, presumably, upon the
assumption that whatever may be said about spatial continuity
and identity may also be said, mutatis mutandis , about temporal continuity and identity. If this assumption is correct,
then the doctrine of temporal parts would seem to be true.
We may say, as our metaphysician did: "Just as an object
that is extended through space at a given time has, for each
portion of space that it occupies, a spatial part that is
unique to that portion of space at that time, so, too, any
object that persists through a period of time has, for each
subpez*iod of time during which it exists, a temp o ral pert
that is unique to that subperiod of time." But is it correct
to assume that whatever may be said about spatial continuity
and identity may also be said, mutatis mutandis about temporal continuity and identity? I would say that there is a
fundamental disanalogy between space and time.
The disanalogy may be suggested by saying simply: "One
and the same thing cannot be in two different places at one
and the same time. But one and the same thing can be at two
different times in one and the same place." Let us put the
point of disanalogy, however , somewhat more precisely.
When we say "a thing cannot be in two different places
at one and the same time," we mean that it is not possible for
all the parts of the thing to be in one of the places at that
one time and also to be in the other of the places at that
same time. It is, possible, of course, for some part of the
thing to be in place at a certain time and another part of
the thing to be in another place at that time. And to remove
a possible ambiguity in the expression "all the parts of a
thing," let us spell it out to "all the parts that the thing
ever will have had."
Instead of saying simply "a thing cannot be in two different places at one and the same time,” let us say this:
"It is not possible for there to be a thing which is such
that all the parts it ever will have had are in cne place at
one time and also in another place at that same time." And
instead of saying "a thing can be at two different times in
one and the same place," let us say this: "It ius possible
for there to be a thing which is such that all the parts it
ever will have had are in one place at one time and also in
that same place at another time."
It seems to me to be clear that each of these two
theses is true and therefore that there is a fundamental disanalogy between space and time.. And so if the case for the
doctrine of temporal parts presupposes that there is no such
disanalogy, then the case is inadequate . (We may, oi course
appeal to the doctrine of temporal parts in order to defena
,
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the view that there is no such disanalogy. We may use
it, in particular, to criticize the second of the two
theses I set forth above, the thesis according to which
it is possible for there to be a thing which is such
that all the parts it ever will have had are in one
place at one time and also in that same place at another
time. But what, then, is the case for the doctrine of

temporal parts? )^ +
In this section Chisholm apparently is trying to establish two claims.

The weaker one asserts that a certain analogy between spatial conti-

nuity and identity, on the one hand, and temporal continuity and identity, on the other, cannot be established as a fact without assuming the

doctrine of temporal, parts as true.

The analogy in question is between

the impossibility that all the spatial parts of a thing should be in
one place at one time and also in another place at that same time and

the like impossibility that all the temporal parts of a thing should be
in one place at one time and also in that same place at another time.

This analogy, of course, depends on the assumption that there are temporal parts.

Hence, if the statement of the analogy is utilised as a

premise in the argument for the conclusion that "whatever may be said
about spatial continuity and identity may also be said, mutatis mutand is,
about temporal continuity and identity," the latter principle cannot be

employed to support the doctrine of temporal parts except on pain of
circularity.

This seems to be a sound claim.

Chisholm’s second and stronger assertion is that there is a fundamental disana logy between space and time.

Hence the teaching that what-

ever may be said about spatial continuity may also be said aoout temporal

continuity is false.

But, as Chisholm himself implicitly admits, the

proof of the existence of this disanalogy is dependent on the assumption
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that the doctrine of temporal parts is false.

Anyone who thinks the doc-

trine true will want to substitute for "parts" in the first thesis the

term "spatial parts," and for "parts" in the second thesis the term
"temporal parts."

Then the first thesis remains true, but the second

thesis becomes false.

It follows that if this disanalogy is employed to

discredit the doctrine of the parallelism between space and time, the

falsity of that doctrine cannot then be utilized to disprove the teaching about temporal parts except on pain of circularity.

Consequently

Chisholm's contention about the disanalogy between space and time does
not appear to advance the argument.

In any case, even if some disanalogies between space and time can be

established, it would not follow that spatial continuity and temporal con-

tinuity are aisanalogous in all respects.

In particular', it would not

follow that there is a disanalogy between the existence of spatial parts
and of temporal parts.

The doctrine of s pat ial parts, as enunciated by

Chisholm's metaphysician, seems to follow from the unquestionably true
premise that every spatial magnitude and every object possessing spatial
magnitude is, at least conceptually, divisible.

The doctrine of temporal

parts is similarly founded on the assumption that every temporal magnitude
and every object possessing temporal magnitude or extension is divisible.

Does it seem reasonable to question the truth of the latter assumption?
Is it possible to conceive of an extent of time that is not, at least in

principle, subject to division?

And

fox'

every extent of time that faxls

within the lifespan of a temporally extended object, no matter how

short,

that extent may be, is there not some portion of that object which coin-
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cides with that extent?

If that is so, the doctrine of temporal parts

would seem to be as much of a necessary truth as its companion teaching

regarding spatially extended entities.
Chisholm goes on to maintain that there are at least some things

which "persist intactly" through time.
"... a thing 'persists intactly' if it has continued, uninterrupted

existence through a period of time and if, at any moment of its existence, it has precisely the same parts it has at any other moment of its

existence.

There is an ambiguity, however, in the expression "precisely the
same parts."

It is indeed possible for an object to possess at one

moment precisely the same spatial parts as it possessed at an earlier
moment.

The spatial parts of an extended object, like the object itself,

may be regarded as four-dimensional chunks of space time.

They are the

subjects of dated properties which they possess during the entire span of
their existences, and as such, they are things which may remain selfidentical over a period of time.

Thus an object made up of two atoms, A

and B, v/ill be thought of as retaining precisely the same spatial parts
so long as it consists of those two atoms and no others.

But is it

possible for an object to possess at a later moment of its existence the
same temporal parts it possessed at some earlier moment?

question needs clarification.

Once again, the

An object which persists through time, as

we have seen, at every point in its existence has all the properties it
ever had and ever will have, although some of

attached to them.

these,

properties have dates

So there is a sense in which at every point in its

existence the object possesses all the temporal parts it ever had or ever

will have, and a sense in which it is true that "at any moment of its
existence, it has precisely the seme temporal parts it has at any other

moment of its existence."
all, persist intactly.

In.

this sense all objects which persist at

But not all of the temporal parts of an object

coincide with that moment of its existence which is the present moment.

And if Chisholm means to require, as it seems he does, that all the temporal parts of an object which persists intactly over a period of time

should coincide exactly with each sub-period of that time, then he is

asking the impossible, and nothing can persist intactly.
sider an object which exists from t^ and t^.

Let us con-

Then a part of its exist-

ence will coincide with the period from t^ until t^, another part with
the pex'iod from

until

t.^.

until

and still another with the period from t_

t^,

That is the same thing as saying it will have a temporal part

that lasts from
from tj until

t,

t,, .

until t_, another lasting from t_ until t^ and a third
In addition it will have mere inclusive proper tempo-

ral parts that extend from

tn

1

until t^ and from t
y

2

until

t,, .

But surely

H-

it is exceedingly strange to suggest that each of these temporal segments

until t^.

By defini-

must coincide with, let us say, the period from

t,

tion, the segment which exists from t^ until

cannot be the same seg-

ment as that existing from
3o

V/e

t

t

^

until t^*

Reinterpreting Locke's Views on Identity

have already observed that some of Locke's statements concerning

identity indicate that he conceived of that relation (or relations) in a
’way

that differs significantly from the way of the contemporary logician.

We must now consider whether his more puzzling and deviant views about
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identity make becter sense

if*

we take him to be talking, not about iden-

tity, but about temporal segments and the relation, so-called, of genetic identity that obtains between such segments when they belong to a

single temporal whole.

We suggested that, in putting forward the thesis

that all significant identity statements involve the comparison of an

object "as existing at one time" with itself "at another time," Locke

may have been motivated by a realisation, however partial, that if an

assertion of identity is to escape triviality, the expressions flanking
the identity sign must have different senses, that is, they must express

different properties.

Stipulating that these expressions must contain

references to times that are distinct was a way, although an unnecessarily stringent one, to see that this requirement would be met.

this suggestion about

hi.s

Even if

philosophical, motivation is correct, however, it

would certainly be a vast exaggeration to claim that Locke had a clear
understanding of the reasons for his stipulation.

Indeed, if he had

possessed such an understanding it seems obvious that he would not have
framed his requirements for significant identity statements as he did.

Locke was not S’rege.

But a person who glimpses that an assertion of

identity can be freed from triviality if its singular terms contain references to different times without fully understanding why this is the

ease-

ls very prone to shift from one interpretation of those terms to the

other and not be aware of what he is doing.

In our terminology, he is

liable to confuse an expression whose form should be analyzed as "the A

which has P

’*

with one having the form "the temporal, segment of A which

coincides exactly with t."

In fact, the only way to steer crear of such

a confusion in dealing with terms of the form "A at t" is to have a
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grasp of the distinction between the very different relations of identity and genidentity.

It seems doubtful that any of the philosophers

in the tradition of British Empiricism understood this distinction.

That Locke was oblivious of it will become particularly obvious when we

undertake a discussion of his treatment of personal identity.

It is

easy to see, then, how Locke may have started out with the idea that sig-

nificant identity statements should have the form "the B which has P
"

the A which has P
l

=
t

2

and then have passed over to the notion that the

l

correct form for such assertions should be "the temporal segment of 3

which coincides exactly with t^ = the temporal segment of A which coincides exactly with t^."

The first idea suffers merely from the defect of

being excessively restrictive; the second notion, which if left unanalyzed so dangerously resembles the first, makes no sense at all when
" = " is

interpreted as standing for identity.

however, if

" = " is

It makes excellent sense,

reinterpreted as standing for the relation of genetic

identity.

We opened this chapter by pointing out that Locke appeal's to think
that every statement of the form "A is the same as (is identical with) B"
is an incomplete version of one having the form "A is the same F as B."
"F" is to be replaced by an expression denoting a kind or sort.

What

Locke says suggests that he believes "A is the same F as B" cannot be analyzed as asserting (l) A is F, (2) B is F

and. (3)

A is identical witn B,

for whether or not (3) is true depends on the sort whose name replaces

"F," and of which A and B are claimed to be the self— same instance.

It

is "one thing to be the same substance , another the same man , and a third

the same pe rson ..."

Let us consider an example of the sort of case in
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which we might feel disinclined to assent to a statement of the identity
of A with 3 without having it filled out as a statement that A is the

same F as B and then assuring ourselves that the name replacing "F"
designated the appropriate sort or kind.

Suppose that we recognize in

the elderly man to whom we are presently being introduced a boy whom we

knew many years ago.

We might well be reluctant to say simply "the old

gentleman is identical

viith the

little boy" and at the same time we

might find it perfectly natural to assert that the old gentleman is the

same -person as the little boy.

I would suggest that the reason why the

unqualified statement of identity between the old gentleman and the
little boy may appear objectionable is that in making it we attribute to
the old gentleman all the properties of the little boy and vice versa.

Specifically, we seem to be attributing to the old gentleman the property
of being a little boy.

Cer-

This is something we may not want to do.

tainly it would be unnatural to reply in the affirmative if we are
asked, "Is this old gentleman a little boy?"

or "Is he an embryo?"

This

is an indication that in a context of this sort "this old gentleman" is

taken as referring, not to the person who at one time was a little boy
and at the present time is an old gentleman, but only to

that,

temporal seg-

ment of him which has the undated property of being an old gentleman.

For the person who includes this segment as a temporal part has the

properties of being a little boy and an embryo in just the same way as he
has the property of being an old gentleman* he has them all as dared

properties.

So if we attribute one of these properties to him, we should

find the attribution of any of the others equally unobjectionable.

other hand, if we ask "Was this old gentleman a little boy?

V/as

On the

he an
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embryo?" we seem to feel no difficulty with the affirmative answer.

Tensing the question apparently alters the context in such a way that
"this old gentleman" no longer refers to a late temporal segment of the

person in question, but rather to the individual as a temporal whole,
who as such is the subject of a variety of dated properties.

In any

case, statements such as "the old gentleman is the little boy" seem to
be ambiguous.

The singular terms may be taken as referring to persons

who are not themselves temporal parts of persons, or they may be regained as denoting temporal segments of such persons.

In the former

case the statements may be true; in the latter they are invariably
false.

No temporal part of a person has both the undated property of

being an old gentleman and the undated property of being a little boy;
as undated properties these two are mutually incompatible.

The ambi-

guity of such statements may explain the uncertainty some people feel
about regarding them as true or possibly true.

That ambiguity is not

necessarily removed by recasting the statement in the mold of "A is the
same F as B."

In the context of a statement such as "the old gentleman

is the same person as the little boy" "the old gentleman" and "the

little boy" may very well continue to refer to temporal segments.

In

fact, it is more likely than ever that they should be regarded as doing
so.

But even if we do interpret the singular terms this way, it does

not seem to be a bar to thinking that the expanded statement is true.

The explanation of this circumstance must be thac substituting "is the
same person as" for "is identical with" permits the statement to assert
a relation between the old gentleman and the little boy which is othei

than the relation of identity.

It may transform an identity statement
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into one of genidentity.

Another way of making the same point is to say

that the "is" in "is the same (or iaentical)person as" is not neces-

sarily the "is" of identity; it may be the "is" of composition.

Then

we are saying that the old gentleman and the little boy go to make up
the person who has them both as temporal segments; the person is composed
of or constituted out of these and other segments.

Understood in this

way, a statement of the form "A is the sane F as B" would assert that A

and B are both parts, although distinct parts, of a whole which is F.
Thus, although "this old gentleman is the same person as the little boy"
is, under the appropriate factual circumstances, perfectly acceptable,

we should certainly reject "the old gentleman is the same child as the
little boy" and "the old gentleman is the same little boy as the little
boy."

That these formulations are unacceptable is a further indication

that the singular terms are regarded as referring to temporal segments.

The last two sentences are objectionable because they suggest, respectively, that the old gentleman is part of a child and of a little boy.

Of course statements having the form "A is the same F as B" need
not be interpreted in this way, and sometimes they cannot be.

If we

say "Tokyo is the same city as the capital of Japan" clearly we are not

maintaining that Tokyo and the capital of Japan are parts, either spatial
or temporal, of the same city.

But unlike the case of "the old gentle-

man is identical with the little boy," here we have no reluctance to
assert simply that Tokyo is identical with the capital of Japan.
is nothing problematic about this identification.

There

Hence the only pur-

pose served by e:cpanding it into the statement that Tokyo is the same
city as the capital of Japan is to convey the additional information

that Tokyo, i.e., the capital of Japan, is a city.

So this statement

does not resist analysis into the assertions that (1) Tokyo is a city,
(2)

the capital of Japan is a city and (3) Tokyo is identical with the

capital of Japan.

The truth of the Tokyo-capital of Japan identity is

not dependent upon the sort of name appearing in the place occupied by

"city" provided only that the name designates a sort to which both

Tokyo and the capital of Japan belong.

This is doubtless due to the

fact that there is no ambiguity in the reference of the terms "Tokyo"

and "the capital of Japan."

But where the terms may refer either to

temporal segments or to the wholes of which those segements are parts,
then substituting "is the same F" for "is the same" seems to open up
the possibility of reinterpreting the "is" and hence of regarding the

statement as true even if its singular terms are thought of as desig-

nating distinct parts of the entity which is F.

Suppose, then, that a

philosopher should want to talk, at least part of the time, about temporal parts belonging to a single whole, rather than about the relation of

identity holding between such wholes.

Suppose further that, lacking a

clear understanding of the distinction in question, he wished still to
cling to the "is the same as" locution, which is appropriate only to

wholes if the "is" is understood as the "is" of identity.

Such a phi-

losopher would have a motive to insist that all statements of the form
"A is the same as B" should be expanded into ones with the form "A is

the same F as B."

We suggest that was the case with Locke.

Let us see if, by substituting the relation of genidentity for
identity, we can now make intelligible Locke's puzzling contention that

A and

B,

both of them possessing the properties F and G, may oe the same
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F

while failing to be the same G.

That A and B are the same F we shall

accordingly translate as the proposition that A and B are distinct temporal segments of a temporally persistent whole which is of kind F.

Now it

is entirely possible that an entity which forms a temporal segment of a

temporally persistent whole of kind F may also form a temporal segment of
a persistent

whole of kind G, where "F" and "G" name distinct kinds.

Thus

a collection of material particles which forms a temporal cross-section of
a mass of matter may also be a temporal segment of a living organism.
us assume that
is B at t 2*

A at

t^ is such a

collection of material particles and so

Does B at t^ belong to the same living organism to which A

belonged at t^?

Clearly a necessary condition for an affirmative answer

is the continued existence at t? of the organism of which

part at t^ #

Let

A was a temporal

in order to know whether the organism which existed at

con-

t-^

tinues to exist at t2> we have to be able to specify those essential proper
ties, continued possession of which is a necessary and sufficient condi-

tion of the persistence of an entity of this kind.

Obviously the same

considerations are applicable when we turn to the question of whether B
at t2 belongs to the same mass of matter to which

A belonged at

tj_*

But

the properties which are essential to the continued existence of an organ-

ism are not the same as the properties essential to the continued existence of a mass of matter.

According to Locke, the continued existence

of a mass of matter requires sameness of the individual atoms making up
the mass.

The continued existence of an organism, on the other hand,

depends upon the sameness of the organization of the particles.

There-

fore it may well be the case that at t? the organism to which A belonged
at 1 1 still exists, whereas the mass of matter to which A belonged at

t-^
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no longer exists.

Under these circumstances it is oossible that B at

t

2

may be a temporal part of the same organism to which A belonged at t^,

while of course it is not possible for B to be a temporal part of the
same mass of matter to which A belonged at t^.

This, then, is a case

where, to employ Locke's terminology, B at t^ may be the same F as A at
t.^,

while it cannot be the same G.

27

The analysis rests on the assump-

tion that two or more material things may spatially overlap or may co-

exist in a given place, provided that they are of different sorts.

Another way of putting this is that a single temporal segment consisting
of a particular collection of atoms, let us say, may form a part of more

than one temporal whole, if the wholes in question are of different kinds.
In our example one whole was a mass of matter, the other a living organism.

When this situation obtains we may say that they have a temporal

stage in common.

Later we shall have to raise the question as to whether

some non-material entities, such as Locke conceives persons to be, may

have a temporal part in common even when they are of the same sort, that
is to say, when they are both persons.
b,

A Parallel Reinterpretation of Geach's View

In his article, "the same F,"

28
^

John Perry has pointed out that ex-

pressions having the form "A is the same F as G" cannot always be understood as asserting that the relation of identity holds between A and B.
The statement, for example, that the couch is the same color as the
color
chair merely asserts that the couch and the chair have the same
are instances of the same color.

01

It does not make the claim that the

couch and the chair are one and the same thing.

Terry's point has been
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reaffirmed and further developed in a recent study by D. Gabbay and J.
M. Moravcsik.

Although rejecting Geach's views concerning the rela-

tivity of identity, these authors were interested in finding a use of
"the same as," other than the assertion of identity, to which the

following contentions of Geach would be applicable.

(1) The expression

"is the same as" needs to be expanded into one having the form "is the

same F as," where "F" is some general term.

(2) Different substitu-

tions for "F" will produce different criteria for determining the truth
of a statement having the form "A is the same F as B."

Therefore (3)

some statements of the form "A is the same F as B, but although A is G,
A is not the same G as B" may be true.

We have seen that Locke's views

apparently parallel those of Geach in this respect.

Now Gabbay and

Moravcsik point out, just as we have done, that where the singular
terms in what is apparently an identity statement may be taken as referring to the stages or segments of a temporally persistent whole, the

statement may have to be reinterpreted as an assertion of genidentity

rather than one of identity.

And they go on to say, correctly it

seems to me, that Geach's claims (1) - (3) do apply to statements of
What is true of Geach

genidentity, although not to those of identity.
is, pari passu , true of Locke.

For whether a temporal segment, A, and

smother temporal segment, B, are such that they belong or could belong
to one and the same entity depends on what sort of thing that entity is

and what its essential properties are.
It should be noted here that Gabbay and Moravcsik make a claim that

is stronger than the one I have just put forward.

where the singular terms in a statement of the

foroi

I

suggested that
"A is the same as B

may refer either to temporal parts or to the wholes composed of such
parts, the expansion of that statement into one having the form "A is
the same F as B," permits us to reinterpret that expanded formulation

as "A is a temporal part of the same F of which B is a temporal part,"

and this in turn allows us to consider the statement true under circum-

stances where we might be reluctant to assent to the unqualified claim
that A is identical with B.

But I did not contend that it is ever the

case that we are compelled to make this reinterpretation; it is my view
that in situations where the singular terms are ambiguous as between

temporal parts and wholes, statements which have the form "A is the same
F as B" are open to being understood either as assertions of identity or
as assertions of genidentity.

Gabbay and Iioravcsik seem to think they

have an argument, or rather two arguments, to show that, at least in
some cases, these statements, and even statements of the form "A is the
same as B," must be taken exclusively as assertions of genidentity.

Both arguments are based on the premise that the following statements are equivalent.
(1) The young woman I met eight years ago turned into the senior lecture

whom I met last year.
(2) The young woman I met eight years ago is the same (woman) as the

senior lecturer whom

I

met last year.

Gabbay and Moravcsik argue that since (1) and (2) are equivalent and
since (1) plainly does not express a relation of identity, neither does
(2),

The second argument, again utilizing the equivalence of (1) and

conclusion the
(2) as its starting point, employs as an intermediate
lesult
principle that substitution in one of them should have the same
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as the same substitution in the other.

But if we substitute "the

young woman I met eight years ago" for the occurrences of "the senior
lecturer whom I met last year" in both (1) and (2) and if we interpret
"is the same (woman) as" in (2) as expressing identity, the result is
to make (1) false, while (2) becomes a trivial truth.

So Gabbay and

Moravcsik conclude that "is the same (woman) as" in (2) should not be
regarded as expressing identity and that the referring expressions in
(1) and (2) need to be taken as denoting exclusively temporal stages

of entities rather than the entities themselves.

Since every statement

of the form of (2) would be equivalent to one having the form of (l),
it would seem that any assertion, the singular terms of which may be

construed as referring to temporal parts and having the form "A is the
(2)

same as B" or "A is the same F as B," must be interpreted as making a

claim of genidentity and not of identity.

Both arguments, it appears to me, are flawed by the questionable
character of their first premise, namely, the equivalence of (l) and
.

All statements of the form "the F turned into the G" seem to imply

that before the "turning into something G" the thing that was F was not

a G.

If we say "the prince turned into a frog," surely it can be in-

ferred that prior to the transformation process the prince was net a
frog.

So (1) implies that eight years ago the young woman in question

was not a senior lecturer.

As Gabbay and Moravcsik themselves say, (1/

expresses a process of changing into something or becoming something.
For that very reason it cannot express a relation of identity.
it seems to me, need not express such a process.

But

(2./,

It says something of

I met
the form "the F I met eight years ago is the same (H) as the G
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last year," and statements of this form do not imply that eight years
ago the F that I met was not a G.
(3)

Consider the following statement:

The young woman with whom I had a shipboard romance last summer is

the same (woman) as the assistant professor ox philosophy to whom I

was just introduced.
We cannot infer from (3) that last summer during the period of the ship-

board romance the young woman did not have the rank of assistant professor of philosophy.

Nor can we infer from (2) that the young woman of

eight years ago was not, at that time, already a senior lecturer.

If

this is right, then (1) and (2) have different implications and so cannot be equivalent.

But perhaps Gabbay and Moravcsik are making the assumption that
"young woman"

arid

"senior lecturer," like "little boy" and "old gentle-

man," are incompatible as undated properties, and hence that (2) does

imply that the young woman of eight years ago was not a senior lecturer.
It would imply this not on account of its form, but through the meaning

of the singular terms.

In that case they would not be claiming that all

statements whose referring terms are ambiguous as between temporal wholes
and parts and which have the form "A is the same (F) as B
px-eted as assertions of genid entity.

1

'

must be inter-

They would be claiming that the

latter interpretation is necessary only in those cases where, in addition,
the properties through which the singular terms, A and B, pick out

their referents arc such that no temporally extended object and no

temporal slice could have them both as undated properties.

claim seems to me to be too strong.

let even this

Let us consider a statement in

which the singular terms consist of predicates clearly incompatible with
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each other, if left undated.

I would say that

a statement such as

(4) the little girl I met fifty years ago is the same (person) as the old

woman

I

met last year

is capable of being interpreted either as
(5)

The person-segment which I met fifty years ago and which had the un-

dated property of being a little girl belongs to the same person as does
the person-segment I met last year and which had the undated property of

being an old woman
or as
(6) The person who, when I met her fifty years ago, had the dated proper-

ty of being a little girl is identical with the person who, when I met her

last year, had the dated property of being an old woman.
I can see no reason for thinking that one of these interpretations

is in general more acceptable than the other, although in specific con-

texts they may not appear equally natural.

What, then, should we say

about the equivalence of (4) with (7)?
met
(7) The young woman I met fifty years ago turned into the old woman I

last year.

Simply that (4) is ambiguous as between (5) and (6), and that (7) is
equivalent to (5) but not to (6).

And this leaves us free to consider (6)

as a strict identity statement.
So whether a statement such as (1) is equivalent to something of the
form of (2) depends on the interpretation placed on (2).

It is question-

begging to assume the equivalence of (2) with vl) and then on that baois
to rule out one of the possible interpretations oi

(<;).

In goneial, we

a given
cannot know what statements are equivalent to (or paraphrase)

assertion until we know, on independent grounds, how each of the statements in question should be interpreted and what its implications are.
It is surely mistaken to assume equivalence before the latter issue has

been decided and then to employ the equivalence thus assumed as a
premise in an argument that seeks to establish the unacceptability of

certain interpretations or implications that, apart from this assumption,

would appear entirely plausible.

which Gabbay and Moravcsik adopt.

But this is essentially the procedure

They assume, not unnaturally, that

the singular terms in (1) refer to temporal segments; they too quickly

assume the equivalence of (1) with (2); they then proceed to the claim
that the only acceptable way of interpreting the singular terms of (2) is
to regard them, too, as denoting temporal stages of entities rather than

the entities themselves.

The second argument adduced by Gabbay and Moravcsik in support of
the latter claim seems to run into trouble even if we accept the equiva-

lence of (1) and (2).

It is true that if we interpret the singular terms

as referring to a woman, and not to her temporal stages, and if we substitute in (l) and (2) the expression appearing on the left-hand side of

those statements in place of the one that appears on the right, the result is to make (i) false while (2) becomes a truism.

dicts the assumption that they are equivalent.

And this contra-

But reinterpreting "is

the same (woman) as" as "is a temporal stage of the same woman as is

will not make (2) any the less truistically true.

Under the proposed

substitution, the expressions on the left and right-hand sides of the

statement will refer to the same thing, although on the genidentity rein-

terpretation this thing will now be a segment of the woman rather than
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the person as a temporal whole, and (2) will trivially assert that this

thing belongs to the same personal whole that it belongs to.
If Gabbay and Moravcsik err in one direction in their contention
that a certain class of statements having the form "A is the same (F)
as B" must be interpreted as talk about temporal parts, it seems to me
that they make a mistake in the opposite direction by insisting that

the singular terms of another class of statements having this form be

interpreted exclusively as referring to wholes which are not themselves
stages or parts of more enduring entities.

Specifically, they accept

Chisholm's thesis that "the agent, of an action is not a stage, but the
individual himself."

Presumably they mean that it is forbidden to

ascribe predicates standing for actions to any entity which is a temporal part of an agent.

Thus we may ascribe the property of being a young

woman or a senior lecturer to the various temporal stages making up a
person, but presumably not the properties of singing or listening to a
song, nor even -those of lecturing or listening to a lecture.

If we per-

mitted the latter ascriptions
... there would be a conglomerate of agents, i.e., the various
stages, involved in the performance of such a simple act as the
singing of a song, and embarrassing Questions would emerge concerning the individuation of stages. 3 ®

It is not clear to me that under these circumstances there would be any

embarrassing questions regarding the individuation of stages.

Temporal

stages are individuated by coinciding with different stretches of time.
If one does not believe in an absolute temporal dimension, one may say

that the temjjoral stages of any particular object are individuated by

their coincidence with certain temporal stages of other objects.

The
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temporal segment of my life which extends from September 1 , 1939, until

August 15, 1945, coincides with the temporal parts of the lives of a
great many people such that all these life-segments constitute an exper-

ience of living through World War II.

am inclined to believe that

I

what Gabbay and Moravcsik really want to say is this.

We cannot permit*

every temporal stage that coincides with a part of an action, such as
the singing of a song, to have the property of performing that action.

For if we do, then every such action will turn out to be performed by,
not one, but a multitude cf agents, perhaps an infinite multitude.
to this difficulty there is an answer.

But

We have already suggested that

there is a way of singling out from the multitude of agents the ’’true"
agent.

He is the one and only one who does not have the property of

being a proper temporal part of an agent.
Let us now consider some embarrassing questions that may arise
from the attempt to prohibit us from interpreting definite descriptions

utilizing action predicates, such as "the woman who lectured on Aristotle
last year," as referring' to temporal segments.

It is clear that Gabbay

and Moravcsik think that terms such as "the senior lecturer" may be, and

upon occasion, must be taken as referring to temporal stages.

Obvi-

ously the same would apply to a term like "the youthful singer."

But

apparently the things that are lecturers and singers do not lecture or
sing.

Not only does this seem very strange; it does not even solve the

alleged problem concerning the proliferation of agents.

For if tempo-

ral stages may be lecturers and singers, then inevitably for every

lecture there will be a "conglomerate" of lecturers and for every song

a similar conglomerate of singers.

Moreover, every statement of the

4?

form exemplified by
(9) The girl who sang the solo piece at my high school graduation is

the same (person) as the woman who sang the title role in Aida at the

Metropolitan Opera last night
will be equivalent, according to Gabbay and Moravcsik, to one exhibiting the form instanced by
(10) The girl who sang the solo piece at

ray

high school graduation

turned into the woman who sang the title role in Aida at the Metro-

politan Opera last night.

According to them (10) does not express a relation of identity.
fore neither does (9)*

There-

The singular terras of both (10) and (9)? conse-

quently, must be taken as referring to temporal stages and (9) must be

construed as a statement of genidentity.

So it will be necessary to

ascribe action predicates to temporal stages after all.
What all this indicates, it seems to me, is that the attempt to
demarcate any class of expressions having the form "A is the same (F)
as B" as subject exclusively either to the identity or the genidentity

interpretations is a mistake.
approach,

I

must part company with Gabbay and Moravcsik in this respect.
5.

a.

Despite my general agreement with their

Criteria of Persistence and Identity

Persistence cr iteria .

By now it should be evident that

"criteria of identity," commonly so-called, are not all of the same kind.
Some of these criteria have as theii' function specification of the properties, continued possession of which is essential to the continued

existence of an entity of a certain kind.

Since the properties which are
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essential to the continued existence of one kind of thing are not

necessarily the same as those essential to the continued existence of a
thing of another kind, there are a variety of such criteria, corres-

ponding to the different kinds.

Alternatively, these criteria may be

thought of as answers to questions such as, what are the relevant simi-

larities that must exist between A and B if they are to be regarded as
parts of a temporally persistent individual of kind F?

Thus if the

individual in question is a mass of matter, Locke answers that the

property which A and B must possess in common is the property of containing exactly the same component atoms.

This is equivalent to the

assertion that what is essential to the continued existence of a mass of
matter is that no atom be added to it or subtracted from it.

If A and B

are to count as segments of the same person, however, then Locke replies
that the later segment must contain, or be capable of containing,

states of consciousness that are appropriately similar to states in-

cluded in the earlier segment.

This is equivalent to the claim that it

is essential to the continued existence of a pei'son that he retain the

capacity to remember his past experiences.
different

To put it in a slightly

these criteria profess to perform the following function.

v/ay,

Given an individual, A, consisting of n temporal segments and existing at
times

t.

to t

,

a criterion of the kind we have been discussing tells

us what properties a new temporal segment, existing at some

than

t

,

t

later

must possess if it is to count as a temporal part of the indi-

vidual, A.

Gabbay and Moravcsik call such criteria "persistence

criteria," and say of them that they are "not conditions of identity,
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but conditions individuating chains of temporal stages, in accordance

with essential properties of the particular in question."^"
task they certainly do perform.

The latter

We shall shortly be discussing whether

and by what means persistence criteria are also serviceable as conditions of identity.

The existence of persistence criteria is dependent upon the notion
that individuals have essences, or that there exists for each individual

a non-empty set of properties, continued retention of which is both

necessary and sufficient to its existence.

In Book III of the Essay

Locke takes up the topic of individual essences.

We shall postpone until

Chapter II consideration of the question as to whether what he has to say
there is compatible with the kind of essentialisra that his criteria of

persistence for organisms and persons presuppose.

What is important for

our present discussion is that the properties making up the essence of an

individual are of two kinds.

One kind includes the properties which any

individual must possess to count as a being of a certain sort.

Thus,

according to the traditional definition, nothing can be a human being unless it is both rational and an animal..

tional view, no individual who is

a.

Since, according to this tradi-

human being could survive the loss of

his humanity, it is essential to the continued existence of such a being
that he retain the properties of rationality and animality.

The propex*-

ties constituting the essence of humanity are also part of his individual

essence.

If he loses these, he does not change, he perishes.

But there

are other properties, which an individual human person needs to retain

in order to remain the same individual, or, which comes to the same thing,
in order to stay in existence.

Xt is the business of theories of
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'’personal identity" to state what these properties are.

A theory of

personality, a theory which tells us what properties are necessary and/
or sufficient to qualify a being as a person, specifies what is some-

times referred to as the "Aristotelian essence" of a thing.

Such a

theory provides what would ordinarily be thought of as a definition of
a person.

It states what undated properties must be possessed by any-

thing belonging to the kind, person.

In so doing, it states properties

which must be had by every temporal segment of that being.

But the

special purpose of a persistence criterion is to tell us what relation
must be borne by the later temporal parts of a thing of a given kind to

its earlier temporal parts.

So a theory of "personal identity" will be

concerned with the stipulation of dated properties, or properties that

attach to the later temporal segments of the individual.
Different persistence criteria stipulate different kinds of relations
that must hold between the later parts and the earlier ones.
the relation is one of similarity.

Sometimes

Thus Locke maintains that every

stage of a material compound must have the same component parts as does
the initial stage

same.

,

although the arrangement of parts need not be the

On the other hand, every stage of an organism must display an organ-

isation similar to that of its first stage, but sameness of components is
not required.

Some philosophers have required that the later parts 01 a

material object be spatiotemporally or causally continuous with its
earlier parts.

The point is that the properties, retention of which is

essential to the continued existence of an individual of a certain kind,
are not identical 'with the properties that in the firso place qualified
the individual for membership in that class.

The "individual essence
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of a thing is not the same as its "Aristotelian essence.

For

example, if a physical object is to be reckoned as a compound material

substance, according to Locke, and perhaps to most philosophers, it is

both necessary and sufficient that it consist of more than one atom of
matter.

This is the definition of a mass of matter.

Let us assume that

Atom 1 and Atom 2 are joined together, creating a mass, v/hich we call M.
Possession of two or more atoms is sufficient to qualify M for membership in the class of material compounds.

But Locke holds that if M is

to continue its existence as a member of that class, continued posses-

sion of more than one atom is not sufficient.

For if we add a third

atom to M, or substitute Atom 3 for either Atom 1 or Atom 2, M will
cease to exist.

It is essential to the continued existence of the indi-

vidual, M, that it retain all and only its original atoms.

This is

not identical with the property that is essential for membership in the

class of material compounds.

Similarly, Locke teaches that anything

v/hich thinks and is conscious of its thinking is a person; thinking

and consciousness of thinking are the only attributes essential to par-

ticipation in personhood.

This is his definition of a person.

But in

order to continue to exist as the same person, it is not sufficient
for the being in question to continue to think.

It is the heart of

Locke's controversial theory of personal identity that in addition to
continued thinking, it is necessary (as well as sufficient) that the

being retain the capacity to remember its past thoughts.

In this case

it is particularly plain that the properties specified as necessary and

sufficient to the continued existence of a person are dated properties
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of the temporally whole individual (or undated properties of some, but
not all of his temporal parts).

On the other hand, what would tradi-

tionally be thought of as the definition of a person, that is, the

specification of the "Aristotelian essence" of a person, makes use only
of undated properties, those that must belong to each of the temporal

segments composing the individual.
We may say, if we will, that there are two sorts of definition.

The first kind tells us what properties anything must possess if it is
to count as a member of a certain class.

If the thing in question is

essentially a member of this class, then these properties attach to
es.ch

of its temporal segments.

If its membership in the class is merely

accidental, then it may be that only some of its temporal parts have
these properties.

In any case, a definition in this sense may be

applied either to a whole that is not itself a proper temporal part or
to a segment that is such a proper part.

The second kind of definition

tries to tell us what conditions are necessary and sufficient for a tem-

porally ordered series of parts to qualify as a temporal whole of a certain sort.

If we restrict ourselves to material objects, we may say

that it delimits four-dimensional objects, whereas the first kind of

definition is primarily concerned with the classification of threedimensional entities.

So this second kind of definition is applicable

only to wholes which are made up of temporal parts.,

relation these parts must bear to each other.

It specifies the

That there are two sorts

of definitions to be distinguished along the lines just sketched be-

comes apparent when we consider the following excerpt from Chisholm's

discussion of the definition of a ship.

A
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'^ e m ay say,
•
then, that if a cornpositum A and a compositura N go to make up the same ship, it is necessary but
not sufficient that one of the composita have evolved from
the other. What more is necessary?
We are asking, in effect for a definition of a ship .

But our question may be put somewhat more precisely as
"What is it for two different composita to make up or constitute the same ship?" Actually, of course, we are nor
now interested in trying to fix a definition of a ship,
specifically. We are concerned with the more general
question "What is the relation that physical things, such
as ships, bear to the composita that make them up?" So
let us consider ships only in a very schematic way.
Noah Webster said that ship is "a structure used for
transportation in water." If this were an acceptable
definition, we could say of two composita, A and N, that
they make up or constitute the same ship provided that the
following condition holds:
is (or was) a structure used
for transportation in water and so is N; and every compositura B such that B evolved from A and N evolved from B
was also a structure used for transportation in water. 33

Webster's definition specifies the Aristotelian essence of

a.

ship.

If

Webster's definition had been adequate, it would have been true of
every temporal whole that was essentially a ship that each of its temporal parts was "a structure used for transportation in water."

(The

fact that this is not true is an indication of the inadequacy of the

definition, an inadequacy which Chisholm later points out.)

But it is

plain that the kind ox definition which Chisholm is interested in constructing is of a sort entirely different from Webster's.

Chisholm in-

dicates this when he says:
Actually, of course, we are not now interested in trying
to fix a definition of a ship , specifically. We are concerned with the more general question "What is the relation that physical things, such as ships, bear to the
composita that make them up?"

Chisholm wants to give a persistence criterion for ships; he wants
to specify what relation must hold between earlier and later temporal

stages if these stages are to be regarded as constituting a temporal

whole which is a ship.

Of each stage we can meaningfully inquire

whether it meets Webster’s specifications.

But we cannot ask whether

any such stage, taken by itself, meets the requirements of Chisholm's

definition.

The latter is designed to apply to pairs of stages, or,

with suitable modifications, to a whole composed of such stages.
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The view that for each kind of thing there are properties in addition to those mailing up its Aristotelian essence which every individual!.
of that kind must continue to possess if it is to stay in existence has

been criticized by Baruch Brody.
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Brody seems to think that if there

are any properties, other than those constituting the Aristotelian

essence of a thing, retention of which is necessary for that thing’s

continued existence, then those additional properties are wholly unique
to the individual in question.

They are not shared with other entities

having the same Aristotelian essence.

Thus Brody defines "individuating

essentialism" as signifying "the view that each object has a set of

properties which only it has and it has them essentially."
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He

rightly regards this as a "strange, very strong" type of essentialism.
Since the concept of a persistence criterion, including a criterion of

personal identity, is dependent upon the notion of individual, essence,
it is not strange to find Brody believing that "any theory of personal

identity (or of the identity of any other type of substance)" faces
fundamental problems

It should be remarked, however

other reasons, too, for this belief.

,

that Brody has

Regarding the principles put tor-

ward by Locke which seem to state non-Aristotelian persistence criteria
for the various kinds of entities, Brody

lias

the following to say:
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At first glance it seems that these principles have
the same -import for each member of the class in question,
but, on further analysis, this turns out to be a mistake.
For example, what I have to retain to continue to exist
is different from what you have to retain to continue to
exist.
I must remember some of the things I am now
conscious of experiencing or doing while you must remember some of the things that you are now conscious of
experiencing or doing.
Similarly, different masses must
retain different compositions and different oak trees
must continue to participate in different common lives. °
But all that Brody succeeds in showing,

it seems

to me,

is that in pos-

sessing the properties necessary for the continued existence of things
of its kind, every individual necessarily possesses other, more

specific properties, which are indeed unique to it, and which may be
said to constitute the particular way in which it instantiates the more

general, less determinate properties it shares with other members of
its class.

Thus, according to Locke, it is essential to the continued

existence of a person that he retain the ability to recall his past experiences.

Every person who has a past necessarily has this ability;

without it he could not stay in existence.

Having this ability is a

property common to every member of the class of persons.

But each per-

son manifests this ability by being able to recall the members of a

particular set of experiences, the set of experiences which are his
own.

Naturally these experiences vary from individual to individual.

But at any given point in time it is not essential to the continued

existence of an individual person that he have precisely the experiences which in fact he does have at that time.

What is unique to him,

the precise nature of his experiences, is not essential to him, is not

part of his individual essence.

On the other hand, the properties

essential to him, that is, having experiences and being able to recall
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the previous ones, are not unique to him.

So I think we may conclude

that Brody is wrong in holding that anyone who believes there are indi-

vidual essences is committed to "the view that each object has a set of

properties which only it has and it has them essentially," and that it
is erroneous to try to foist such an opinion on Locke.
b.

Criteria of identity .

Should the criteria for the continued

existence of different sorts of entities, such as persons and organisms,

which we have been discussing also be regarded as criteria of identity?
We shall shortly be discussing the circumstances under which they may

play that role.

At this point it is important to note that criteria of

identity, which are not persistence criteria, do indeed exist.

What is

a criterion of identity, if it is not a persistence criterion?

Are there

more than one?

And if so, what inter-relationships obtain between them?

Certainly the fundamental principle of identity is the familiar one
that A is identical with B just in case A and B have all their properties

in common.
(I)

(x)

(y)

/Tx = y) = (F) (Fx 5 Fy)/

It may be maintained that this is the only principle entitled to the name
of a criterion of identity.

Certainly it alone can be thought of as ex-

pressing the meaning of "identity."

We have seen that it applies

equally to an entity which is considered at different moments of its
existence in time and to one which is considered unner ciifferent descriptions at the same moment of its existence.

It is also clear in what way

this principle differs from a persistence criterion.

Unlike the latter

it is devoid of any references to essential properties* hence it is

powerless to individuate chains of temporal stages or zo tell us whether
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a

temporal part existing at some time later than

tn

is such that it may

belong to an individual composed of n temporal segments and existing
from

until t^.

t

Nor can it inform us whether a dated property of a

certain kind is compatible with another such property.
us,

It will not tell

for example, whether one and the same thing may have the property of

being made of wood at t^ and of being composed of ashes at t^.
So perhaps it is the case that there is one and only one criterion

of identity and that all the other more special criteria for different

kinds of objects should be understood as persistence criteria.

In the

next chapter we shall be discussing the several criteria for individu-

ating objects of different sorts proffered by Locke.

None of them is

identical with the fundamental principle of identity we have been discussing.

Should they all, then, be construed as specifications of the

essential properties which things of a particular kind must retain in

order to continue in existence?

them can be so interpreted.

It will become apparent that not all of

Specifically, Locke will offer a criterion

for the identity of simple substances belonging to the same sort, that
is to say,

for atoms of matter, for simple immaterial substances and for

the unique infinite immaterial substance, which is God.

This criterion

will depend upon the notion that no two or more of such substances, if
they are of the same kind, can exactly occupy the same place at the same
time.

The notion of exact occupation will be clarified later.

The im-

portant point for the purposes of our present discussion is that this

criterion cf identity, like the fundamental principle itself, has
nothing to do with the specification of essential properties, necessary
for the continued existence of an entity of a certain ki.nd.

Locke, of
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course, intends no suggestion that it is necessary for the continued

existence of a finite substance, at any rate, that it continue to
occupy the same place it had previously occupied.

The reference to

occupying the same place at the same time shows that this test is useless for determining whether distinct temporal stages existing at

different and non-overlapping times are stages of the same enduring
whole.

In short, there is no way in which this criterion can be re-

garded as a persistence criterion.

What, then, is its function?

Since

we have (I), the fundamental principle stating the logically necessary
and sufficient conditions of identity, why should we require other

principles stating additional necessary and/or sufficient conditions?
The answer in a nutshell, it seems to me, is that epistemic consid-

erations impel us to develop such additional criteria.

N. L. Wilson says

that (I) "... merely states the syntactical properties of the identity

sign but gives us no help in deciding in a given case whether to declare
two individuals identical

.

Precisely because

(I)

is absolutely uni-

versal in scope, applying to all objects whatsoever no matter what
their kind, it is, as Jack Nelson remarks, "terribly uninteresting and

uninformative."

It is the vacuousness of (I), he points out, that

leads us to seek for other "more restrictive and therefore more infor-

mative requirements for the identity of particular kinds of things

...'

Both Wilson and Nelson are particularly concerned to point out the un-

helpfulness of (I) as applied to material objects picked out as
existing at different times.
little guidance from

whether A and

B,

(I.)

But it is also true that we derive

in those ca.ses in which we are inquiring

existing at the same time, are identical x^ith one
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another

,

that is to say, when we ask whether two undated properties or

two properties having the same date are exemplified by a single object.

For in order to know whether any A and B satisfy the requirements

specified in (I) we need to know whether they have all their properties in common.

But since everything has an indefinitely large or in-

finite number of properties, it is impossible to check every one of
them.
I

intend to leave out of consideration the special problem involved

in the application of (I) that arises from the fact that the properties
of an object include its identity-properties, that is, the fact that

among the properties of A are the properties of being identical with
every object with which it is in fact the same.

If we could not ascer-

tain whether A and B were identical without first discovering whether A
had the property of being identical v/ith B, clearly we should be caught

up in a circular proceeding and the attempt to apply (I) would be

utterly futile.

However, as has already been indicated, it seems to me

that it is not possible that A and B should have all their properties,

other than identity-properties, in common and yet fail to have the prop-

erties of being identical with each other.

I

am willing to accept in

substance the view of Baruch 3rody "... that there is an ontological

dependency here, that identity is a second-order relation that holds between entities a and b just in case they have their first-order properties in common."^

1

But even with this difficulty cleared away, it seems

that we could never assure ourselves that a given A and B possessed all

their first-order properties in common, without first knowing that they

were in fact identical.

6o

What then justifies us in making identity claims?

Surely we are

dependent upon the assumption that if an A and a B of a given kind

possess certain key properties in common, then every property had by
the one will also be had by the other.

Joint possession of these

critical properties, or the lack of it, will then serve as a test for
the identity of the objects in question.

These tests profess to state

the sufficient and necessary conditions which an A and a B of a certain

sort must meet if they are to be identical in the full sense.
the following form.

They have

If A and B are things of kind F, then there is some

property, G, such that A and B both possess it if and only if A and B

possess all their properties in common.

Following Locke's lead, it has,

for example, been widely accepted that if A and B are material objects,

then there is a place which A and B exactly occupy at the same time if
and only if A and B are identical.

In theory there is no reason why

there should not be chains of such criteria.

There may, for example, be

some other property, H, such that A and B both have it if and only if

they both possess G*

Adding on another such link to the chain of tests

will have a point just in those cases where it is epistemica'lly easier
to establish whether A and B are both H than to determine if they are

both G.

A failure to understand the function of tests of identity and
their relationship to the fundamental principle which alone can be said
to give che meaning of identity bedevils nearly the whole of Brody's

critique of Locke's system of criteria for persistence and identity.

This failure is particularly strange because in an earlier article we
find Brody, in the course of denying that there is any philosophical

6l

problem about coming to know that A and B are identical, saying:

Why couldn't we, by examining only some of the properties of both a and Is and finding that they have them in
common, be justified in concluding that they have all
their properties in common and are identical. Here Brody seems to have the notion of tests of identity and to under-

stand their function.

But in his article on Locke, which is supposed

to be an application to a concrete example of the principles set forth
in the article from which the foregoing quotation was extracted, this

understanding appears to have vanished.

The leading theme of his dis-

cussion of Locke is that any philosopher who accepts a plurality of
identity criteria is "in trouble" and is "making commitments whose jus-

tification is very unclear."
The problem, in its most general form, is a simple one.
If you have (because of the adoption of the identity of
is
indiscernibles) a view that a certain condition
sufficient for identity, then the adoption of the view
that some other condition
is necessary for identity
of a certain type of entity commits you to the claim
that C can be satisfied by entities of that type only
4
when C is. Similarly, if you have (because of Leibniz'
is necessary for
Lav?) a view that a certain condition
identity, then the adoption of the vief? that some other
condition
is sufficient for identity of a certain
can be
type of entity commits you to the claim that
is.
satisfied by entities of that type only when
Since these conditions often seem unrelated, ahd. consequently, these commitments often seem to be unjustified,
this result casts doubt upon theories of identity that
contain both of these conditions. 4^
In fact, there is no reason to be disturbed by the proliferation
of logically necessary and/or sufficient conditions for identity.

Nelson correctly points out "It should be clear that having one logically necessary and sufficient condition for the holding of some relation does not preclude there being more specific conditions for that
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relation's holding."

It will, of course, be the case that if there

are two distinct conditions, each of them logically necessary and

sufficient for the holding of a certain relation, then they will be

equivalent to each other.
is.

The one will be met just in case the other

Brody’s suggestion that there might be two necessary and sufficient

conditions for the identity of objects of a certain type and that these

conditions might be logically unrelated to each other is simply impossible.

If they are unrelated, then they are not both of them necessary

and sufficient conditions of identity.

The same applies to any pair of

conditions, one of which is sufficient and the other necessary.
(I), the criterion of identity which is of universal applicability,

is necessarily the contradictory of the criterion of non-identity.

Every

pair of objects, A and B, must stand to each other either in the relation of identity or non-identity, but not both.

An epistemic test for

identity, however, need not be the contradictory of an epistemic test
for the non-identity of the thing in question.

Thus the test for the non-

identity of material objects A and B is the existence of a place which at
some time is occupied by A and not by B.

This is not the contradictory

of the criterion for their identity which was suggested above.

So if

one inspects only the logical form of these tests, it might seem that
some pair of material objects could satisfy both the criterion of iden-

tity

and.

that ox non-identity.

But the nature of material objects is

thought to be such that if any A and B exactly occupy the same place at
the same time, it follows that at every moment of their existence, they

exactly occupy the same place.

It follows further that it as impcssi—
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ble for there to be a place which at some time is occupied by one of

them and not ny the other.

Hence any pair of material objects which

satisfies the test of identity will necessarily satisfy a further criterion which is the contradictory of the test of non-identity.

In gen-

eral, if tests for identity and non-identity are properly framed, it

will never be possible for any pair of objects of the relevant kind
to meet them both.

We do not wish to require, however, that the tests

of identity and non-identity themselves be contradictories, since the

purpose of devising such tests is precisely to isolate the unique property, or at any rate the smallest cluster of properties, common posses-

sion of v/hich will serve to guarantee the identity or non-identity of
the objects in question.

Characteristically, then, the criteria of

identity and non-identity will both be shorn of universal quantifiers,
and hence they will lack the proper logical form to be contradictories.
One of the morals to be drawn from the preceding discussion is

When confronted with a formula of the form, "A is the same F as B

this.

if and only if A and B both possess G (are similar in respect G)" with-

out investigating the content of the right-hand side of the formula one

cannot tell \\rhether one is being presented v/ith a test for identity or
a persistence criterion that will enable one to determine whether or

not distinct temporal segments belong to a single temporally persistent

entity.
c

Relatio n between the two kinds of

c riteria .

What is the rela-

tion between tests or criteria for identity and persistence criteria
that serve to individuate chains of temporal stages

i

Are there any cir-

cumstances under which the latter are suited to specify conditions of
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identity?

Contrary to the suggestion of Gabbay and Moravcsik, it would

seem that there are.

Every identity statement which picks out its sub-

jects by means of dated properties and which consequently has the form
"(1) There is something, A, which has F^, (2) there is something, B,

which has

G^.'

and (3) A = B" is equivalent to one which asserts (1) the

existence of a temporal segment coinciding with

t

and having F as an un-

dated property, (2) the existence of another temporal segment coinciding

with t'and having G as an undated property and (3) the fact that these
two segments are parts of a single temporally extended whole.

cases where

t =

In those

t',the relation of identity is asserted to hold, not

merely between the wholes picked out by means of dated properties, but
also between the temporal segments coinciding with

t

and t'» If we say

that there is a person who was King of England during 1936, a person who

had a love affair with Mrs. Wallis Simpson during 1936 and that these per-

sons are one and the same, this is equivalent to saying that there is a

person segment coinciding with the year 1936 which has the property of
being King of England and that this temporal part of a person is identical
with the person segment coinciding with 1936 that has the property of

being engaged in a love affair with Mrs. Simpson.

In general, two tempo-

ral stages, A and B, are stages of the same object if and only if there

exists a single temporally extended entity which has as its properties
all the properties of A and all the properties of B, excluding those,

such as being a proper temporal part, which flow from their nature as

temporal segments.
for
So all persistence criteria that specify necessary conditions
the continued existence of objects of a certain sort and that conse-
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quently are useful for determining whether a given temporal segment may

possibly belong to a given temporal whole also have the function of determining whether the properties specified by different temporal predicates are compatible as properties belonging to a single enduring entity
of a certain kind.

The persistence criterion for objects such as

tables, for example, would presumably lay it down that no table can be

made of wood at

t

and be composed of ashes at any time later than t, but

the persistence criterion for objects of another sort, collections of

particles, perhaps, might not find these predicates incompatible.

So a

persistence criterion which specifies properties as essential to the continuance of an individual of a given kind will tell us whether an A which
has

F.
T

can be identical with a B which has

'l

.

G.,

C

For example, it will

2

tell us that an individual who is a young woman at

can be identical

with an individual who is a senior lecturer at t^ , but that, Greek
mythology notwithstanding, nothing can be a young woman at
tree at t 0 .

t^

and a laurel

It should be noted that some properties that could not con-

sistently be assigned to a single entity if they bore the same date (if
they were regarded as undated properties of a single temporal segment of
that entity) can be so assigned if they bear different dates and if the

dates are related to each other in the right order and are appropriately
spaced.

Examples are "little boy" and "old gentleman."

Nothing can

have both of these either as undated properties or as dated properties

with exactly the same dates.

Nothing can have the second property at a

time earlier than the time at which it has the first, and there

must,

be a

temporal distance of an appropriate length separating the date attached
to the property of being a little boy and that attached to tne property
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of being an old gentleman.

On the other hand, there are some properties

which may not be ascribed to a single individual if they bear different
dates, but which are compatible if their dates coincide.

An example

might be the property of being an infant and the property of being less

than a

year- old.

Given that an individual possesses certain properties at a certain
date, it may follow necessarily that he possesses or does not possess

certain other properties both at that date and at other dates.
necessity in question may be either logical or natural.

The

Given that some-

thing is a full-grown horse at t, it is analytically impossible for that

thing to be a colt at t.

The meaning of the terms "full-grown horse"

and "colt" rule out the possibility of those terms being correctly

applied, without having different dates attached to them, to the same object.

But given that something is a full-grown horse at t, it is

natural or causal necessity which dictates that the thing in question

was a colt at some time previous to
any time later than

t.

t

and that it will not be a colt at

"Full-grown horse at t" and "colt at t" are

temporal predicates which are analytically inconsistent.

But "full-

grown horse at t" and "colt at some time later than t" or "not a colt at
any time previous to t" are rendered incompatible predicates by the
of nature.

j.aws

It is one of the jobs of a persistence criterion to tell us,

concerning differently dated temporal predicates, whether they may be
consistently assigned to an entity of a particular sort.

In so aoing

-.t

lays down necessary conditions for the truth of certain kinds of identity statements having the form "the A which has

F.
x

- the B

which has G

*

2

6?

Now let us consider a persistence criterion which lays down specifi-

cations that are both necessary and sufficient to insure that any temporal part. A, which meets them belongs to a certain temporal whole, W,
not itself a proper temporal part.

If W and W' belong to the same kind,

V,

also not a proper temporal part, will

does it follow that any whole,

have as one of its own temporal segments an A which meets these specifications if and only if W' is identical with W?

fications by "F."

Let us represent the speci-

If the answer to the foregoing question is affirma-

tive, then it will follov; that any temporal whole,

W,

having F as a dated

property, will be identical with any whole W of the sane kind which also

has F as a dated property, no matter v/hether the dates in question are
If this holds true, then a persistence criterion

the same or different.

of the kind we have been discussing would obviously be well suited to

stipulate conditions of identity for wholes which are not themselves tem-

poral parts, whether the entities under consideration are being picked out
by properties v/hich have dates that are the same, or by ones having different dates.

that it can.

But can the question be affirmatively answered?

It would seem

Let us look at a specific example.

According to Locke, a collection of atoms continues to exist just
so long as its components remain the same.

In other words, every such

collection must be made up of temporal parts such that each part has exactly the same atomic components as every other part
sider a particular collection of atoms, C.

«

Now let us con-

The persistence criterion

for such collections permits us to stipulate that a temporal segment, A,

is composed of atoms

a.

,

a^,

»».,

a.^

if and only if A is a temporal part
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of C*

Then C consists of all the temporal segments so composed and only

of those.

It follows that any collection of atoms, C', which has a tempo-

ral segment composed of atoms a^, a^,

a^ is identical with C, pro-

vided that C' is a temporal whole and is not itself a proper part of
more inclusive temporal whole.

any-

For if 0 s has some temporal segment com-

posed of a^, a^, ..., a^, then each of its temporal parts must be similarly composed.

But every temporal segment having that composition is a
is identical with some temporal

part of C.

So each temporal part of C

part of C.

This shows that C' is either a proper temporal part of C, or

else it is identical with C.

1

But we have stipulated that

proper temporal part of any larger whole.
tical with C.

C

is not a

So it follows that C* is iden-

The argument employed in this case is applicable to any

situation where possession of a property, F, is both necessary and
sufficient to insure that a temporal segment. A, belongs to a whole , W.
In all such cases it will be true that if

W

is of the same kind as W

and is not itself a proper temporal part, then W’ has a temporal segment
that is F if and only if

V/'

= W.

But the success of the argument in this case is dependent on the
fact that the persistence criterion for collections of atoms demands
that every temporal part of such a collection have exactly the same compos

nents as every other temporal part.

It was this feature of the criteri-

on which permitted us to say of an arbitrary collection of atoms, C,
that a temporal segment has a particular atomic composition it and only
if it belongs to C.

It would be a mistake to assume that this feature

is possessed by every persistence criterion which specifies necessary

and sufficient conditions for the co-membership of two temporal segments
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in a single temporal series that constitute a whole.

For some such cri-

teria stipulate the sort of relation that must hold between such segments, without singling out a property that is required to attach to

every temporal part considered individually.

We shall see that Locke is

committed to the view that a person continues to exist just so long as
he retains the ability to recall his past experiences.

So if A is a

temporal segment of a person which has the property of having an experience, £, and B is a temporal segment of a person which has the property

of being able to recall

then A and B belong to the same person, P.

Let "F" stand for the property of having the experience, e, and ”G" for
the property of being able to remember eu

Then Locke's persistence cri-

terion for persons enables us to assert the truth of an identity statement of the form "the A which has

F_,

*1

= the B which has G^
‘2

But this

criterion does not stipulate that there is some property, F, which is

both necessary and sufficient to insure that any arbitrarily selected
temporal segment possessing it belongs to a given person, P.

In the case

of our example, for instance, it is not necessary that the temporal segment, A, have the property of being able to recall its own experience,

and it is not necessary that B possess the property of having the exSo if a particular person-segment, A, coinciding with t,

perience,

belongs to

a.

person-whole, P, by virtue of the fact that it remembers

the experiences had by segments of P coinciding with times earlier than
a.

temporal

pant) which has A as its own temporal part is identical v/ith P.

It does

t,

it cannot be inferred that a person-whole, P'

,

(not itself

not follow from the fact that P' possesses one part which remembers the

experiences of P that each of the parts of P' remembers the experiences
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of P.

And so there is no way to
^f P*

shov;

that every part of P' must be a

Thus it is possibie that persons P and P* be distinct while

possessing a temporal part in common.

This circumstance will turn out

to be of great importance for Locke's theory of persons.
Is a persistence criterion of any use in determining the identity

or diversity of entities which are picked out by properties whose dates
do not differ?

Well, among the properties which a thing of a given

kind must retain in order to continue to exist are those making up its
Aristotelian essence.

If B is to be identical with A, it is obvious

that, no matter how B is described, B must possess every propez’ty in-

eluded in the Aristotelian, essence of A.

So it may be useful to know

what these essential properties of A are in determining whether a B
that is picked out by a property whose date does not differ from the

date of the property by which A is picked out can be identical with A.
If we want to determine whether the tallest basketball player in America
is identical with the tallest man in the world, and if we know that

rationality is essential to the latter, it might be appropriate to inquire if that property is possessed by the basketball player.

After all,

it is neither logically nor physically impossible that the basketball

player should be a gorilla.

Moreover, we have just seen that a persist-

ence criterion which lays down a property which is sufficient, as well
as necessary, to insure that any temporal part possessing it will belong
to a given temporal whole works just as well for entities that are

picked out by properties whose dales do not differ as for those singled
out by dated properties with different dates.

However, it is in general true that the special purpose of a persist"
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ence criterion is to say what relation must be borne by the later temporal parts of a temporally extended object to its earlier parts.

An ex-

ample is the requirement that the temporal parts of a material object
be spatiotemporally or causally continuous.

If all we know about A is

that it is F at t, and all we know about B is that it is G at t, our in-

formation about both these entities is limited to temporal segments which
coincide with the same time.

And the requirement that every temporal

part of an entity be continuous with its preceding temporal part does
not help us to compare temporal parts that coincide with the same time.

Suppose we want to know if the mountain which at present is called Everest
by English speaking people is the sane as the one now called Gaurisanker
by speakers of Hindu.

The criterion which will be of assistance in a

case like this is one that has nothing to do with stipulating conditions
for the persistence of mountains.

It is the test for identity which stipu-

lates that if A and B are material objects, then there is a place which
they occupy at the same time if and only if they have all their properties in common.

In order to find out if Everest is identical with

Gaurisanker we look at a map to see if the place in which the one is
situated is the same as the place in which the other has its location.
What is true of Everest and Gaurisanker will in general apply to determinations of the truth of identity statements about material objects

which have the form "the A which has F

= the
t

l

B which has

G^_

'1

»"
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CHAPTER

II

SIMPLE SUBSTANCES, MASSES OF MATTER AND ORGANISMS

Locke proposes distinct "criteria of identity" for four different

kinds of beings.

They are (1) simple substances (both material and im-

material), (2) masses of matter, (3) living organisms and (4) persons.
I

have already suggested that the criterion for simple substances is a

true identity criterion, having the form "if A and B are of kind F,

then A and B both possess G if and only if A and B are identical."

It

is not a persistence criterion; it has nothing to do with the specifica-

tion of properties essential to the continued existence of an individual
of a given kind.

It is an epistemic test designed to determine whether

an A and a B, both of them temporally extended .individuals, are the same

object or different objects.

It is useful primarily on those occasions

when two material objects (or two simple substances) axe picked out
properties that are either dateless or have the same dates.

by-

The cri-

teria for the other three kinds of entities are persistence criteria.

Their chief function is

.to

determine whether two or .more temporal,

stages are stages of the same object, but they have the limited usefulness in deciding questions concerning the identity or diversity of tempo

ral wholes that was described at the end of the last chapter.

They are

helpful as identity criteria mainly when the properties by which the

temporally extended objects are singled out have different dates.
1.

Simple Substances

Implicit in Locke s discussion of the identity and diversity of sub
*

stances is a division of substances into two categories, simple and com-
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pound*

Of simple substances there are three sorts, namely, God,

finite souls and particles of matter.

For all three kinds, identity

is defined primarily in terms of spatial location.

It should be

pointed out that Locke maintains that every kind of substance, whether
material or spiritual, occupies space and is in place.

His theory that

finite souls occupy space and are capable of motion appears to be based

on the fact that each human soul can operate only on its own body, and
not on bodies in places distant from its own.

Locke takes this as an

indication that the soul is in the same place as its body.

2

There is no

contradiction, he thinks, in a spiritual substance occupying the same

place at the same time as a material substance*

Furthermore, God, who

is the unique infinite immaterial substance, is spatially and temporally

omnipresent and hence coexists in the same places at the same times with

both atoms of matter and individual souls.

So some places are occupied

at the same time by both an infinite and a finite spiritual substance.

According to Locke this assertion is also free from inconsistency.

But

when we confine ourselves to considering substances of a particular sort,
that is to say, infinite spiritual substance, finite spiritual substance
or material substance then spatial location at a given time can serve as

an individuating principle.

This is because no two substances of the
Why

same kind are capable of occupying the same place at the same time.

Locke should think that it is impossible for two finite immaterial substances, i.e., two souls, to occupy the same place at the same time may

seem difficult to understand, but we cannot pursue the matter further
here.

V/e

shall later observe

that his attitude toward the topic of

spiritual substance is marked by a certain ironic ambivalence, to say

>-he
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very least.

A more fundamental criticism has been raised by Baruch Brody.
Brody believes that Locke faces special problems because of his belief
that location in a given place at a given time is an adequate individ-

uating principle only v;hen applied to individuals which belong to the
same substantial

kind.*,

"Locke is saying that x and

£ are identical

if they are in the same

places at the same times and have certain properties (the ones that make
them God, or a finite spirit, or a particle of matter) in common.

question that naturally arises is t
What reason is there to suppose

The

What makes these properties special?

that,

the common possession of these prop-

erties, and not others, makes it impossible for two objects to be in the

same place at the same time?"

3

In the next paragraph Brody says that Locke's theory runs "into

trouble just because it picks out certain properties as special" and

suggests that the way to avoid such problems is to "treat all properties
equally."

He briefly considers the possibility of reformulating Locke's

criterion in such a way as to permit it to assert the identity of any x
and v that occupy the same place at the same time.

But he rejects this

alternative on the grounds that, after all, Locke was correct in thinking that certain entities of different types can be in the same place

simultaneously.

"After all, my body and I are in the same place at the

same time, but they cannot be identical since there are some properties
that they do not have in common."

One might think that this statement

constitutes a recognition of what makes some properties "special" in the
sense that "the common possession of these properties, and not others,

8o

makes it impossible for two objects to be in the same place at the same
time."

But Brody apparently does not see it in this light.

His final,

reformulation of Locke's sufficient condition for the identity of
simple substances is as follows:

"x and

£ are identical

if they are in

the same place at the same time and have all their properties in

common."
He considers this to be "the most plausible version for a general

theory of identity like Locke's, although, unfortunately, it is not the
one that Locke actually adopted."

Brody's version of "a general theory of identity" states as the
sufficient condition for the identity of any substances, x and Zs iheir

indiscernibility plus their simultaneous location in a given place.

The first and most obvious comment is that if one is stipulating the indiscernibility of x and j as a sufficient condition of their identity,
it is wholly redundant to add to that stipulation any ether condition

whatsoever.

If x and

possess all their properties in common, then

clearly one of them will not have the property of being in a certain
place at a given time unless the other likewise possesses it.

So Brody

could and should simplify his sufficient condition by removing the re-

quirement that x and ^ be in the same place at tne same time.

So sim-

plified, his "general theory of identity" turns out to be the principle
of the identity of indiscernibles.

As a restatement ox one half oi the

fundamental principle ox identity, this formulation is faultless.

But

as an epistemic test for the identity of things of a particular kind, it
is absolutely futile.

What Locke was properly in quest of was pre-

cisely a criterion adequate to inform as when simple substances, x and

^

8l

have all their properties in common.

Brody shows little understand-

ing of the nature of this undertaking.

Concerning criteria of identity for simple substances, Locke has
the following to say:
... one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence,
nor two things one beginning; it being impossible for
two things of the same kind to be or exist in the same
instant, in the very same place; or one and the same thing
in different places. That, therefore, that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that v/hich had a different
beginning in time and place from that, is not the same,
but diverse.

Where "A” and "B" are replaceable exclusively by names of simple sub-

stances of the same sort, we may render "... it being impossible for two
things of the same kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very
same place ..." as:
(1)

A/ 3 & /T3

t)

(3p)

(A occupies p at t and B occupies p at t)/j.

(1) provides a fairly literal rendering of Locke's words, but it is

clearly a defective principle, and as such, perhaps should not be regarded as capturing his intent.
of indeterminate magnitude.

A "place" occupies a spatial location

There seems to be no reason why a "place"

should not be large enough to accommodate more than one atom, or for
that matter, more than one physical object of any finite magnitude.
same
Two stars, for example, can be said to be in the same place at the

time.

They are situated in the same galaxy.

Therefore, in order to do

concept
justice to Locke's intentions, it seems necessary to develop a
of total occupation.

We may say that a simple substance, A, totally

such that A
occupies a place, P, at t if and only if every part of P is
is in it at t.

Then it will be reasonable to assert that distinct
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Bimple substances of the same sort cannot totally occupy
the same place
au the same time.

Perhaps this was what Locke intended to convey
by

his statement that two things of the same kind could not
exist "in the
same instant, in the very same place."

So we may amend (1) to read as

follows;
(2)

“-0

/G 1)

f B) and

{(A

(dp) (A totally occupies p at t and B

totally occupies p at t)77.^

From chis principle we can derive, not indeed a criterion providing the
necessary and sufficient conditions of identity for simple substances,
but a statement of the sufficient condition.
(4)
(3)

Z(3t)

(3

p)

(A totally occupies p at t and B totally occupies
p at t)7

(A = B).

We may also derive a statement of the necessary condition for the diver-

sity of simple substances of the same sort.
(A

f

B)-Z>

™

/Gt) Gp)

(A totally occupies p at t and B totally

occupies p at t)/.
(4)

entails (5).

(5)

(A

f B)~^

/Tt) (p) (A totally occupies p at t -y B does not totally

occupy p at

7

tj)/

.

The most straightforward way of expressing the statement that it is

impossible for one and the same thing to exist in different places at
the same instant would seem to be as follows;
(6)

™

OfJ A

- b)

Sc

{(3t) (3p) (3 p

’

>

</(p

f o’)

at t & B totally occupies p* at t)/f

S'.

(A totally occupies p

,

'~~>J

So formulated, the principle would serve, for example, to eliminate the

possibility that a given soul might inhabit more than one body at any
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one time, and this is something Locke presumably would wish to do.

How-

ever, among Locke's teachings there is a doctrine which is a stunning

counter-example to (6).

God is in every place at every time.

According to (6), God would fail to be self-identical.

In addition,

there is a difficulty in connection with atoms of matter.

According to

Locke, every material particle, no matter how small, possesses the prop-

erty of being extended.

g

Hence there is a possibility of its totally

occupying more than one spatial location at a given time.

In view of

these considerations, it does not seem likely that Locke intended to

assert (6), even although (6) appears to be the most direct and literal

formulation of his verbal statement.

Once again, in order to capture

his intent it seems necessary to elucidate a new concept, that of being

limited or confined to the occupation of a certain place.

Let us say

that a substance A is limited to the occupation of a place, p, at t if

and only if there is no place p' such that (a) no part of p* is in-

cluded in p and (b) A is in any part of p' at t.
the notion of exact occupation.

A exactly occupies a place, p, at

and only if (a) A totally occupies p at

occupation of p at t.

We may then formulate

t

t

if

and (b) A is limited to the

Using this concept, we shall reformulate (6) as

follows s
(7)

—

(}

- 3) and C( 3t)

Gp) Gp’) /fp /

P') and (A exactly

occupies p at t and B exactly occupies p* at

t)/.

Like (6), (7) is a fairly straightforward rendering of Locke's actual
words, but unlike (6), it states a principle that is both true and that

would unquestionably be acceptable to Locke.

The claim that it makes,

however, turns out upon examination to be extremely weak.

For it A and

B exactly occupy distinct places at the same time, it will follow that
at one and the same time there is some place totally occupied by the one

which is not totally occupied by the other.

Now every substance,

according to Locke, necessarily occupies some place.

So if there is a

place which at a given time is totally occupied by A and not by B, then
there is a place v/hich at that time is exactly occupied by B and it is
not the same as the place exactly occupied by A.

Consequently, the

assertion that A and B at the same time exactly occupy places which are
distinct is equivalent to the statement that there is some place which
at a given time is totally occupied by A and not by B

<pr

vice versa).

So the claim that A and B cannot be identical while exactly occupying
(8)

distinct places at the same time amounts to no more than a version of
the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals.

For the sake of

bringing (?) into line with principles (2) - (5), we may restate it, in
a slightly abbreviated form, as follows:

—

(^>

q(A = B) and /C3t) (dp) (A totally occupies p at

not totally occupy p at

t)/tj

t

and B does

.

(8) yields the following sufficient condition for the non-identity of

simple substances of the same sort.
(9) /JBt) (dp)

(A totally occupies p at t and B does not totally occupy

p at t2? -2

(A

/ B),

It also yields a necessary condition for their identity.

(10)

(A - B)

— ZT3t)

totally occupy p at

(3p)

t)A

(10) is equivalent to (11).

(A totally occiipies p at t and B does net

)
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(

(A-B)

11

p at

Z(t) (p) (A totally occupies p at

B totally

t

ty.

As we have seen, Locke subscribes to the doctrine that every substance,
no matter what its kind, necessarily occupies space.

Hence, where "A"

is replaceable by the name of any substance, he would assent to the

following statement.
(12) (3t) (dp) (A totally occupies p at t).

When we conjoin (12) with the consequent of (11), we may infer:
(13) (3t) (3p) (A totally occupies p at

t

and B totally occupies p at t).

So the result of combining (11) and (12) is a new statement of the neces-

sary condition for the identity of simple substances of the same sort.
(1h) (A = B)

/(3t) (3p) (A totally occupies p at

occupies p at

t

t

and B totally

V«

Combining (l4) with (3) enables us to state a full criterion of the necessary and sufficient conditions of identity for simple substances.

When

"A" and "B" are replaceable exclusively by names of simple substances of

the same sort, the following biconditional will hold.
(15) (A = B)

/T3t ) (3p) (A totally occupies p at

4“^

occupies p at

t

and B totally

t_)7»

Similarly, the consequence of conjoining (12) with (5) is another statement of the necessary condition for the diversity of simple substances
of the same kind.
(

16 )

(A

/ B)

/(3t)

Op)

totally occupy p at
So
and.

(

(A totally occupies p at t and B does not

t,Y7.

9 ) may be transformed into a biconditional asserting the necessary

sufficient conditions for the diversity of simple substances.
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Where "A" and "B" are replaceable exclusively by names of simple substances of the ssme sort, the following will be trueB

(17) (A

/T3t) (Jp) (A totally occupies p at

t

and B does not

totally occupy p at t)/.
It may be noted that the necessary condition for the identity of

simple substances that would have been derivable from (6), when conjoined with (12), would have failed to yield (14).

Hence, if we had

accepted (6) as the correct formulation of Locke's statement that it is
impossible for one and the same thing to exist in different places at
the same instant, we would have had no legitimate basis for transforming
(3) into the biconditional,

(15), and thus we would not have been able

to obtain a full criterion for the identity of simple substances of the

sane sort.

Similarly., (16)

,

which is derivable from the conjunction of

(12) and (5), would not have legitimated turning the sufficient condi-

tion for diversity derivable from (6) into a biconditional.

But, in any

case, such a transformation would have led to undesirable consequences.

For if we were to make existing at different places at the same time a

necessary condition for the non-identity of A and B, we should not be
able to assert that substances with non-overlapping life spans were
diverse.

Every finite spirit and every atom of matter has its beginning;

any of them could be annihilated at any time if it were God's pleasure to
do so.

Consequently the possibility of such non-overlapping life spans

for simple substances cannot be ruled out.

There is yet another reason why it is preferable to derive the criterion of non-identity from (8) rather than from (6).

The necessary

and sufficient condition for identity presented in (15) and the neces-

.
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sary and sufficient condition for non-identity presented in (1?) are
not contradictories.

However, (11) tells us that any simple substances,

A and B, which satisfy the conditions for identity stipulated in (15)

will necessarily satisfy a further condition, (l8).
(18) (t) (p) (A totally occupies p at t
(

B totally occupies p at t)„

18 ) is the contradictory of the necessary and sufficient condition of

non-identity presented in (17),
Similarly, if A and B satisfy the necessary and sufficient condition pre-

sented in (17), then according to (5) they w ill necessarily satisfy (19).
(19) (t) (p) (A totally occupies p at t

^

B does not totally occupy p

at t)
(19) is the contradictory of the necessary and sufficient condition pro-

vided in (15),

Consequently it is impossible that any pair of simple

substances of the same sort should ever satisfy both the criterion of

identity and that of non-identity.

The relation between the necessary and

sufficient conditions presented in (15) and (1?) exemplifies one kind of

logical relationship which in Chapter I we argued it is proper for
tests of identity and non-identity to exhibit.

But this is not true of

the relation holding between the conditions for identity and diversity

which could be derived from combining (6) with (2).

The universally

quantified version of the sufficient condition for diversity derivable
from (6) is not the contradictory of the sufficient condition of identity

presented in (3).

Nor is it the case that any A and B satisfying the

sufficient condition, of diversity derivable from (6) would necessarily

satisfy the universally quantified version of that condition.
It is readily apparent that Locke's test of identity for simple sub-

stances cannot be regarded as a genidentity criterion determining

whether or not distinct temporal segments belong to a single persisting
whole.

For if two temporal segments do not overlap, then, even if they

belong to the same persisting individual, there is no place which they
occupy at the same time.

They cannot meet the necessary and sufficient

condition specified in (15).

Perhaps less apparent, but equally impor-

tant, is the fact that Locke's criterion for the identity of simple sub-

stances also fails to serve as a true identity criterion for temporal
segments.

This is because Locke proceeds on the assumption that spatio-

temporal overlapping on the part of distinct simple substances belonging
to the same sort is an impossibility.

We have already seen that overlap-

ping on the part of temporal segments of the same object is always a possibility.

Any overlapping but non-identical pair of temporal stages of

the same object meets the necessary and sufficient condition for identity

laid

doxtfn

in (15)

,

since there is a time at which its members both

totally occupy the same place.

At the same time these members meet the

requirement for diversity stipulated in (17), for there is a time at

which one of them totally occupies a place that the other does not
totally occupy.

In order to make Locke's identity criterion applicable

to temporal segments of objects, we should need to reinterpret (2) along

the following lines;
(20)

—
t

(}

£(A / B) and /Jt) (p) (A totally occupies p at (or during)
B totally occupies p at (or during)

As long as we retain (2) and the identity criterion that is derived from
it, we shall be compelled to stipulate that it is not permissible to

substitute for "A" and "B" in (l) - (19) the names of proper temporal

:
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parts of simple substances*
Let us turn now to Locke's principles concerning the beginnings of

existence.

First of all, we need a definition of "beginning."

may be said to begin at

t if

A thing

and only if it exists at t and did not

exist at the time immediately preceding t.

This is the broad sense of

"beginning" which makes it permissible for us to say that things

"begin again," or that they resume an interrupted existence.

We may

also define a strict or absolute sense of "beginning," according to

which a thing may be said to begin at
time previous to t„

t

only if it never existed at any

Let us say, then, that a substance, A, begins in p

at t if and only if (1) A totally occupies p at t, (2) there is a period,
t ~

n to t, such that every moment in it is prior to

t and such that

there is no time that is both later than any moment in this period and

also earlier than

t

and (3) during t - n to

that it is totally occupied by A.

ginning in p at

t

t

there is no place such

A substance. A, has an absolute be-

if and only if A totally occupies p at t and there is

no place such that it was totally occupied by A at any time earlier than
t.

Naturally, no substance can have more than one absolute beginning.

Now Locke's principle that

txro

things cannot have one beginning v/ill

hold good no matter which interpretation of "beginning" is chosen, for
in either case, if a substance begins in p, it totally occupies p.

The principle may be expressed as follows
(21)

=»•

A

|^(A

/

5) & /C3t) (3p) (A has its beginning in p at t & B has

its beginning in p at

t)_/j

•

From (21) we may derive another sufficient condition of identity:
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(22)

ZGt)

(3

p) (A has its beginning in p at t & B has its beginning in

p at t)/

(A = B).

Since the antecedent of (22) implies the antecedent of
rivable from (3)o
tional

(22) is de-

,

Note that we cannot transform (22) into a bicondi-

preserve its truth.

and.

(35)

If we made beginning in the same place

at the same time a necessary, as well as a sufficient, condition of

identity, eternal substances, e.g., God, would fail to be self-identical.

There are serious difficulties concerning the proper interpretation of Locke's principle that one thing cannot have two beginnings of
existence.

This teaching has often been regarded as asserting that

nothing which has ceased to exist can at a later point of time resume
its existence or that there can be no secondary beginnings.

choice of words

does.,

7

indeed, seem to suggest this reading.

Locke's
If this is

what he meant to say, the principle should be expressed as foilowss
(23)

0

((A = B) & .((3t) Gt')

(3

p)

Gp') /Ta has its beginning in p

at t & B has its beginning in p* at t') & (T

/

t'

or p Z v'l/

According to (23) all beginnings of substances are absolute beginnings.
(23) yields (2*+) as a sufficient condition of diversity for simple

substances.
(2k)

i

Gt) (3f) Gp)

(3p')

/Ta has its beginning in p at

beginning in p* at t') & (t / T 1 or p / P'2/j

(A

t

& B has its

/ B).

But the difficulty to which this interpretation is exposed is immedi-

ately apparent.

Locke makes it clear that he thinks the principle in

question is derivable either from the proposition that two things of
the same kind cannot "exist in the same instant, in the very same place"
or from the proposition that one and the same thing cannot exist in

different places at the same time, or from both of these together.

lj

ut
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(24) is not derivable either from (3) cr (9) or from both together.

Nor is the situation improved by intei’preting the claim that it is im-

possible for one thing to exist in different places at the same time as
(6).

The sufficient condition of non-identity derivable from (6) is not

implied by the antecedent of (24).

Furthermore, the claim expressed in

(23) and (24) is so much stronger than and so unrelated in subject matter
to the principles expressed in (1) - (9) that it is difficult to believe

anyone could have regarded the former as a logical consequence of the
latter.

Under these circumstances it seems more reasonable to interpret

Locke's dictum that one thing cannot have two (or different) beginnings
as the following weak claim, which like (8) is a direct consequence of

the indisc ernibility of identicals.
(25) =»

(A = B

8t

/T

t)

(

p)

(A has its beginning at p at t & B does

not have its beginning at p at t )7

•

From (25) we derive the foliov/ing sufficient condition of diversity for
simple substances of the
(26) /( t)

sarnie

sort.

p) (A has its beginning in p at t and B does not have its
-

(

beginning in p at t}/

—

(A

f-

B).

(26) cannot be transformed into a biconditional for reasons similar to

those that prohibit the parallel transformation of (22).
(26), unlike (24), appears to be derivable from (9)*

We need to

show that the antecedent of (26) implies the antecedent of (9).

By the

meaning of ’’beginning,' if A has its beginning in some p at t, A did
1

not totally occupy any p during a period, t - n to t, which is such

that every moment in it is prior to t and such that there is no time
that is both later than any moment in this period and also earlier than
t»

occu(We are not excluding the possibility that A may have totally
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pied some p at some

t

prior to the period,

t

during this period or before it commenced.)

- n to t, and ceased to exist

But if B does not have its

beginning in p at t, then either B does not totally occupy p at t, or,
if it does, it totally occupied some p' during the period,
(p

*

may or may not be identical with p).

totally occupied by A at t, but not by B.

- n to t

In the former case p is

In the latter, there is a p'

which is totally occupied by B during the period,
A.

t

t -

n to t, but not by

If the disjunction is to be exhaustive, we must rule out the possi-

bility of the following state of affairs.

B totally occupies p at t,

there is a p' (non-identical with p) which B also totally occupies at t,
and B has its beginning at p

s

,

although not at p.

However, it seems

reasonable to assert that if a substance has its beginning at t, then it
has that beginning in every p which it occupies at t.
p and p

!

So if B occupies

at t and has its beginning in p’ at t, it also begins in p at

We conclude that the passage we have been discussing does not pro-

vide adequate grounds for attributing to Locke the view that the existence of a simple substance must be continuous or uninterrupted.

We

know that Locke did not hold that every kind of entity must exist uninterruptedly.

As we shall see when we take up the question of personal

identity, he thought that the existence of a person need not be tempo-

rally continuous.

But since a person is a non-substantial entity for

Locke, this leaves open the question of the continuity of the existence
of substances.

It must be admitted that when he is discussing the

identity of a living creature, Locke does frequently mention continued
existence in a way that suggests he thought of it as a necessary condi-

9

9.3

tion for that identity.

It is not altogether certain whether Locke

thought of an organism as a substance; if he did, it was as a compound

rather than a simple substance.

Most relevant to the issue are Locke's

remarks concerning the continued identity of an atom of matter.

Unfor-

tunately they are extremely difficult to understand.
... it is evident, that considered in any instant of
its existence, it is in that instant the same with
itself. For, being at that instant what it is, and
nothing else, it is the same, and so must continue
as long as its existence is continued:
for so long
it will be the same, and no other.

Interpreted literally, this passage seems to say no more than that an

atom which continues to exist will continue to be identical with itself
and with nothing else.

But some commentators have regarded it as a

"groping toward the conception of individuality as spatiotemporal continuity."' '^
1

The latter viewpoint must base itself, so far as

I

can see,

upon the fragment "... it is the same, and so must continue as long as
its existence is continued;

..."

Apparently these words are construed

as saying that if some temporal parts of an atom are spatiotemporally

continuous with earlier atom-parts ("... as long as its existence is
then the later and earlier parts belong to a single

continued

atom ("... it is the same
ingly strained.

This interpretation seems exceed-

Even if it is correct, it does not seem likely that

Locke is making the point that uninterrupted existence is necessary to
an atom.

It would appear that he is saying, rather, that if an unin-

terrupted thread of existence connects earlier and later temporal

parts of an atom, that is sufficient to insure that they are parts of
the same atom
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Unless we adopt the problematic view that the quotation just cited
puts forward a sufficient condition for the continued existence of an
atom, we shall be obliged to say that Locke offers no persistence cri-

terion for simple material substance.

If we do not have a criterion

to determine when two or more temporal segments of an atom belong to

the same atom, then we cannot give a definition of what it is to be a

temporally extended atomic whole, that is to say, an atom viewed as a
four-dimensional object.

We can, however, lay down certain necessary

conditions which any such object must meet.
(27) SMS is a simple material substance which is a temporal whole

only if
SMS is composed of a series, S, of temporal segments such that
(a.)

each segment of S consists of exactly one atom of matter
and

(b) S is not itself a member (a proper temporal part) of any series

which meets the requirement specified in (a).
2.

a.

Nature of a mass .

Masses of Matter

The only kind of compound substance consid-

ered by Locke is a material compound; presumably there are no compound

spiritual substances.

The terms ''compound," "mass," "body," and

"parcel of matter" are employed, by him interchangeably.

The most obvi-

ous difference between a simple material substance and a compound one is
that, while the former is identical with a single atom, the latter con-

sists of

at

least two atoms.

But we have not exhausted the properties

making up the Aristotelian essence of a material compound when we say
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that each of its temporal segments must be identical with a collection

of atoms containing more than one member.

Locke comes closest to speci-

fying that essence when he distinguishes a mass of matter from an

organism by saying that the former is "only the cohesion of particles
of matter any how united" whereas an oak tree (serving as an example of
an organism) is "such a disposition of them ^/particles/' as constitutes
the parts of an oak ..."

12

So we may say that the Aristotelian essence

of a mass of matter is the property of being a "cohesion" of atoms.

This implies, of course, that it consists of at least two atoms.

Since

the atousmay be "any how united," possession of a specific organization

of its components is not essential to a mass.

Accordingly, the persist-

ence criterion for masses specifies that in order to continue to exist a

mass must retain exactly the

sarnie

atomic components but that it does not

matter whether or not these parts are "differently jumbled."

The problem

is how to determine whether or not a given set of particles constitutes

a "cohesion."

Clearly not every such set does, because then it would be

meaningless to speak., as Locke does, of taking atoms away from a mass,
or adding new ones to it, except, possibly, in the case of the annihila-

tion or creation of atoms.

It might be that, in speaking of collections

or cohesions of atomic particles, Locke had in mind a paradigm typified

by that of two rock piles.

them two?

What makes each of them one and the pair of

We might try saying that the distance which separates any two

rocks belonging to a given rock pile is considerably less than the

distance separating any rock belonging to pile A from any rock belonging
to pile B.

To take a rock away from pile A is to remove it to a

distance from the rock in A that is nearest to it which is greater than
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the distance separating the rocks in A and B which are nearest to each
other,*

To add a rock to A is to place it in a proximity to some other

rock in A which is closer than the proximity in which it stands to any
rock in B.

However, if the rock piles are sizable, it might well be

that a rock situated, let us say, at the bottom of A is further away

from a rock at the top of A than it is from the nearest rock in B.

So

this account is not satisfactory,.
In any case, if we model the notion of a mass on the rock pile para-

digm we fail to capture the element of "cohesion" which appears to be of
considerable importance to Locke.

"Mass" and "body" are synonymous terms

for him and he says that one of the primary ideas "peculiar to body" is

"the cohesion of solid, and consequently separable, parts."

13

In fact,

the analysis he offers of the notion of the extension of body is that it
is "nothing but the cohesion of solid parts."

"... body is no further,

nor otherwise, extended, than by the union and cohesion of its solid

parts

]

4

In the next paragraph "sticking firmly together" is offered

as a synonym for "cohesion."

Locke rejects the hypothesis that it is the

pressure of a circumambient external body, such as air, that holds together the parts of sensible bodies.

It is rather the case that the

union and cohesion of these parts is incomprehensible, both as to "the
,.15

manner of thinking, and how it is performed."

He that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose
little bodies together so firmly, he that could make known
the cement that makes them stick so fast one to another,
would discover a great and yet unknown secret

These passages seem to offer the strongest possible support for the
view that it is essential to a mass of matter that its component atoms
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"stick firmly together."

In weariness, we shall ignore the question of

how firmly they must stick.

Now apparently what we would ordinarily

call a "body of water" (water in a cup, water in a lake) does not count
as a body for Locke, and, if a mass of matter is to be identified with
a body, such a collection of water particles would not constitute a

mass.

For the particles of water are "perfectly loose one from another”

and "have no cohesion one with another."

But if the water freezes and

the parts cohere, then a body or mass presumably comes into being, only
to disappear from existence, one would suppose, when the ice again melts

and to reappear if the water once more freezes.

When we come to consider

the persistence criterion for masses it will be obvious that a body, or

mass, will thus be capable of an interrupted, non-continuous existence,

but as we have seen, this consequence need not be thought of as inconsistent with Locke's principle regarding the impossibility of one thing's

having two beginnings.

It simply constitutes a further ground for re-

fusing to interpret that principle as a statement of the impossibility
of a thing's going out of existence and then beginning to exist a second

time.

However, this view of what it is to be a mass of matter is net

wholly unproblematic when placed in the context of some other Lockian
teachings.

In Book III of the Essa^ Locke makes a distinction between

real and nominal essence.

Emphatically rejecting the notion that the

real essence of a being is to be identified

\i/ith

its substantial icrm,

Locke tells us that real essence is "the very being of anything, whereby
it is what it is.

... the real internal, but generally (in substances)

unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable quali

(.res
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depend

In yet another passage Locke explicitly states that the

real essence or internal constitution of body

can be nothing but

the figure, size, and connexion of its solid parts

.

Synonyms for

"connexion" provided later in the paragraph are "situation," "putting

together," and "posture."
In a typical statement, very often repeated, Locke informs us:

Nor indeed can we rank and sort things, and consequently
(which is the end of sorting) denominate them, by their
read, essences; because we know them not.
Our faculties
carry us no further towards the knowledge and distinction
of substances, than a collection of those sensible ideas
which we observe in them.^O

We may remark in passing that Locke's view concerning the unknowable

character of the

read,

essence or the real constitution of things does

not seem to fit well with his doctrine of primary and secondary qualities.

According to that teaching, secondary qualities, such as colors,

sounds, smells and tastes, do not in reality belong to the substances
to which we attribute them.

Sensible ideas of secondary properties are

induced in us through the operation upon our senses of the insensible

primary qualities of body.

But the primary qualities of bodies, viz,

bulk (extension plus solidity), figure, mobility and number, axe properties that really inhere in material substances and our ideas of these

qualities are truly resemblances of them.

21

Furthermore, he holds that

these primai’y qualities are "... utterly inseparable from the body, in

what state soever it be
essential to it.

.

and hence, presumably, they axe really

Clearly the primary qualities of bulk and figure, at

least, are being asserted to be part of the real essence of body.

Since our ideas of these qualities do resemble them, it seems to follow

99

that we have knowledge of them, and hence that we also have partial

knowledge, at any rate, of the real essence of bodily substance.

The problem v/ith which we must immediately deal is as follows.
The real essence of a material substance, e.g.,gold, a horse, is that
arrangement, texture or constitution of its insensible parts (atomic

components) upon which its observable properties depend.

Typically, a

natural body, whose parts cohere together, will be a material substance
of a certain sort.

horse or a man.

It will be a nugget of gold, a piece of ice, a

As such it will have a real essence; the arrangement of

its atomic parts will not be one of its merely accidental properties,

but will be essential to it.

Locke goes so far as to say that a real

essence is "that particular constitution which every thing has within
itself."
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However, the arrangement of its atomic components is ines-

sential to a mass of matter.

It is in this v/ay that a mass is distin-

guished from a living organism.

Is it an inconsistency, then, on

Locke’s part to identify a mass of matter with a body?

Can a piece of

ice or a nugget of gold, to which a certain atomic structure is essential, be identical with a mass, to which such a structure is inessen-

tial?
b«

Individuals an d their essences .

In order to obtain an answer

to this question we must now turn to Locke's famous discussion of the

topic of individual essence which appears in Book III, Chapter VI, of
the Essay .

The cardinal point made by Locke in this passage is pre-

cisely that individuals as such have no essences; that nothing is
essential to the existence or the continued existence of an individual
except insofar as it has already been classified as an individual of a
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certain kind.

That essence in the ordinary use of the word, relates to
sorts, and that it is considered in particular beings no
further than as they are ranked into sorts, appears from
hence : that take but away the abstract ideas by which we
sort individuals, and rank them under common names, and
then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly vanishes: we have no notion of the one without
the other, which plainly shows their relation. It is
necessary for me to be as I am; God and nature has made me
so:
but there is nothing I have is essential to me. An
accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape;
a fever or fall may take away my reason or memory, or both;
and an apoplexy leave neither sense, nor understanding, no,
nor life. Other creatures of my shape may be made with
more and better, or fewer and worse faculties than I have;
and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body
very different from mine. None of these are essential to
the one or the other, or to any individual whatever, till
the mind refers it to some sort or species of things; and
then presently, according to the abstract idea of that sort,
something is found essential. Let any one examine his ovm
thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or
speaks of essential., the consideration of some species, or
the complex idea, signified by some general, name, comes
into his mind; and it is in reference to that that this or
that quality is said to be essential. So that if it be
asked, whether it be essential to me or any other particular corporeal being, to have reason? I say, no; no more
than it is essential to this white thing I write on to
have words in it. But if that particular being be to be
counted of the sort man, and to have the name man given it,
then reason is essential to it; supposing reason to be a
part of the complex idea the name man stands for; as it is
essential to this thing I write on to contain words, if I
will give it the name tr eatise , and rank it under that,
species. So that essential and not essential relate only
to our abstract ideas, and the names annexed to them; which
amounts to no more than this, that whatever particular
thing has not in it those qualities which are contained in
the abstract idea which any general term stands for, cannot
be ranked under that species, nor be called by that name;
since thaj: abstract idea is the very essence of that
species. 24
,

,

In this passage Locke appears to be telling us that statements of

the form "F is essential to A" are intelligible only when they are in-

terpreted as abbreviations of statements having the form "Ac<k

A is
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F," where

is replaceable by the name of a class.

Thus the state-

ment that rationality is essential to Locke must be understood as

asserting that Locke is a member of the class of men only on condition
of being rational.

Stripped of his rationality, the individual we

denote by "Locke" would continue to exist, although he would no longer
exist as a man.

Essentiality is always essentiality for class member-

ship; it is a relation holding between species or properties, rather

than an individual and a species.

"It would be absurd to ask, whether a

thing really existing wanted anything essential to it."

"... particular

beings, considered barely in themselves, will be found to have all their

qualities equally essential; and everything in each individual will be
essential to it; or, which is more, nothing at all."

25

At first sight this passage seems to contradict two well-known

Lockian teachings.

The first is the doctrine we have just been discus-

sing, that everything has within itself a particular constitution which
is its real essence.

The second is the thesis upon which his construc-

tion of persistence criteria for entities of various sorts is founded,
namely, that the continued existence of any individual is dependent upon
its retention of certain key properties, or upon the maintenance of a

particular sort of relation between its temporal parts.
Let us attempt to resolve the first contradiction.

If we succeed

we shall at the same time be able to explain away the inconsistency in

Locke's apparent identification of a body, to which a certain atomic
structure is essential, with a mass, to which it is not.

Now Locke is

aware of the tension between his denial that individuals, "considered

barely in themselves," have no essence and his doctrine that everything
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is possessed of a real essence,,

This essence, he tells us, is a con-

stitution which it has "within itself, without any relation to any-

thing without it," that is to say, quite independently of any ranking
or sorting of the thing on the part of human beings .

This is his

attempt to reconcile the two teachings.
It is true, I have often mentioned a real essence , distinct
in substances from those abstract ideas of them, which I
call their nominal essence. 3y this real essence I mean,
that real constitution of anything, which is the foundation
of all those properties that are combined in, and are constantly found to co-exist v/ith the nominal essence; that

particular constitution which everything has within itself,
without any relation to anything without it. But essence,
even in this sense, relates to a sort and sup poses a
species . For, being that real constitution on which the
properties depend, it necessarily supposes a sort of things,
properties belonging only to species, and not to individuals:
v.g. supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a body of
such a peculiar colour and weight, v/ith malleability and
fusibility, the real essence is that constitution of the
parts of matter on which these qualities and their union
depend; and is also the foundation of its solubility in aqua
regia and other properties, accompanying that complex idea.
Here are essences and properties, but all upon supposition
of a sort or general abstract idea, which is considered as
immutable; but there is no individual parcel of matter to
which any of these qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from it. That which is essential
belongs to it as a condition v/hereby it is of this or that
sort:
but take away the consideration of its being ranked
under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is
nothing necessary to it, nothing inseparable from it. u
,

When Locke says that properties belong only to species and not to
individuals, I think we must understand him as asserting that proper-

ties belong

e ssentially

easy to comprehend.
sort in mind.

only to species.

As usual, this passage is not

Locke seems to have something of the following

Each body, each parcel of mat ter, possesses a particular

kind of atomic arrangement or internal structure.

That it does so is

a natural fact not dependent upon our observation of it nor upon our
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classifying the body as belonging to a certain kind.

Possession of

this real constitution causes the body to manifest a certain set of

properties observable by us.

Ideas of these properties combined to-

gether (plus the idea of a support) make up for us a nominal essence
or abstract idea and it is this which forms the basis of our ranking

the body as a member of a certain sort or species.

The atomic con-

stitution of the body is the causal basis of properties which anything
must have

_if it

is to be classified by us as a being of a certain sort.

Having a certain arrangement of atomic parts causes a given parcel of
matter to exhibit the properties of malleability, fusibility, yellow
colour and a particular weight.
ties as gold.

We classify anything having such proper

Having each of these properties is an analytic necessity

for anything which is so classified; having the appropriate atomic struc

ture is a causal necessity for any body manifesting the properties.

Therefore we may say that possession of an atomic constitution of a certain sort is essential to every gold thing.

"Take but away" this real

constitution, i.e., disrupt the underlying organization of the atoms,

and the parcel of matter will no longer be a piece of gold.

It would

seem to follow that a previously existing piece of gold ceased to exist.

But Locke doesn't want to say this.

He does not view this phenomenon

as the disappearance from the world of a real individual, namely, a

piece of gold.

No doubt this is connected with that part of his teach-

ing according to which "being a piece of gold" is a property conferred

upon a thing by men, rather than by nature.
And to talk of specific differences in nature , without
reference to general ideas in names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would ask anyone, v/hat is sufficient
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to make an essential difference in nature between any
two particular beings, without any regard had to some
abstract idea, which is looked upon as the essence and
standard of a species?^-?

So when a parcel of matter loses the internal organization of its

parts that is the causal foundation of its being classified as gold,
Locke denies that an individual has perished.

The individual still

persists, he thinks, but it is no longer classifiable as gold.

This

shows that the properties essential to being a piece of gold are not

essential to the individual.
ual with the parcel of matter.

Clearly Locke is identifying the individFor possession of the set of observable

properties essential to a thing's being a member of the species, gold,
or any other particular species of material substance, is not essential
to a mass of matter as such.

atoms sticking together.

A body or mass consists of a number of

Those atoms presumably must always be arranged

according to some definite pattern; hence it may be that possession of
some such patterning of parts is essential to a body.

But any particu-

lar organization of atomic components is always a merely accidental

feature of a mass of matter.

Consequently it can survive the loss of

such a patterning and remain the same body.

Every natural body whose

parts cohere together is always a body of a particular sort; in addition to being a mass of matter it is a nugget of gold or a piece of ice
or an animal.

According to this analysis, "mass of matter" or "body"

becomes the genus of which gold, ice, living organism, etc. constitute

particular species.
cow,

roan,

substance.

Just as every animal must also be either a horse,

etc., so must every mass be a particular kind of material

But its continued existence as a parcel of matter is com-

patible with its belonging to different species of material substance
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at different times, just as the continued existence of an animal might,

for example , be compatible with its being a caterpillar at one stage
of its existence and a butterfly at another.

So Locke has not been

inconsistent in identifying a mass to which any particular organiza-

tion of parts is inessential, with a natural body whose parts cohere together, even although every such body does possess a particular organi-

zation which is the basis of its being classified as a substance of a
special sort, and which is essential to its being so classified.

Locke's identification of an individual, with a parcel of matter permits him to say that belonging to any particular species of material substance is not essential to an individual as such.

Does it justify him

in saying that there is nothing essential to an individual?

In malting

the latter claim, Locke seems to adopt the view that in every case of a

property loss, there is an individual!, which had been existing as a being
of a certain kind, and which after the property loss continues to survive,

although no longer as a being of that kind.

This is what is suggested

by his statement that if he were to lose his rationality, he would

cease to be a man, but would continue to exist as a corporeal being,
that is, presumably, as an animal organism.

Here the thought seems to

be that the underlying individual is the animal body, and that humanity
is a property which may or may not attach to that body.

Let us suppose

that the organism loses the organizational pattern that is essential to

its existence as a living creature of that sort.
dies.

Then the organism

But there is still a surviving entity and that is Locke's ulti-

mate individual, the material compound of atoms which now makes up
the corpse of the former organism.

The compound or mass that at one
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time had possessed the property of animality and at a still earlier

time the property of rationality continues to exist, but no longer

a living creature.

a_s

But does Locke imagine that nothing is essential to

the continued existence of a mass of matter?

If that v/ere so parcels of

matter would be immortal, but certainly Locke knows this is not the case.
The mere fact that he proffers a persistence criterion for masses, and a

very stringent one at that

,

shows that he recognizes that the retention

of certain key properties is indeed essential to the continued existence
of a parcel of matter.

That persistence criterion teaches us that if a

compound loses an atom, which is always a possibility, then it ceases to
exist.

Under these circumstances is it possible to locate an individual,

more real and more ultimate than the mass, which may sensibly be spoken
of as surviving the destruction of the mass and as continuing to exist,
but in the form of something other than a mass of matter?

The new com-

pound which consists of the atoms, minus one, that made up the original
mass does not seem to be a likely candidate.

In the first place it is

itself a mass; it has not lost the property of being a material compound.
Secondly, it did not come into being until the original compound passed
out of existence, so it cannot be thought of as that which survives the

disappearance of the original, mass.

If the objection is raised that

every sub-set of the collection of material particles which comprises a

given mass is itself a mass, we may change the example so that an atom
is added to, rather than subtracted from, the original compound.

But

in either case the persistence criterion for masses forbids us to con-

sider the new compound as being the same individual as the old.

Per-

haps we could say that the mass is survived by its component atoms.

10 ?

Clearly in cases where the compound is wholly dissolved these would be
the only survivors.

The difficulty is that there is no one individual

which we can thihl: of as being the successor to the mass.

Furthermore,

since none of the individual atoms ever possessed the property of being
a compound, we cannot truthfully aver of any of them that it once

existed as a mass, but now exists as an atom.

The theory that nothing

is essential to an individual, or that every loss of a property leaves

intact an individual that survives that loss appears to be untenable.
It seems particularly unfortunate that Locke, who ostensibly held

that there are non-material beings such as souls, and who unquestionably

was committed to the view that some entities, persons, for example, are
not substances at all, should have attempted to identify parcels of matter as the real or ultimate individuals.

It makes a certain amount of

sense to view an organism as a mass of natter whose component parts are

organized in such a way as to constitute a living creature.

When the

organization is fatally disrupted, instead of saying that an individual,
the organism, has ceased to exist, we may say simply that the status of

the material compound has undergone a change; it no longer has the prop-

erty of being alive.

But neither a soul nor a person, according to the

conception Locke had of them, can conceivably be regarded as a parcel of
matter displaying a particular type of organization.

It is initially

plausible to hold that the genus-species relation holds between masses
of matter and each of the various sorts of material substances, of

which organisms may be viewed as one variety.

Every particular material

substance, whether it be a piece of gold or a human body, seems to be a
parcei. of matter displaying in addition a special sort of patterning of
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parts*

But the genus-species relation most certainly does not hold be-

tween a mass or matter, on the one hand, and a soul or a person on the
other.

Neither a person nor a soul, nor any temporal part of either

one, belongs to the genus, mass of matter.

Consequently if, according

to the Lockian notion, through loss of ability to recall his past ex-

periences a person is annihilated, he may indeed be survived by the

body with which he was formerly associated.

But the body which sur-

vives is an entity entirely distinct from the person who has perished.
We cannot say, as we could in the case 'where an organism "dies," that
the only event that has occurred is a change in the status of the body,
e.g., that it is no longer "personified."

There is no persistent indi-

vidual underlying the person in the way that the mass of matter may be
thought of as the continuing individual which sometimes may and some-

times may not have the property of being a living organic body.

The

doctrine that the ultimate individuals are parcels of matter not only

conflicts with Locke's teaching that there are non-material entities,
such as souls and persons; it is also incompatible with his view that
there are certain species of material substances, notably living organisms, which have persistence criteria of their own and which are not re-

quired to meet the persistence criterion which must be met by any temporally extended mass of matter.

It is essential to a mass, but not to

an organism, that all of its temporal parts have exactly the same components.

The view that an organism is in reality a mass of matter dis-

playing certain special organize.! ional traits, traits which it may lose
without ceasing to exist as a mass, is equivalent to the thesis that
the class of material masses stands in the genus relation to the class
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of organisms.

The notion is that an individual belonging to the genus

may lose the differentiating properties which qualify it as a member of
the species, and yet continue its existence as a member of the genus.

Indeed it is true that every organism, considered as a temporally extended whole, must possess the undated properties of being material,

compound and cohesive, but it is not necessary that every mass possess
the undated property of being organic or even that it possess that prop-

erty at all.

So at first glance the genus-species relation does seem to

hold between a mass and an organism.

A mass can lose its organic prop-

erties and yet continue to exist, just as Locke suggests.

So it is cer-

tainly correct to say that the property ox being organic is not essential to any mass.

On the other hand an organism must always retain the

properties of being material, compound and cohesive.

It is essential to

an organism that each of its temporal segments have these properties.

The thesis that the class of organisms is a species, or sub-set, of
the class of masses of matter is destroyed, however, by Locke's stipula-

tion that an organism, considered as a temporally extended whole,

need,

not meet the requirements which temporally extended masses must meet if

they are to be considered as wholes.

This means that there can be an

organism which is not identical with, nor a part of, any particular mass
of matter.

There can be an organism which simply does not qualify for

membership in the class of (temporally extended)

raatex’ial

masses.

All

of its temporal segments must indeed be material, compound and cohesive;

but the crucial point is that they need not belong to the same cohesive

material mass.

The principles which are sufficient to unify an organ-

ism and make a temporal whole out cf it will not serve to constitute a
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temporally whole mass of matter.

Consequently, if an organism ceases to

possess the properties which are essential to its continued existence as
the same organism, we cannot assume that there is a single parcel of

matter, of which that organism was once a part, that will survive the

demise of the organism and continue to exist as a mass.

Probably the most serious criticism that can be lodged against

Locke's teaching that individuals, except insofar as we have assigned
them to a certain classification, have no essential properties is its
apparent inconsistency with the fundamental notion which underlies his

persistence criteria for masses of matter, organisms and persons.

The

persistence criteria presuppose that for every individual of a given type
there are certain properties which are essential to its continued existence.

Locke appears to challenge the assumption upon which an important

part of his philosophical work rests.

Locke might defend himself against the charge of inconsistency in
the following way.

He fully recognizes, so he might contend, that once

the Aristotelian essence of an individual has been specified, that is,

once it has been typed, there will be another set of properties making up
the "individual" essence of the thing in question.

The members of this

set will be precisely those properties that are stipulated by the per-

sistence criterion for the sortal kind to which the individual has been
assigned.

Indeed, he might argue, in the course of his discussion of

identity, it was one of his chief concerns to emphasize that the

"identity" of an individual (i.e., its persistence requirements, rules
for its re-identification) is differently determined according to the

kind of being it is.

"... for such as is the idea belonging to that
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name, such must be the identity ..."

Because he talks about identity

where he should be talking about persistence and because he uses "A is
the same F as B" where he should say that A and B are distinct parts of

the same F, this part of Locke's teaching seems to bring him close to
the position of a contemporary relative identity theorist such as Peter

Geach.

In making statements such as "it is possible for the same man

to be two distinct persons "'

0

Locke suggests that where A and B are both

men and both persons, A may bear to B the relation of being the same man
and yet fail to bean to B the relation of being the same person*

But we

have seen that there is a strong case for reconstructing Locke's asser-

tions so that he is understood to say merely that temporal segments A

and B may belong to a single enduring entity of type F and yet belong to
different enduring entities of type G»

We may say that Locke's deep in-

sight, never clearly or explicitly articulated by him, is that the prin-

ciples according to which temporal wholes are constructed vary according
to kind.

We cannot define a temporal whole as such; it is questionable

if we can even give a definition of what it is to be a material object

which is a temporal whole.

Consequently, there is no one persistence cri-

terion that will serve for all objects or that is competent to inform us

when any pair of temporal segments belong to a single entity of whatever kind.

Definitions of temporal wholes are always definitions of

kinds of wholes*

Rules for recognition and re-identification over time

(i.e., persistence criteria) are always rules for things belonging to a

certain sort.

This is the truth that appears in a distorted form both

in Locke's teaching about different kinds of "identity" and in the

following thesis advocated by Peter Geach;

"For every proper name there
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is a corresponding use of a common noun preceded by 'the same' to ex-

press what requirements as to identity the proper name conveys." 2 "
Locke and Geach distort the truth because they fail to distinguish

between temporal persistence and identity.

They are correct in thinking

that there is no absolutely general or universal answer to the question,

what is a temporally extended thing?

But they are wrong in thinking

that there is no absolutely general answer to the question of what it is
for an object A to stand in the relation of identity with object B«

This

answer is provided in the fundamental principle of identity which is universal. in its scope.

It is true of arr£ A and any B that they are iden-

tical just in case they have all their properties in common.

"Being a

temporal whole" is a property which must be analyzed differently for
different sorts of beings; what properties are entailed by possession of
that property is a question which must be answered separately for each
sort.

But "being identical with A" always has the same analysis.

ways entails having all properties in common with A.

It al-

Correctly glimps-

ing that "being a temporal whole" names a property which can be ana-

lyzed only relatively to kinds, Locke and Geach incorrectly proceed to
the conclusion that "being identical with A" names a relational property

of which the same thing holds good.
It is true, of course, that particular tests for identity are al-

most invariably framed for entities of a specific type, e.g., material
objects.''

0

But this is primarily a matter of epistemic convenience.

It

is sometimes possible to discover that entities of a particular kind can

be counted on to have all their properties in common if (or if and only
if) they have a given property in common.

For practical cognitive pur-

poses this may be very important.

But what constitutes the identity of

A with B is not their joint possession of this particular property but
,
1

the having of ail properties in common.

What varies with the kind is

not the nature of identity but the way in which we can discover whether

A and B do in fact have all properties in common.
If we reconstruct Locke's theory by replacing the concept of iden-

tity with that of temporal persistence, can we successfully claim to
have eliminated the apparent contradiction between his view that there

are persistence criteria and his teaching that an individual "considered

barely in itself" has no essence?

Can we reduce the latter contention

to the sound thesis that there are no persistence criteria for individ-

uals simply, but only for individuals of a certain kind?
to think this possible.

It is tempting

But, as usual, Locke places obstacles in the

path of the would-be charitable interpreter.

If there are no persistenc

criteria for individuals simply, then it is impossible to recognise or
re-identify a temporal whole which has not been classified as being of a

certain kind.

Talk of a temporally extended individual which lacks

essential properties and for which, accordingly, there is no persistence

criterion involves a contradiction in terms.

The notions of being a

temporal whole, on the one hand, and of having properties essential to

continued existence, on the other, are strictly correlative.

The per-

sistence criterion marks the boundaries of a temporal individual and in
so doing actually constitutes the individual.

In order to be consistent

then, Locke should take the view that there are no individuals, "consid-

ered barely in themselves" or abstracted from a species.

This he does
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The passages from Chapter VI, Book III which we have quoted at

not do.

length make it abundantly clear that he thinks such untyped individuals
can be both identified and re-identified, and he proceeds to make a

variety of assertions about them.

He begins and ends the discussion by

asking the reader to take away in thought "the abstract ideas by which
we sort individuals" and then to consider whether the entities thus

stripped can be considered to have any essential properties.

"... there

is nothing I have is essential to me," he says, thus assuming that the

individual., Locke, exists and is identifiable even when abstracted from

his species.

Such an individual has no essential properties, says Locke,

"till the mind refers it to some sort or species of things," and in so

saying he reveals the assumption that the existence of the individual

antedates this referral.

The alternative way of interpreting these passages is to regard
Locke not as asserting that there can be untyped, individuals lacking all
essential, properties, but rather that the real individuals are parcels

of matter, fully equipped with the appropriate essential properties.

What appear to be individuals of a different sort (men, organisms) are

simply parcels of matter displaying
tion.

a,

certain special kind of organiza-

This view would entail the conclusion that there is ultimately

only one persistence criterion, namely, the criterion for material

bodies.

But Locke did not maintain this opinion either, so the alterna-

tive interpretation also leads to the conclusion that Locke was inconsistent.

We can, however, weaken the thesis which according to the al-

ternative interpretation Locke is putting forward in a way that would

render it true.

Let us assume that Locke is talking only about material
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entities,

and.

let us consider that his statement that nothing is essen-

tial to an individual means merely that it is not essential to a tem-

porally extended material substance that it belong to (or be identical
with) a sintiLe temporally extended individual.

statement as true.

Then we can regard his

For it is indeed the case that a given temporal seg-

ment which is a cohesion of material particles may at one and the same
time form a part of a mass of matter and of an organism.

Those two

entities of different kinds may have a temporal part in common or may
spat i o t e mpor ally overlap.

It is also possible that they could com-

pletely coincide, in which case they would have all their properties in
common and would constitute a single individual which was both a mass of
matter and an -organism.

We can now provide the following weak interpre-

tation of the thesis that nothing is essential to an individual.
assume that at t

Let us

there is a segment which is a member of two series, one

of them constituting a temporally persistent mass of matter, M, the

other an organism, 0.

At t

the component atoms of M, while remaining

the same individuals, are jumbled in such a way as to unfit M for member-

ship in the series that is the organism.

Then it may be that the series

constituting the organism comes to an end, but the series making up the
temporalljr persistent mass will nevertheless continue.

This shows that

it is not essential to the continued existence of the series which is

the temporally persistent mass that some of its temporal segments should

also participate in another series constituting an organism.

living creature is not essential to a material compound.

Being a

So the state-

ment that nothing is essential to the existence of an individual is in

this case paraphrased as the claim that it is not essential to the
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continued existence of a series constituting a mass that its members be

participants in some other series in which they have the capacity to participate «

However, it seems fairly clear that Locke intended to assert a

thesis far more ambitious than the modest claim we have been describing.
About all that can be said for this weal: interpretation is that it has
the virtue of construing the words of a great philosopher charitably.
c.

Persistence and identity criteria for masses of matter .

... if two or more atoms be joined together into the same
mass. . .whilst they exist united together, the mass, consisting of the same atoms, must be the same mass, or the
same body, let the parts be ever so differently jumbled.
But if one of these atoms be taken away, or one new one
added, it is no longer the same mass or the same body .51

This statement of Locke's provides a genuine persistence criterion
for material masses and permits us to give a definition of a mass of mat-

ter considered as a four-dimensional whole persisting through time.

Following Locke's indications, we shall offer the following definition of a "cohesion" of atoms.
(28)

C is a cohesion of atoms

if and only if
(a) C consists of more than one atom
(b) The atoms composing C stick firmly together

(29)

M is a mass of matter which is a temporal whole
if and only if

M is composed of a series, S, of temporal segments such that
(a) each segment of S is a cohesion of atoms

and
(b)

(A)

(B)

j

(A is a member of S and B is a member of S) only if
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/Tx) (x is an atomic component of A if and only if x is an

atomic component of B_)/j

and
(c) S is not itself a proper temporal part of any series meeting

requirements (a) and

(

b ).

It is clause (b) of (29) which specifies the sufficient individuating con-

dition for masses of matter; no counterpart to (b) is included in

(

27 ).

Any series meeting the requirements laid down in (b) will compose or constitute a genuine temporally persistent individual, whereas the require-

ments in (a) and (b) of

(

27 ) can be met by seri.es made up of temporal seg-

ments belonging to different temporally persistent individuals.

From Locke's persistence criterion for masses we can also derive a
statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the co-membership of distinct temporal segments in a single series constituting a mass
of matter.

Where "A" and "3" are replaceable exclusively by names of

temporal segments which meet the requirement specified in

(

29 a), we

rnay

say:
(30)

B at t- and A at
2

t,

x

belong to the same mass of matter

if and only if
Cx)

(x is an atomic component of A if and only if x is an atomic

component of B).
No comparable statement parallels (27).
In the last chapter we pointed out that Locke's persistence cri-

terion for masses of matter is also capable of yielding a true identity

criterion for these entities.

Where

and

"M"

are replaceable ex-

clusively by names of masses of matter which are temporal wholes, and "A"

:
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and "B" by names of temporal segments meeting the requirement of (29a),
we may assert
M

(31)

1

= M

2

if and only if
(-3

A)

(3b)

(/K

is part of

and B is part of

11^7

and /Tx) (x is

an atomic component of A if and only if x is an atomic component of

As in the case of the identity criterion for simple substances, it is im-

perative that we assure ourselves that names of proper temporal parts of
material masses not be substitutable for "M

"

and "M^."

Otherwise (31)

would have the undesirable consequence of permitting us to declare such a
mass identical with one of its temporal segments.

This stipulation is

taken care of by requirement (c) of (29) which every mass of matter must
meet .
Nov; it

is apparent that Locke thinks his criterion of identity for

simple material substances is also applicable to masses of matter.

We

find him saying;
"... could two bodies be in the same place at the same time; then

those two parcels of matter must be one and the same, take them great or

little ..."'

2

A particular time and place, he says, is "incommunicable to two beings of
the same kind." "This, though it seems easier to conceive in simple sub-

stances or modes; yet when reflected, on, is not more difficult in con-

pound ones."

33

Clearly Locke's central intuition is

f hat

it is impossible for two

distinct substances of the same kind, whether simple or compound,
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totally to occupy the same place at the same time.

The consequence is

that we are in possession of two independent criteria for the identity
of material masses, one depending upon spatial location at a given time,
the other upon atomic composition.

Locke's system of criteria?

Does this represent a redundancy in

The answer to this question,

I

think, is

that such a duplication of criteria can do no harm, providing both of

them are correctly framed.

It may well be epistemically useful.

Some-

times it is possible or convenient to refer to the members of a pair of

masses by means of the place they occupy at a given time; sometimes it
may be easier to pick them out with reference to their atomic composiThe criterion for identity based upon composition is, of course,

tion.

more versatile in that it permits us to refer to the members of the pair
by dated properties having different dates.

which is composed of atoms
similarly composed at

t

2

a-,,

a

2

>

.

..,

a

We may compare the mass

n at

t-j

with the mass that is

and declare them to be identical masses.

When

we use the criterion of identity originally proposed by Locke for
simple substances we are restricted to dated properties having the same
dates.

We compare objects A and B by referring to the places they

totally or exactly occupied at the same time and asking if those places
are the same or different.
So the only question which remains to be settled is whether the

criterion for the identity of simple substances of the same sort which
appears in (15) is suitable as an identity test for masses of matter.
The answer seems to be, not as it stands.

Locke identifies simple

material substances with material particles or atoms.

(15)

provides an

adequate criterion for atoms precisely because a spatial part of an
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atom, lacking an immutable physical superficies, cannot itself qualify

as an atom.

34

Hence it is not permissible to substitute for "A" and "3"

the name of any such spatial part.

But presumably the spatial parts of

masses of matter are cohesions of atoms and hence are themselves masses
of matter.

whole.

(15 ) would compel us to declare the part identical with the

There are, however, two obvious ways in which (15) can be modi-

fied so as to make it an adequate criterion for the identity of masses,

while at the same time it remains a suitable test for the identity of
atoms.
(15') (A = B)

fg)

/T3t) (3p) (A exactly occupies p at

t

and B exactly

occupies p at t )/
(15") (A = B)

/ft) (p) (A totally occupies p at

t

)>

B totally

occupies p at t)7.
It might be thought that porous bodies, such as sponges, would pro-

vide counter-examples to (15') and (15").

One will run into problems if

one thinks that the sponge exactly or totally occupies "the whole of
the space which would be enclosed by a flexible sponge-bag which touches
-35
the exterior surface at as many points as possible."

For then it will

appear that some other bodies will be able exactly or totally to occupy
,

parts of that space, namely, the places coinciding with the holes in
the sponge.

But in fact the sponge does not exactly occupy the whole of

the space enclosed by the sponge-bag.

It is, indeed, limited to that

space, but it does not totally occupy it, because the parts of the space

coinciding with the holes do not have any parts of the sponge occupying
them.

The space exactly occupied by the porous sponge is a space with

"holes"in it.
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3.

Organisms

Having completed his discussion of the criteria for the identity
and persistence of material bodies, viewed as cohesions of atomic particles, Locke turns immediately to the topic of the persistence criterion

appropriate to organisms.

He is emphatic that this criterion is not the

same as the one for masses of matter.

He never explores the question as

to whether there are not also separate criteria for the persistence of

particular material substances, such as gold or ice, which are not animate bodies.

Yet it seems plain that there are properties necessary for

the continuance of these substances which are not the same as those

essential

to the continued existence of a mass.

A nugget of gold or a

piece of ice must retain the particular organization of atomic parts,

which is the causal basis of its observable properties, if it is to continue to exist as a nugget of gold or a piece of ice.

In this respect

such an entity more closely resembles an organism than it does a mass.
On the other hand, it may be that a nugget of gold, in order to remain
the same nugget, must also retain exactly the same atomic components,

and in this respect it would be similar to a mass rather than to a

living creature.

Locke's refusal to consider objects belonging to the
,

particular species of substances as genuine or ultimate individuals no
doubt

\’/as

a bar to his proffering distinct persistence criteria for

these entities, but, as we have seen, had he been consistent this refusal would also have barred the development

organisms.

of.

a unique criterion for

The need for a test ox persistence different from that

which is suitable for material aggregates seems particularly acute in
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the case of inanimate natural objects such as mountains, planets or

stars.

According to ordinary ways of thinking, a mountain or a planet

most certainly does not cease to exist simply because one or more atoms
of matter has been added to it or subtracted from it.

Application of

the persistence criterion for masses of matter to such entities would

have the consequence of making the massive objects, which we ordinarily

think of as the most enduring of physical things, extremely ephemeral.

Problems also result when this criterion is applied to artifacts such
as houses, tables, chairs, etc.

form

cat

It is rather the retention of a certain

structure, or perhaps the capacity to fulfill a certain function,

which appears essential to the continued existence of things such as
these.

Locke displays an awareness of this fact in his discussion of

machines.

In the relevant respect, he tells us, machines resemble or-

ganisms rather than masses of matter.

For example, what is a watch? It is plain that it is nothing
but a fit organization or construction of parts to a certain
end, which, when a sufficient force is added to it, it is
capable to attain.^ 13
Presumably, then, a watch can continue to exist even although parts
of it have been replaced, provided that it retains the organization

"fit” to the functioning of a watch.

This notion should probably be

generalized to cover all artifacts.

These examples serve to indicate

that, so far as persistence criteria are concerned, the crucial division

may not be that separating inanimate from animate bodies, as Locke some-

times seemed to think, but rather that between mere material aggregates
and organized bodies.

Whether the latter are alive or not does not

affect the fact that retention of a certain patterning of parts is
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necessary to their continued existence.
a.

Nature of an organism .

Before considering the persistence cri-

terion for organisms, let us try to enumerate the properties which Locke
thinks of as making up the "Aristotelian essence" of such entities.

These are properties which should be attributable to every temporal segment of an organic body.
face a difficulty.

But at the very outset of this enterprise we

It is natural to attempt a definition of an organism

as a particular kind of material mass, that is, as a material body dis-

playing such-and-such organizational properties.
cisely the way in which Locke proceeds.

Indeed this is pre-

However, in the course of our

discussion of the relation holding between masses of matter and organisms,
we saw that Locke cannot place organisms, considered as temporal wholes,
in the genus of material bodies, since the former are not required to

meet the persistence criteria stipulated for the latter.

What is true

of temporal wholes also holds good cf temporal segments possessing dura-

tion.

Every temporal segment of an organism, like the temporal whole of

which it is a part, is made up exclusively of masses of matter.
cannot be made definitionally identical with any particular mass.

But it

This

situation contrasts with the relation holding between an organism and an
animal, or an animal body and a human body..

Animals must meet the per-

sistence requirements for organisms; human bodies must meet those for
animal bodies.

Hence every temporal segment of an animal is identical

with some particular temporal segment of an organism and every temporal
part of a human body is the same as some temporal part of a given animal
body.

However, when Locke defines an organism as being a cohesion of

particles having a certain disposition, we shall have to understand this
as a definition of a dixrat ionless temporal slice of an organism, that is,

^
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a definition of a three-dimensional object altogether lacking temporal

depth.

For it will be true of every such durationless slice that it is

identical with some particular mass of matter.

Heedless to say, such

considerations were hardly in the forefront of Locke’s mind.

The state-

ment in the Essay which most closely approximates to a definition of an

organism is the following.
We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a
mass of matter, and that seems to me to be in this, that
the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any
how united, the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak; and such an organization
of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute
nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark,
and leaves,. &c„ , of an oak, in which consists the vegetable life .

Locke appears to offer

a.

two-part definition of an organism, or, as

we should prefer to say, a durationless temporal slice of an organism.

An organism, he suggests, is a cohesion of particles (a mass of matter)
displaying an organization which is (a)

characteristic of the species

to which the organism in question belongs ("... such a disposition ...

of particles ... as constitutes the parts of an oak
to sustain the organism in being.

and (b) fitted

The first thing to say about this

definition is that it is grossly flawed by circularity in both of its
parts.

It Is obvious that we should reject as unacceptable a defini-

tion of a mammal which attempted to stipulate that a mammal is an animal

displaying a physiological organization which is (a) peculiar to the

particular mammalian species of which it is a member and (b) fitted to
sustain a mammal in being.

But this definition is exactly

the one put forward by Locke for organisms.

paralle.'- to

Secondly, clause (b) is

wholly inappropriate if we are taking the term "organism" to refer to a

125

durationless time slice.

It is inappropriate even if we do not bring

such sophisticated notions into the picture.

For what is the entity

which the organization is fitted to sustain?

By Locke's own account it

cannot be the mass of the matter.

His central teaching regarding the

nature of an organism is that it, unlike a mere material mass, can survive both the addition and the subtraction, not only of atomic particles,
but of macroscopic parts.

It survives the disappearance from the world

of an indefinite number of material masses which enter into its temporal

composition.

So it seems that the entity which the organization is

fitted to sustain in being can only be the organization itself.

What,

does it mean to say that an organization is fitted to sustain itself in

being?

It seems to me that all we can do is to attempt to formulate the

answer along the following lines.

If the organization is displayed by a

temporally enduring mass of matter at a given time, then, if certain
minimal conditions are met (e.g. the organism is not destroyed by an
agency external to itself), that organization will again be displayed at
a later time by a temporally enduring mass of matter which may or may not
be identical with the first mass.

Translating this "into talk about dura-

tionless temporal slices, we may say that if a temporal slice of a mass
that coincides with a given point in time displays the organization, the

organization will be displayed again by a temporal slice of a mass coinciding with a subsequent point in time.
not belong to the same mass.

The temporal slice may or may

We shall not attempt to answer the

question as to whether the later time must be an immediate successor of
the earlier time.

Since it is also impossible to specify the "minimal

conditions" with any precision, this is an explication that inevitably
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suffers from vagueness.

Let "t" designate either a durationless tempo-

ral point or a temporal stretch possessing a finite magnitude.

We

shall now have to content ourselves with the crude statement that a

temporal part of a material mass coinciding with t displays an organi-

sation fitted to sustain itself if and only if

Mat

organization has a

tendency to be displayed anew (will probably be displayed anew) by a
temporal part of a mass coinciding with a time later than t.
Let us now attempt to construct a somewhat improved version of

Locke's definition of an organism.

Clause (a) of the original definition

is wholly useless and is best abandoned.

Let us say that an organism,

more precisely a durationless temporal slice of an organism, is a cohe-

sion of atoms displaying an organization which is fitted to sustain
itself in being,
bo

The persistence criterion for organisms .

What does Locke have

to offer as a persistence criterion for organic beings?

The answer, un-

fortunately, is not so clear as it was in the case of his discussion of
the conditions for the continued existence of masses of matter.

His

initial statement is as follows;

That being then one plant which has such an organization of
parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life,
it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of
the same life, though that life be communicated to new particles of matte:' vitally united to the living plant, in a
like continued organization conformable to that sort of
plants .-" 0
So the first answer seems to be that an organism persists just so long

as its temporal, parts continue uo partake of the same lifej A and B are

temporal parts of the same organism if and only if they partake of "one

common life."

The problem now becomes one of explaining what the life
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of an organism is and what makes temporal parts of a life parts of the

same life.

A philosopher such as Leibniz would have identified that

life with the soul of the organic being.
If vegetables and animals have no soul, their identity is
only apparent; but if they have, individual identity is
in truth strictly speaking there, although their organized
bodies do not preserve it.^9

But this solution is clearly unacceptable to Locke.

Searching for an

alternative answer, he is driven to say that the "continued organiza-

tion conformable to that sort of plants" "Is that individual life."

The italics are his.

4o

On the basis of this statement we may interpret

Locke as saying that it is necessary and sufficient to the continued existence of an organism that its new temporal parts have the same organ-

ization as did its earlier ones.

A and B are temporal parts of the

same organism if and only if they display the same organization of

their atomic components.

It is true that Locke sometimes makes remarks

which are inconsistent with the statement in which he identifies the
life of an organism with the organization displayed by its temporal parts.

For example, we find him saying of "that continued organization" that it
is "fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united."

But in

view of the fact that he offers no other definition of the life of an
organic being, such inconsistencies should probably be dismissed as due
to carelessness.

Now we are prepared to present a definition of an organism considered as a four-dimensional temporal whole.
(32) 0 is an organism which is a temporal whole

if and only if
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0 is composed of a series, S, of (duration!!. ess) temporal slices
such that
(a) Each slice is a cohesion of atoms
(b)

Each slice has an organization of its atomic parts such that the
organization is fitted to sustain itself in being

(c)

(A) (B)

/Ta is a member of S and B is a member of S) only if

(A and B have the same organization^?
(d) S is not itself a proper part of any series meeting requirements

(a),

(b) and (c).

There might be an objection to (32) on the ground that not even a
nondenumerably infinite series of durationless instants can compose a
temporally extended object

<»

If we revise (32) to say that 0 is composed

of a series of temporal parts having duration, then we shall have to

weaken (a) to reads
(a®) Each temporal part has as its ultimate spatial components exclu-

sively atoms of matter.

Following the procedure we employed when discussing masses of matter,
we might try to develop an identity criterion for organisms which are

temporal wholes.

Where "0^" and "0^" are replaceable exclusively by

names of such temporal wholes and "A" and "B" by names of tempoi’al parts
that meet the requirement of (a) or (a*) and the requirement of (b).s we

may assert
(

0

33 )

1

= 02

if and only if
(3A) (3b)

/Ta is part of 0 1 and B is part of 0

have the same organization)? =

and (A and B
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Before we cam assess the adequacy of this definition of a tempo-

rally extended organic whole and of the identity criterion which is
based upon it, we need to know more precisely what kind of organization
it is that the temporal parts of a single organism are being required

to share.

Is Locke saying that all of the temporal parts of an organ-

ism must display exactly the same atomic configuration?

Is any alter-

ation in the patterning of its component atoms sufficient to bring an
organism to an end?

Clearly no temporally extended organic body could

meet such a criterion.

But it seems likely that Locke had a far less

stringent requirement in mind.

Using the example of an oak tree, he

describes the organization which must be displayed by all the temporal

parts of the tree in the following terms:
"such a disposition of ^articles^ as constitutes the parts of an
oak"

"such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and dis-

tribute nourishment, so as to continue and frame the wood, bark, and
leaves, &c„, of an oak"
"a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants"

4

It seems quite clear that the organization which must be had in common

by all the temporal parts of an oak is simply that organization which
is characteristic of the species.

the requirement (a) or (a

f

)

If A and B are temporal parts meeting

and the requirement (b) of (J2), then they

are parts of the same oak if and only if they both display oak tree

organization.

Any series made up of temporal parts all of which have

the characteristic oak tree properties will constitute a single oak.

and oak tree., both have a part that displays oak tree

If oak tree
^

'
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organization, they will be identical oaks.

Nothing is plainer than the falsity of the last three statements.

Oak tree organization is common to all oaks; it does not serve to individuate them.

If each member of a plurality of temporal parts of the

requisite sort displays oak tree organization, these parts may belong
to the same oak or to different oaks.

The fact that the parts of oak

treei and the parts of oak tree2 all display oak organization does not

legitimate the conclusion that they are the same oak.
It seems that Locke was not altogether blind to this defect in

his criteria for the persistence and identity of organisms.

We find

him saying:
"For this organization, being at any one instant in any one collec-

tion of matter, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all

other ..."
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Now a patterning or organization of material, particles may be regarded in
two v/ays .

It may be viewed as an abstract entity, that is to say, a

property which is capable of being instantiated by more than one

collection of particles.
gard it.

This is probably the most natural, way to re-

Or it may be thought of as a particular collection of partic-

ular material particles arranged in a certain pattern.

In other words

an organization may be identified either with a pattern or with the

collection of things that displays the pattern.
If Locke intends to identify an organization as an abstract
pattern, then it is feasible for him to think, as he doe3, that the same

organization may be displayed by distinct masses of matter or by temporal segments belonging to masses which are diverse.

So it will be
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possible

for-

a single organism to have temporal parts belonging to

diiferent masses*

But his definition of an organism and his criteria

for the identity of organisms will suffer from the fatal defects we

have been describing.

In the sentence just quoted, Locke, apparently

sensing the problem, wants to identify the organization common to the
different temporal parts of an organism with a particular collection of

material particles that is arranged according to a certain pattern.

When "organization" is interpreted in this way, it will no doubt be
true that no two organisms, even of the same kind, will be able to

possess the sane organisation, and difference of organization will serve
as an individuating principle.

The difficulty that now arises is that

organization or patterning ceases to be a property that can be exhibited
by diverse collections of particles.

So Locke's persistence criterion

for organisms will require that if temporal segments A and B are to be

parts of the same oak, they must not only both display oak tree organization; they must be temporal, parts of the same mass of matter.

And this

clearly violates Locke’s basic intention in framing the persistence
criterion.

If we think of the organization which all the temporal parts

of a given organism must display as the organization characteristic of
its species, then we shall be in trouble whether we interpret "organiza-

tion" as referring to an abstract entity or to a concrete collection of
things.

But is there perhaps some organization, other than that typical

of the species, which would invariably be displayed by all the parts of

a particular organism and which would be unique to them?

If we could

discover such an organization or pattern, it would enable us to assert
that any two non-identical temporal segments of masses of matter dis-
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playing that organization belong to the same organism.

It seems un-

likely, hov/ever, that such an organization is discoverable.

Any living

organism undergoes profound organizational changes in the course of its
existence.

A mature oak displays an organization that resembles the

organization displayed by other mature oaks far more closely than it
does the organization manifested by itself v/hen a young seedling or an
acorn.

It is difficult to believe that any similarity between the or-

ganizational patterns displayed by the acorn and the mature tree grown
from that acorn would not also exist between the organizational patterns
of most full-grown oaks.

But perhaps we have been neglecting an important element in Locke s
9

discussion of the properties essential to the persistence of organisms.

There is some evidence that he wished to include spatiotemporal continuity of parts as one of these properties.
For this organization ... is that individual life, which existing
constantly from that moment both forwards and backwards, in the
same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts united to the
living body of the plant, it has that identity which makes the
same plant, and all the parts of it, parts of the same plant,
during all thp^time that they exist united in that continued
organization. ^
In a subsequent discussion of the nature of human beings we find him
saying:
"... the same successive body not shift ed al l at o nce, must, as well

as the same immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man.
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The notion which he is trying to express in this passage seems to be
that if two distinct masses of matter constitute successive temporal, parts
of the same organic body, it must be the case that the successor mass re-

tains some of the particles of matter that entered into the composition
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of its predecessor.

Sc perhaps we should supplement the definition of an organism as a

four-dimensional temporal whole which was presented in (32) with additional clauses specifying, first, that the temporal parts of such a whole
must exhibit spatioternporal continuity and, second, that when successive

temporal parts of an organic whole consist of different material masses,
the masses must have some atomic components in common.

There are enormous difficulties involved in developing an account of
spatioternporal continuity adequate to serve as a persistence criterion

for material objects or as the basis for logically necessary and suffi-

cient conditions of identity for material objects picked out as existing
at different times.

In a recent article, Jack Nelson has argued power-

fully that we have no such adequate account and that it is unlikely that

shall ever be able to develop one.

vre

"Indeed it now seems that talk of the spatio-temporal continuity of

material objects is a loose and popular way of talking, a way of talking
ff5

which does not allow of rigorous refinement."
An exploration of this complex topic lies wholly outside the bounds
of our discussion.

We shall have to content ourselves with a crude and

admittedly inadequate formulation of the concept.

Let us assume that A

and B are temporal parts of objects of the same sort, e.g., they are both
temporal parts of atoms, of finite spirits, of masses of matter, of
organisms, etc.
t

*

„

Let us further assume that A coincides with t and B with

Then A and B are spatiotemporally continuous just in case there is

some C, which is a temporal, segment of an object of the same sort to which

A and B belong, at every temporal instant t" between t and t', such that

r

!

134

each C ar each f

occupies a place contiguous with the place occupied by

1

the C at the prior and succeeding instants of time, the series beginning

with A at

t

and ending with B at t'»

occupies a spatial position

P_
L

tion P. at time

t

J

,

J
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The central, notion is that if A

at time t^ and B occupies a spatial, posi-

then A and B are spatiotemporally continuous if and

only if there is a contiguous series of places (volumes of space) connec-

ting P. and P

such that those places are occupied at successive times
J

between t^ and t ..by temporal segments of objects of the same kind as that
to which A and B belongs

In order to

male©

more precise the notion behind Locke's requirement

that "the same successive body" not be "shifted all at once," we shall

borrow the terminology and definitional, apparatus developed by R„ M»

Chisholm for the purpose of explicating the relation that must hold between
•

different composita making up a material object such as a ship*

47

Except

for the fact that a compositnm apparently cannot survive a rearrangement

of its component parts, Chisholm's composita do not differ from Locke's

masses of matter,,

The requirement that a mass of matter must retain some

of the elements composing the mass which is its immediate temporal prede-

cessor is expressed by Chisholm

sis

the specification that a compositum

dire ctl y evolve from its predecessor.
Let us say that a given compositum N direc tly evolv es from a
certain compositum A provided the following condition holds
N and A have some parts in common! and N is that compositum
which directly results either from rearranging parts of A, or
from adding parts of A, or from removing parts from A. And,
for simplicity, let us misuse the word "evolves" so that we
may also say that any given compositum also evolves from
itself; if N is identical with A, then N has evolved from A,
and A has evolved from N. °
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If we remove the phrase "from rearringing parts of A," and substi-

tute "mass of matter" for "compositum," this definition of direct evo-

lution will suit our purposes nicely.

However, it is plain that the re-

lation of direct evolution will not hold between any two arbitrarily selected masses of matter that enter into the temporal composition of an
organism,

When we encounter the same ship on two different occasions, the compositum we encounter on the second occasion
in all probability will not have evolved directly from the
compositum we encountered on the earlier occasion. There
will rather be a series of composita, one of v/hich will have
evolved directly from the one we encountered on the earlier
occasion, another of which will have evolved directly from
that, and so on, perhaps for many different composita, resulting finally in the compositum we encountered on the
later occasion. The later compositum will thus have evolved
from the first, even though it did not directly evolve from
the first.
The relation that evolving bears to directly evolvin g
will thus be analogous to the relation that ancestor bears
to parent « And thus we could define "evolution" in terms of
"direct evolution" by imitating Frege's definition of the
ancestral relation. N is an ancestor of A, Frege said in
effect, provided that the following condition holds: N is a
member of every class C such that (1) A is a member of C and
(2) whatever is parent of anything that is a member of C is
also a member of C,
Let us say, then, that a compositum N evolves from a
compositum A, provided that: N is a member of every class
C such that (1) A is a member of G and (2) whatever directly
from anything that is a member of C is also a member

The notion that an organic body "may not be shifted all at once"
may be expressed by saying that two masses of matter (or temporal segments of such masses), M and M*

,

belong to the same organism only if M

has evolved from M* or M* has evolved from M.
So we may add the following clauses to (32), which is our definition
of an organism as a temporally extended whole.
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(e)

(A)

(B)

/Ta is a member of S and B is a member cf S) only if (A and

7
B are spatiotemporally continuous)/ *

(f)

(A)

(B) /Ta is a member of S and B is a member of S) only if (A has

evolved from B or B has evolved from

A_)7*

It may be thought that the presence of (f) makes (e) redundant; that any

series satisfying (f) would necessarily satisfy (e)„

But this is not the

It will be recalled that if the compositum, A, is identical with

case.

the compositum, B, then it is said that A has evolved from B and also
that B has evolved from A.

The same would hold true of any A and B that

were temporal parts of the same compositum or mass*

But both Chisholm and

Locke allow for the possibility that a compositum or a mass of matter may
go out of existence and then at a later time once again commence to

exist.

The parts of such a mass would not be spatiotemporally continued.

So it might be possible for an A and a B to meet requirement (f) either

because they were- identical masses or parts of an identical mass and yet
fail to satisfy (e).
It is apparent that (32), supplemented by (e) and (f), provides a

persistence criterion for organisms far superior to that derivable from
The chief defect of the new criterion is its depend-

the original (32).

ence on an unsatisfactory concept of spatiotemporal continuity.

Even if

we ignore this difficulty, however, there appear to be counter-examples
to it.

For the most part they involve entities standing in the parent-

offspring relation.

Gabbay and Moravcsik remark that "a mother dying at

childbirth and her baby exemplify both /spatiotemporal-7 continuity and
causal connection, but are clearly not construed as temporal- stages of a

single entity."'^

0

They are surely correct in thinking this.

Mother and
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baby have the same human organization, enabling them to satisfy our
clause (c), and the baby has evolved from the mother, so that they satisfy (f).

Yet they are two organisms, not one.

We may observe in

passing that the mother-baby pair would seem to be a counter-example to
the supplemented (32) even if the mother did not die at childbirth.

Under these circumstances we should be obliged to say that there existed
two temporally extended human beings, having as a common part the mother

prior to the baby's birth (or conception) but having later parts (the

mother after the birth and the baby after the birth) that were distinct.

The situation of the mother prior to the birth, in other words, would be
analogous to that of an amoeba before the occurrence of fission.

This

certainly conflicts with our ordinary ways of thinking.
We may use clauses (e) and (f) of the revised (32) to supplement the

criterion of identity for organisms presented in (33)

°

Then (33) will

have the same strengths and weaknesses that were discussed in connection

with the new version of (32).
4.

The Relation between the Test for the Identity
of Simple Substances and the Persistence Criteria

Locke's system of criteria for the identity and persistence of objects of different sorts has been subjected to grave criticism of a funda-

mental sort by his contemporary commentator, Baruch Brody.

It is the

central thesis of Brody's critique that, having proffered a test for the

identity of temporally enduring objects (what Brody calls "a general
theory of identity'*), it was a profound conceptual mistake on Locke's
part to go on to propose a variety of persistence criteria for entities
of different types (referred to by Brody as "special, principles govern-

,
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ing the identity of different types of objects”).

This criticism of

Brody's is difficult to comprehend in view of the fact that at several
points in his article he displays some understanding of the unique role

performed by a persistence criterion and of Locke's reasons for wanting
to put forward such criteria.

For example:

In summary then, Locke felt that, for any given entity, there
were only certain changes that it could undergo and still continue to exist, that it had to retain certain properties from
t^ to t-, if there was going to be any entity existing at t^
identical with it. Moreover, he felt that what properties""
these were would vary from one type of entity to another. In
some cases, the properties in question were, composition properties, but usually this was not the case.^ 1
"... he felt that his general theory did not do justice to our intui-

tions about the type of charges that an object can undergo while still

continuing to exist.”

52

While not denying that

vie

have such "essentialist” intuitions,

Brody nevertheless seems to believe that some sort of inconsistency will
inevitably be generated by any attempt to combine a criterion for identity, such as Locke proposes for simple substances, with persistence cri-

teria that specify the properties necessary for the continued existence
of individuals belonging to the various kinds.

It never becomes clear

at least to this reader, why Brody thinks this is so.

He begins his

article by pointing out that Locke's discussion of personal, identity
”... is found within the context of a much more general theox'y about

identity, a theory which (if true) raises considerable doubt about the
53
noint of his discussion of personal identity.”'"

This seems to suggest

that Brody thinks the theory of “personal identity" redundant, in view
of the fact that Locke

ha.s

"a much more general theory aoout identity.”

^
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After the discussion of the last chapter, it hardly seems necessary to
comment that the former is a persistence criterion, the latter, an epistemic test for identity, that the roles they perform

sire

different, though

not unrelated, and that their coexistence in a system of criteria for

identity and individuation involves no redundancy whatsoever.

Brody

goes on to intimate that the consequences of combining criteria of these

different sorts are worse than mere redundancy.

On the one hand, I want to show that, given Locke's general
theory, a theory of personal identity of the type he advances
faces much more fundamental problems than the familiar ones
raised by Reid and Butler .
This claim is repeated in the last paragraph of the article,

v/ith

the difference that the "fundamental problems" have become "fundamental

defects."

Apparently Brody thinks that the problems resulting from the

combination of the "general theory" with the theory of personal identity
are insoluble.

"... similar things can be said about all special theories

of the identity of physical objects, persons, etc."

What are these fundamental defects?
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Why does Brody think it incon-

sistent to propound a criterion or criteria for identity and at the same
time to set forth a variety of persistence criteria for individuals of

different kinds?

First of all, he seems to believe, as we noted in the

last chapter, that there are difficulties entailed by the stipulation of
more than one necessary and sufficient condition of identity.

He is

aware that these conditions would have to be such that one of them would

hold good just in case the other did.

For reasons never made clean he

appears to think that this requirement would not or could not be met.

We have already pointed out that this view is erroneous.

Here it may

.
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simply bo mentioned that if Brody were consistent about this matter he
should be criticizing Locke for putting forward a test for identity

which depends on the notion that no two simple substances of the same
sort may exactly occupy the same place at the same time.

For Brody

thinks that anyone accepting the principle of the identity of indiscernibles is thereby debarred from subscribing to a necessary condition
of identity other than the principle of the indiscernibility of identi-

cals t and likewise, anyone accepting the latter principle is forbidden
to make use of a condition sufficient to insure identity other than the

principle of the identity of indiscernibles
Anyone who is prepared to accept the identity of indiscernibles
is identical
. .. and yet wants to say that physical object
with physical object o ? only if they are spatio-temporally continuous has the same problem. And even if one is not prepared
to accept the identity of indiscernibles, one will still be in
the same trouble if one adopts Leibniz' Law and also claims that
spatio-temporal continuity is sufficient for the identity of
physical objects. 5°
Now Locke, of course, did not formally subscribe either to the prin
c-iple of the

identity of indiscernibles or that of the indiscernibility

of identicals.

fused

Ms

Yet it is not credible to suppose that he would have re-

assent to them if they had been propounded to him,

said

indeed

his test for the identity of simple substances presupposes these principles.

So Brody should be saying that Locke has no right to put forward

even that criterion of identity which stipulates the sameness of objects

provided they are of the same substantial sort, exactly occupying the
same place at the same time.

For clearly he believes that to subscribe

to more than one necessary and/or sufficient condition of identity is to

involve oneself in some sort of logical difficulty.
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The second cause of Brody's notion that it is somehow inconsistent
to combine a test for identity with a variety of persistence criteria may

be found in the fact that he never seems to have a clear grasp of the way
in which a persistence criterion differs from a test for identity.

Re-

peatedly Brody falls into Locke's own mistake of thinking that the relation which holds between distinct temporal segments of a given whole is
one of identity.
"... an oak tree

can be identical with an oak tree Op even though

the set of particles making up

cles making up Op"

57

is not identical with the set of parti-

Brody apparently realizes that this sounds a little

strange for he appends a footnote saying "this does not contravene

would be an oak tree at time

Leibniz' Law since

an oak tree at a different time t 0 ,"
is that

t

while o^ would be

What he should, of course, be saying

and Op are not (whole) oak trees, but oak tree parts that are

not identical with each other although they are parts of the same tree.

The same confusion reveals itself in statements such as "... on the
whole, there is no connection between x’s being identical with y and

their composition" and "It is ordinarily thought that in order for x at
to be identical with y at t_, y at tp must retain some of the properties

that x had at

term such as "x at

58

t^

(Note the failure to resolve the ambiguity of a

If it refers to a temporal segment, then the

relation of identity does net hold between x at

and y at tp.

If it

refers to a whole by means of a dated property, then clearly that whole
must retain, not just some, but all of its properties in order to remain

self-identical.)
So Brody thinks that persistence criteria do not differ in kind
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from tests of identity; they simply specify additional necessary and/or

sufficient conditions for identity.

He does not see that when they do

fill this role they are applicable primarily to wholes that are being

picked out by temporal predicates with dates that differ from each
other.

Consequently he believes that the specification of persistence

criteria in addition to the specification of a criterion of identity
falls under his general prohibition against laying down mors than one

necessary and/or sufficient condition of identity.

Repeatedly he says

that adding these additional, principles involves "making commitments

w hose justification is very unclear."

59

Finally,. Brody makes it clear that he has not understood the differ-

ence between the properties an individual of a certain sort must retain
in order to continue to exist as the same individual (its individual

essence) and the properties which it needs to qualify it as a member of a

certain class (its Aristotelian essence).

Toward the end of the article,

Brody again appears to recognize that the essentialist principles Locke
puts forward as persistence criteria for masses of matter, organisms and
persons do perform a function that is not fulfilled by his test for the
identity of simple substances.

The latter does not "do justice to our

intuitive feeling that objects do not continue to exist through radical
changes."

But Brody thinks that it was unnecessary for Locke to make

such "strong" essentialist claims.

It would, he suggests, have been

sufficient to specify the Aristotelian essence of the things in question.

This sounds as though he believes that we have laid down an adequate persistence criterion for persons in saying that if a person is to continue in existence he must retain the property of being a person.

But
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in the next paragraph Brody admits that a stipulation of the Aristote-

lian essence is not sufficient to distinguish from each other members
of a class of objects having the same Aristotelian essence.

He thinks

it is plausible to assume that is why "Locke felt that what was needed

was a special requirement for the identity of each object
If, however, this suggestion is correct, then it is evident
that Locke has made a serious blunder here. After all, he
already has a principle that enables him to distinguish
objects with the same Aristotelean essence, viz., (2). If,
then, like Locke, one is adding essentialist principles to
a theory of identity that contains some principle like the
identity of indescernibles , there is no need to go beyond
Aristotelean essentialism. 1

This statement furnishes a magnificent example of the misconceptions

which can ©-rise from a failure to distinguish clearly between a number of
very different principles.

We have, first of all, the fundamental prin-

ciple of identity, of which the identity of indiscernibles constitutes
one half, and what is commonly referred to as Leibniz' Law constitutes
the other half.

Secondly, we have a very general epistemic test which

purports to tell us whether substances of the same sort can satisfy the
principle of identity, that is, whether they do in fact have all their

properties in common.

This test is based upon the intuition that no two

such substances can totally occupy the same place at the same time.
Thirdly, we have specifications of the Aristotelian essence of things
of various sorts.

These are what would ordinarily be considered as

definitions of kinds or species.
teria properly speaking.

Finally, we have the persistence cri-

A definition of a temporally extended whole

includes a specification both of the Aristotelian essence and of the

persistence criterion for entities of that sort.
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Each of these kinds of criteria has a distinct function to perform.
Brody's final criticism of Locke is based upon a failure to see the
difference between an epistemic test of identity, such as the specifi-

cation that any A and B totally occupying the same place at the same time
are identical, and persistence criteria v;hich tell us, for example, that
no mass of matter can survive either the loss or the acquisition of an

atom, vjhereas an organism, which can survive indefinitely many of such

losses and acquisitions, must meet other more complicated requirements in
order to stay in existence.

He seems to think that a criterion of iden-

tity, which might be either the principle of the identity of indiscern-

ibles or the epistemic test based on spatial and temporal location put
forward by Locke, can do the work of a persistence criterion.

Hence, he

concludes, Locke has made a serious blunder in adding persistence prin-

ciples to his tests of identity, thus going "beyond Aristotelian essentialism."

But this is surely erroneous.

Neither a principle such as

the identity of indiscernibles nor Locke's epistemic test does anything

to specify what properties are essential to the continued existence of a

being of a certain kind.

The identity principles do nothing to mark out

the boundaries of temporally extended individuals of different sorts.

That is not their purpose.

Part of Bx-ody's confusion on this matter may

stem from his notion that the test

fox-

identity based on spatial and

temporal location does carry a commitment to a minimum form of essentialism.

Because this test is applicable only to substances of the

same sort, he seems to think of it as specifying persistence criteria
fox-

things belonging to the different substantial kinds.

do this.

But it does not

The principle which asserts that things totally occupying the
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same place at the same time are the same thing does not so much as con-

tain a prohibition against an atom's transforming itself into a spiritual substance or vice versa.

It does not rule out the possibility of

there being a temporally extended individual which begins life as an

atom but in its later years is promoted to the status of a finite
spirit.

For even if an individual, call it A, were to undergo such a

transformation it would still be true that any individual, B, which at
s.

given time totally occupied the same place occupied by A, would be

identical with A.

It would simply be the case that when A was an atom,

so was B, and similar ly when A became a spirit.
It is not my intention to argue that Locke was aware of the differ-

ence in kind that separates his test for the identity of simple sub-

stances from his persistence criteria for masses of matter, organisms and
persons.
t fl

Oblivious to the ambiguity of expressions having the form' 'A at

and lacking clarity concerning the distinction between the very differ-

ent relations of identity and genidentity, he thinks of all these tests

as criteria of identity.

This misconception is the source of some

serious difficulties for his theories.

However, that he does in fact

provide both a general epistemic test of identity and a variety of persistence criteria for entities of different sorts is proof that he was not

entirely insensitive to the difference between the notions of identity
and genidentity.

His work manifests at least a subliminal awareness of

the distinction he was never able explicitly to articulate.

146

Footnotes to Chanter II
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(II, 27, 4).
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328 f.
4

II, 27, 1.
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it is impossible for two things of the same kind to be in the same place
at the same time.
It is true that Locke does present the former as
though it were a logical consequence of the latter in his initial statement of these principles. But this is a piece of carelessness which
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Brody's assertion that "Locke normally did not see this point ..."
,

II, 27, 4.

O'.

D. Mabbott, John Locke

II, 27, 4.

12

II, 27, 5.

II, 23, 17.

II, 23, 24.

15
16

17

18

19

20
21

Ibid,
II, 23, 26.

Ibid

.

Ill, 3, 15.
II, 31, 6.

III, 6, 9.
II, 8, 15.

,

P. 59.

148

22

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

n,

o

o, 9.

III, 6, 6 .
III, 6, 4.
III, 6, 5.

III, 6, 6 .
III, 6, 5*
II, 27, 21 .

Peter Geach, Reference and Generality

,

pp. 43-44.

30

It was Locke's belief that there was a single test for the identity ox simple substances. The test could be applied only when dealing
with substances of the same sort, but it was supposed to work equally
well for material substances, finite spiritual substances and infinite
spiritual substances. For Locke, even the test of identity did not differ from one substantial kind to another.

31

II, 27, 4.

II, 27, 2.
II, 27, 4.

34

See note 5 above.

39

p. 13. Broad says Locke held "that every
C. D. Broad, o£. cit .
macroscopic body is a disconnected collection of ultra-microscopic particles of various kinds." Hence Broad's example of an aggregate or mass
of particles is a heap of rocks. Broad speaks of the components of an
aggregate as being "conjoined together," but he clearly takes this to
mean either "touching each other" or "in close proximity to each other."
Locke did indeed hold that every macroscopic body is composed of numbers
of separate atoms, but as wa have seen he believed it to be essential to
an extended body that its atomic parts stick firmly together. But the
rocks in a rock pile are "perfectly loose one from another," so a rock
pile would not qualify as a mass. In another part of his article Broad
uses liquid enclosed in a vessel as an example of a body. But Locke expressly disqualifies liquids from membership in the class of material
,

,

,

149

masses because the particles of the liquid "have no cohesion one with
another,,"

36
37

38
39

40
4l

42
43

II, 2?, 6.
II, 27, 3.

Ibid.
-

.

.Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding , II, 27, 5,

II, 27, 5.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid .

Italics mine.

Mabbott interprets Locke as proffering spatio-

temporal. continuity of parts as "the principle of identity" for organisms,
on. cit . , p. 6l.

II, 27, 10.
Italics mine. Mabbott incorrectly, I think, interprets this passage as a mere reiteration of the principle that spatiotemporal continuity is the criterion for "same body."

45

Jack Nelson, "Logically Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for
Identity through Time," American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 9 (1972),
pp. 177-185.
,

46

This definition of spatiotemporal continuity is an adaptation of
one provided by Richard Swinburne in Space and Time , p. 23. It appears
in the article by Nelson, op. cit . , p« ldO.
47
Roderick M. Chisholm, "The Loose and Popular and the Strict and
Philosophical Senses of Identity," in Pe rcepti on and Personal Identi fy
ed. by Norman S» Care and Robert H, Grimm, pp. 62-106.
'

Ibid, p. 95.

^
^
p. 518.

ibid, p. 96 .

Gabbay and Moravcsik, "Sameness and Individuation,"

otd.

cit

.

.

.

150

51

52

Brody, "Locke on the
Identity of Persons,"
on. cit .
Ibid, p. 334 .

iilLli

54
55
56

57

P* 327.

Italics mine.

Ibid.
Ibid, p. 334 .

Ibid» P- 331.
Ibid, p. 33o.

58
Ibid*

59
6o
6l

62

Italics mine.

.ibid . P.

Ibid

.

331.

P. 334.

Ibid.

Ibid, P * p31

P. 331.

151

CHAPTER

III

THE MIND AS AN IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE

1.

The Mind

In the opening paragraphs of the Essay Concerning Human Understand ing Locke informs the reader:

—

This, therefore, being my purpose
to inquire into the
original, certainty and extent of human knowledge . .. I
shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind? or trouble myself to examine wherein
its essence consists
If by "physical consideration of the mind" Locke intends to refer to the

physiology of the brain and the sense organs, we can easily understand

why he would wish

fco

excuse himself from such an undertalcing.

It is

clear that he hopes to give an account of the operations of the under-

standing which could be true regardless of the nature of the physical
processes which may or may not accompany such operations.

In fact, if

Locke had adhered more firmly to this resolution and, at least in the
initial stages of his discussion, had avoided talk concerning the

working of the physical organism, his account of the understanding would
have been more consistent than it actually is.

On the other hand, it

may well seem surprising that an inquiry concerning the human under-

standing should seek to bypass the question of the essence of the mind.
For the understanding, according to Locke, is nothing more than the
power of perception which the mind possesses,

2

and in many instances he

appears to employ the terms, "mind and"understanding, "synonymously.
,!

Contrary to his preliminary disavowal, Locke seems at first
to have little hesitation in informing us regarding the essence

sight,
or.

the

5
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mind.

He refers to the mind as a "thinking substance," a"spiritual"sub-

stance," or as a "being that thinks end wills."

The terms "mind,"

"soul," and "spirit" are for him interchangeable.^

distinguish the mind from the physical brain.

He is careful to

Cheerfully violating his

initial determination to refrain from discussion of "physical consider-

ations," he informs us that the simple ideas of sensation enter into us
by means of the "organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey

them from without to their audience in the brain, the mind's presence

room (as

I

may so call it)."

Nevertheless, alterations of the body do

not in themselves constitute perception, nor do they infallibly guarantee that it will take place.
... if they reach not the mind, whatever impressions
are made- on the outward parts, if they are not taken
notice of within, there is no perception.

Concerning the existence of our own selves, Locke claims that we possess the highest degree of certainty.

Producing an argument similar to

the Cartesian cogito , he maintains:
... if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of
the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought
which I call doubt. ... In every act of sensation,
reasoning or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of
our ov/n being.®

Judging on the basis of this passage, it would seem that Locke does not
intend to infer the existence of a thinker from the fact of the thought,
but rather that he claims immediate and intuitive awareness of himself

as a thinking being.

Elsewhere, however, in a passage that more directly

parallels the Cartesian formula, he appears to be presenting an inference

7

9
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We know certainly, by experience, that we sometimes
think; and thence draw this infallible consequence,
that there in something in us that has a power to
think.

—

In the next sentence that "something" is identified as a substance.

It

is logically impossible, Locke here indicates, for thinking to take

place which is not the thought of some thinker, and to be a thinker means
to be a thinking substance.

Despite his original reluctance to examine wherein the essence of

mind consists, Locke continues to furnish illumination on this subject.
What he says is still in accord with the Cartesian, account.

Our idea of soul, as an immaterial spirit, is of a
substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting
motion in body, by will or thought.
Our idea of body, on the other hand "is of an extended solid substance,
capable of communicating motion by impulse.

g
1

’

That which especially dis-

tinguishes spirit or mind from body is its possession of active, rather

than merely passive, power.

Only spirit is truly active, in that it

alone has the power to make or initiate any change.

All power relates to

action, Locke tells us, and of action we have the idea of two sorts only!

thinking and motion.
it is
(1) of thinking, body affords us no idea at all;
only from reflection that we have that,
(2) Neither have
we from body any idea of the beginning of motion, ...
The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection, on what passes in ourselves, where we find by
experience, that, barely by willing it, barely by a
thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies
which were before at rest.

The active power of the mind to move the body, or to "order the consideration of any idea," Locke calls the will.

The second great power,

that of perception or thinking, he entitles the understanding,

'l’he

power

U
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of thinking, in its turn, possesses both a passive and an active

capacity.

The "power to receive ideas or thoughts from the operation of

any external substance" is purely passive.

That is to say, in receiving

the simple ideas of sensation, the understanding has no more power to refuse or alter them "than a mirror can refuse, alter or obliterate the

images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein produce." 10

For this reason we cannot avoid the painful sensation of being burned
except by removing ourselves from the vicinity of fire, a circumstance

which is, of course, biologically salutary.

But there is another aspect

to the understanding.
...» to be able to bring into view ideas out of sight at
one's own choice, and to compare which of them one thinks
fit, this is an active power.

This leads us to the conception of the mind as the locus of active intellectual powers or the seat of faculties.

Locke is anxious to prevent us

from thinking of these faculties as real beings cr distinct agents of the
soul.

12

The faculties are no more nor less than capacities cl the mind

to act, or in the case of the passive faculties, to be acted upon.

The

active power of the mind to fix its attention upon whatsoever object it

chooses is a prerequisite for the discovery of the second great source of
simple ideas?

reflection.

It lies within the power of the understanding

to turn inward upon itself, to observe its own internal, operations and

thus to acquire self-knowledge.

gained in this way.

All our knowledge of our own minds is

But if attention is not deliberately directed upon

the inner world of mental activities, clear and distinct ideas of such

operations will not be forthcoming.

13

In addition to the act which is

necessary for self-discovery, the mind actively operates upon the simple
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ideas which it derives from the two sources of sensation and reflection.
It first shows itself active in recollection, which is the deliberate

revival of previously imprinted ideas.

Secondly, it possesses the

power of actively distinguishing between ideas, that is, of seeing them
as same or different.

Here, according to Locke, it is infallible and

acts without pain, labor or deduction.

Thirdly, by means of its faculty

of comparing, the understanding gives rise to ideas of relations.

Most

important is the further power of compounding, by which the understanding,

acting voluntarily, combines simple ideas into complex ones.
the mind has the power to name and the power to abstract.

Finally,

In the latter

operation, the mind considers an appearance as separate from the circum-

stances of its real existence, such as its time, place or concomitant
ideas.

The color of chalk, snow, milk and so forth, considered in

itself, is then made "a representative of that kind" and called "white„l4
ness."
V/ith the

exception of his teaching regarding abstract ideas, Locke’s

account of the mind or soul, insofar as we have hitherto sketched it,

differs very little from the view of Descartes.

The mind has been

described as an immaterial thinking substance, a res cogitans , possessing

both the power passively to receive

idea.s in

sensation and the power ac-

tively to combine, compare and otherwise operate upon them in thinking.
Furthermore, the mind has been presented either as accessible to its own
direct observation, or failing that, as logically inferrible from those
of its operations which ere directly obsei'vable.

Let us now consider the

ways in which the Lockian conception of the mind diverges from the

Cartesian pattern.
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It is Locke's denial of the doctrine of innate ideas and innate prin-

ciples that constitutes the most famous deviation.

His claim that the

mind is at birth a tabula rasa is based on the teaching, which will prove
to be central for his theory of the mind, that to have an idea is to be

consciously aware of it.
analytic truth for Locke.

This teaching seems to have the status of an
The word, "idea," is defined as "whatsoever is

the object of the understanding when a man thinks."

1 '’

If there are any

innate principles, he maintains, they must have been imprinted upon the

mind since its inception.

"For if they are not notions naturally im-

printed, how can they be innate?"

But it is incoherent to assert that the

mind has imprinted upon it a notion of which it is ignorant.
... it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that
there are truths imprinted on the soul which it perceives or understands not; imprinting, if it signify
anything, being nothing else but the making certain
truths to be perceived.

Hence he is able to argue that since children and idiots neither apprehend
nor assent to propositions such as the law of contradiction, these propo-

sitions cannot be imprinted upon their minds and cannot have the status
of innate ideas for them.

Locke's teaching rules out the possibility of unconscious or unperceived ideas.

Ideas, he tells us, are "nothing but actual perceptions in

the mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them."

Strangely enough, in

the first edition of the Essay Locke nevertheless

sets out to explain memory in the traditional way as a storehouse of un-

perceived ideas.

By the second edition he seems to have realized tne in-

consistency of this account with his main teaching, for he inserts the
following paragraph.

17

157

••• this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the
memory signifies no more but this,
that the mind has
a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has
once had, with this additional perception annexed to them,
that it has had them before .-*- 0

Whether the memories are numerically identical with the original
ideas or whether they are simply more or less accurate and lively copies
of the originals is a difficult point*

In his chapter on memory Locke

speaks as though he held the former opinion.

This farther is to be observed, concerning ideas lodged
in the memory, and upon occasion revived by the mind,
that they are not only (as the word revive imports) none
of them new ones, but also that the mind takes notice of
them as of a former impression, and renews its acquaint^
ance with them, as with ideas it had known before. 1 9
But in his chapter on identity and diversity

v?e

find him saying that a

thought, since it perishes at the moment it begins, cannot exist at

different times as permanent beings can.

exists at a time,

different time,

Therefore a thought which

cannot be the same as a thought existing at a

20

It is the latter passage that seems to represent

Locke's considered opinion, and which seems most consistent with the
totality of his teaching.

The pov/er of the mind, then, to revive perceptions which it once had
must be understood as a power to produce copies of the original impressions.

After the mind has received a certain idea through the avenues

of perception or reflection it is typically able to produce in itself new

ideas which more or less resemble the first one.

This is a power it did

not possess prior to the original perception or act of reflection.

It

would seem that the mind’s acquisition of a new power can be explained
1

only by some alteration or modification in the mind produced by the
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receipt of the original idea.

In fact, Locke describes this process of

modification as an "imprinting" on the memory or a "setting of the
stamp" into the mind.

This is strangely at variance with his statement

that it is nonsensical to speak of notions imprinted upon the soul and
yet unperceived by it.

Ideas of which the mind is not consciously

aware but which are nevertheless "imprinted" or "stamped" on the mind

seem to be indistinguishable from the unperceived ideas which his theory
has prohibited.

Yet what could the requisite modification of the mind,

consist of except some such imprinting of memorial, traces?

If we have

no ideas other than those of which we are consciously aware, it is hard
to understand how we can possess any knowledge other than that which is

immediately and perpetually present to the mind.

Considerations of this

sort were important in causing Leibniz, in his rejoinder to Locke, to

abandon the doctrine that thought must necessarily be self “Conscious, and
to replace it with the teaching that the mind is always characterised by

a mass of subconscious perceptions.

To the thesis that the having of an idea entails conscious awareness of it, Locke adds the corollary that to think entails consciousness
that one thinks.

21

For it is altogether as intelligible to say that a body
is extended without parts, as that anything thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does
so. They who talk thus may, with as much reason, if it
be necessary to their hypothesis say that a man is always
hungry, but that he does not always feel it, whereas
hunger consists in that very sensation, as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks.

The doctrine that all thinking, all mental activity, is necessarily
accompanied by awareness of that activity comes as somewhat of a surprise
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to the reader who has already absorbed the teaching that the operations
of the mind reveal themselves only when they are made the objects of

deliberate attention.

It is for the latter reason, Locke informs us,

that "it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations
of their own minds; and some have not any very clear or perfect ideas of

the greatest part of them all their lives."

23

Apparently Locke believed

that everyone always has a confused idea or awareness of his mental op-

erations.

But a clear and distinct idea of them can be had only

through deliberate and attentive observation.

Yet the admission that

the consciousness of thinking which invariably accompanies thinking may

sometimes be a confused

czie

seems to undermine the claim that thinking

consists in being conscious that one thinks.

For surely children and

inattentive adults have some clear and distinct ideas of sensation.

At

any rate, Locke tells us that the senses "do convey into the mind several
distinct perceptions of things ... And thus we come by those ideas we
have of ... sensible qualities."

How is it possible for a clear and

distinct thought to consist of a confused consciousness of that thought?

Consciousness of thinking is itself an operation of the mind.
Hence, on the basis of Locke's teaching, it should not be possible for

such consciousness to exist without being perceived.

For the sake of

consistency, then, Locke ought to have postulated yet another level of

consciousness upon which one could be conscious of one's consciousness,
and so on indefinitely.

Without such an infinite regress, it will

always be necessary to settle for a set of mental contents which are not
themselves consciously perceived.

The path grows ever thornier.

Invoking the doctrine that we can-

,
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not think without being sensible of that activity, Locke maintains that
it is possible, even probable, that for long periods of time, during

dreamless sleep, the soul does not think at all, and hence is entirely
devoid of ideas, of activity and of consciousness.

24

If the soul thinks

during sleep, it must be conscious of its sleeping thoughts.

But,

Locke argues, if the soul of Socrates while asleep has its enjoyments
and concerns, its pleasures and pains, of which the man Socrates, con-

sisting of body and soul , when awake has no knowledge, then the soul of
sleeping Socrates and the waking

man,

are two distinct persons.

seems to have gotten into a tangle on this point.

Locke

If the sleeping and

waking Socrates have one and the same soul, one would be inclined to
think that the soul of the waking Socrates simply forgets its sleeping
thoughts, rather than that soul and man become two persons!

But as we

shall see, Locke is savoring in advance the peculiarities of the theory
of personal identity he v/ill develop in a later section.

Locke next attends to the possibility just mentioned:

In any event

"that the soul

thinks even in the soundest sleep, but the memory retains it not."

26

His answer to this objection is strangely unsatisfactory, consisting of

hardly more than the assertion that such a state of affairs "is very
hard to be conceived and would need some better proof than bare assertion
to make it be believed."

27

Clinching evidence against the theory is then

provided by the following anecdote.
Most men, I think, pass a great pari of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar
and had no bad memory, who told me he had never dreamed
in his life, till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of, which,. was about the five or six and twentieth
P \
year of his age. u
r

l6l

That certainly settles the matter!

It is clear- that Locke is anxious to

reach the conclusion that the soul may spend indefinitely long periods
of time in an unthinking state.

Why should this be so important to him?

The answer can only be that he wishes to overthrow the Cartesian view that
"actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul as actual extension is
from the body,"

29

myself to have one of those dull souls, that
doth not perceive itself always to contemplate ideas;
nor can conceive it any more necessary for the soul
always to think, than for the body always to move; the
perception of ideas being (as I conceive) to the soul ,
what motion is to the body; not its essence, but one
of its operations.'^
I confess

Thinking, then, is not an essential attribute of the soul.
A strange asymmetry now makes itself apparent between Locke’s account
of our idea of body and his account of our idea of spirit.

Both ideas are

classified as complex ideas of substances which, for Locke, are "such com-

binations of simple ideas as are, by experience and observation of men’s
senses, taken notice of to exist together; and are therefore supposed to
flow from the particular internal constitution, or unknown essence of that
substance."''''"

Powers, that is to say, capacities to alter "sensible

qualities in those subjects on which they operate"

32

are in reality com-

plex ideas, but for the sake of brevity, Locke says he will reckon them
,33
among the simple ideas which when, "considered as united in one thing,"

constitute a specific idea of a substance.

In a passage we have already

quoted Locke tells us that our idea of body is of "an extended solid substance, capable of communicating motion by impulse," while our idea oi

spirit is of "a substance that thinks , and has a power of exciting
V

motion in body, by willing or thought."

f,

So the simple idea of thinking
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is the component of our complex idea of immaterial substance which
is

the counterpart of the simple ideas of extension and solidity
in our

complex idea of material substance*

But whereas extension and solidity

are regarded by Locke as essential attributes of body, he denies that

thinking is part of the essence of the soul*

This is the asymmetry be-

tween the two accounts to which we referred above.
We have already seen that Locke makes a distinction between the

real essence of a being and its nominal essence.

He is insistent that

the real essence is unknown to us and that "essence to us, which deter-

mines every particular to this or that classis

is the nominal

essence, or the abstract idea to which the name is annexed.
"all the essence of natural substances that we k now

This is

^6

The abstract

idea of every substance or sort is formed from the collection of simple
ideas associated with "particular existences" by the process of

"leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several particular

existences as they are found to agree in ..."

37

The essence of anything in respect of us, is the whole
complex idea comprehended and marked by that name; and
in substances, besides the several distinct simple ideas
that make them up, the confused one of substance, or of
an unknown support and cause of their union, is always
a part; and therefore the essence of body is 0 not bare
extension, but an extended solid thing

Thus if the idea of body with some people be bare extension or space, then solidity is not essential to bodys
if others make the idea to which they give the name body
to be solidity and extension, then solidity is essential
to body* That therefore, and that alone, is considered
os essential, which makes a part of the complex idea the
name of a sort stands for; without which no particular
thing can be reckoned of that sort, nor be entitled to
that name. -^9
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Elsewhere, however, Locke maintains that solidity "seems the idea most

intimately connected with, and essential to body; so as nowhere else to
be found or imagined, but only in matter." 40 Accordingly, he argues,

against the Cartesians, that pure extension cannot be the whole essence
of body; the essence of body must include solidity.

Now our complex idea of an immaterial spirit is framed, according
to Locke, by putting together "the simple ideas we have taken from those

operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as
thinking, understanding, willing, knowing, and power of beginning motion,

&c„"

b2.
'

Understanding, willing and knowing may all be regarded as species

or modes of thinking.

For this reason, Locke later says simply that our

idea of soul is of a substance that thinks and has a power of exciting

motion in the body.

Clearly, thinking is the idea most intimately connect-

ed with spirit, just as solidity is the idea so connected with body.
How, then, is it possible for Locke to deny that thinking is part of

the nominal essence of the soul?

him in a contradiction.

The attempt to do so seems to involve

But nominal essence, he tells us, is the only

kind of essence knowable to us, the only kind by which we are able to
sort and rank.

So Locke's position should be that the only conception

of the soul which, we are capable of framing is that of a being which

thinks.

Hence if he truly believed he had evidence indicating that

thinking is not a continuous or uninterrupted process, it would have
been far more sensible for him to say that in the course of its lifetime the body is sometimes without a soul than to maintain, as he does,
that the soul exists in an unthinking state.

Berkeley, as unwilling

as Locke to admit the possibility within the mind of unperceived ideas,
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found himself obliged to adopt the former solution.

Locke seems to be mistaken when he says thought is not
essential to the mind. Certainly the mind always and
constantly thinks and we know this too. In sleep and
trances the mind exists not
there is not time, no
succession of ideas. To say the mind exists without
thinking is a contradiction, nonsense, nothing. ^3
We have seen that Locke has no right to deny that thinking is part
of the nominal essence of the soul.

stand him as making such a denial.

It may be that we should not under-

Perhaps his statement that thinking

is not essential to the soul should be construed instead as a statement

about the real essence of spiritual substance.

There is considerable

textual evidence to support this interpretation.

our ranking and distinguishing natural substances
into species consists in the nominal essences the mind
makes, and not in the real essences to be found in the
things themselves is further evident from our ideas of
spirits. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on
its own operations, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits, it hath or can have no other notion
of spirit but by attributing all those operations it
finds in itself to a sort of beings; without considera4
tion of matter.

'That

Since thinking is the chief of the mind's operations, this passage
suggests that the idea of thinking is indeed part
nominal essence of spirit.

o'f

the mind-maae

In other places, Locke indicates that the

properties, ideas of which contribute to the nominal essence of a substance, do not form part of its real essence, but are to be regarded

instead

ess

causal consequences or as superficial manifestations of that

essence.
... the nominal essence of gold is that complex idea
the word gold stands for, let it be, for instance, a
body yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible,
and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution
of the insensible parts of that body, on which those

'
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qualities and all the other properties of gold depend.
How far' these two are different, though they are both
called essence, is obvious at first sight to discover. b
So if thinking is part of the nominal essence of the soul, it seems

reasonable to conclude that it is not part of its real essence.

This

inference is supported by yet another passage in which Locke makes a

distinction between the nominal and real essence, not simply of a soul,
but of a man, here considered as a compound of body and soul.
For, though perhaps voluntary motion, with sense and
reason, joined to a body of a certain shape, be the
complex idea to which I and others annex the name man,
and so be the nominal essence of the species so called;
yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence
and source of all those operations which are to be found
in any individual of that sort* The foundation of all
those qualities which are the ingredients of our complex
idea, is something quite different; and had we such a
knowledge of that constitution of man, from which his
faculties of moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other
powers flow, and on which his so regular shape depends,
as it is possible angels have, and it is certain his
Maker has, we should have a quite other idea of his
essence than what now is contained in our definition of
that species, be it what it will; and our idea of any
individual man would be as far different from what it
is now, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels
and other contrivances within of the famous clock at
Strasburg, from that which a gazing countryman has of
it, who barely sees the motion of the hand, and hears
the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward
b
appearances*

Sensation, reasoning and v/illing are all modes of thinking.

The rele-

vance of this passage to our purposes is its explicit ascription of
these faculties to nominal essence*

The real essence or constitution of

a man is said to ba the source and foundation of those operations, but

something quite different in kind from them.

It is reasonable to con-

clude, then, that when Locke denies that thinking is an essential

attribute of the soul, he means to say that the idea of thinking is,
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indeed, a part of the nominal essence of spirit, but that it is not

part of the real essence of the soul.

There is, however, a very serious problem connected with the notion
of a soul possessing a real essence, given Locke's vievr that the real

essence of a being is not its form, but rather the constitution or

arrangement of its insensible parts.

We have seen that in the case of

material substances Locke identifies the real essence with the size,
figure and "putting together" of its parts.

Clearly he has in mind some-

thing like the atomic structure of the body in question.

Likewise, the

real essence of the soul is supposed to be its constitution, the nature
of which is hidden from us, but which is compared by Locke to the invisible system of springs, wheels and other contrivances that operates the

famous clock at Strasburg.

But the soul is a simple substance.

no parts, sensible or otherwise.

Thus it cannot have

a.

It has

constitution, if

"constitution" is to be given its standard meaning of an arrangement or

ordering of parts, and it cannot display any "connexion" or "putting together" of those parts.

It becomes obvious that the conception of the

real nature of the soul which Locke is suggesting, namely an arrangement
of insensible parts, fits far better with a theory that identifies the

mind v;ith the physical brain, than with a view that identifies it with a
simple, immaterial substance,

V/e

shall subsequently see that Locke was

not blind to this consideration.

Substance

Tbo conception of the mind originally presented to us by Locke,
that of an immaterial thinking substance, is of course an integral part
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of his wider teaching concerning the notion of substance in general.

Everyone would agree that an understanding of Locke’s view of substance
is centred, to an appreciation of his philosophical position; yet, un-

fortunately, the vacillating and contradictory nature of his statements

on the subject render such an understanding extremely difficult to
attain.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to assess in any adequate

fashion this crucial topic.

All that can be sard is that Locke appears

to oscillate between the pcles of asserting, on the one hand, that the

existence of substance is logically inferrible from the existence of
sensible qualities, and on the other, of maintaining that "substance" is

a meaningless word, and that the concept of substance is useless as a
principle of philosophical explanation.

The strongest statements of

the view that sensible qualities cannot conceivably exist without being

supported by a substratum occur in his letters to Dr. Stillingfleet,

Bishop of Worcester.

In these letters Locke was attempting to defend

hiraself against charges of heretical tendencies and, specifically,

against Stillingfleet's accusation that he had "almost discarded sub-

stance out of the world."

Some scholars believe that this ecclesiasti-

cal context must be borne in mind when assessing the weight to be given
Un

these statements.

'

Thus in the First Letter to Stillingfleet, Locke

says;

The idea of these qualities and actions or powers are
perceived by the mind to be inconsistent with existence ... thence the mind perceives their necessary
connection with inherence or being supported. (Italics mine).
And in the Third Letter;
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Your lordship grounds the idea of substance upon reason ,
or because it is a repugnancy to our just conceptions
of things that inodes or accidents should subsist by
themselves; and I conclude the same thing.

These assertions, if taken seriously, certainly constitute the strongest
possible support for the view that Locke believed the self-subsistence of

qualities or accidents to be

a

logical impossibility.

In the Essay , on the other hand, Locke often speaks of substance as
!,

an obscure and relative idea,”

48

as something of which we can have no

positive concept , and no clear or distinct idea.

49

Instead of stressing

the logical, inconceivability of self-subsisting qualities, we find him
saying:
... not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist
by themselves, we accustom ourselves to supnose some
substratum wherein they do subsist ...50

This passage suggests that the positing of substance is a psychological

,

rather than a logical necessity, founded perhaps in our inability to pic ture to ourselves the union of simple ideas other than in a substratum.

On either account of the idea of substance, however, Locke faces a
logical difficulty.

Since all our complex ideas are formed out of the

simple ideas that come to us via sensation or reflection, how is it

possible for us to form the idea of a relation of inherence holding between a quality presented in experience

,

such as yellow or heavy , and

something which in principle cannot be experienced at all?

The mind

forms other ideas of relation by comparing with each other ideas, all of

which have come to us through the medium of experience.

But in the acci-

dent-substance relationship, one of the terms lies wholly beyond the

bounds of sensory experience,.

Locke is hard put to explain how such an
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idea could have arisen in our minds or what it could signify to us.
Some of the passages in the Essay which deal with the notion of

substance indicate that Locke was not unaware of this kind of difficulty.

Interestingly enough, the most severe criticisms of the concept

of substance do not occur in the chapters explicitly devoted to that

topic.

They are buried in discussions of quite different issues.

In

the course of his critique of innate ideas, Locke remarks, as in passing,
that we neither have, nor can have, the idea of substance either by sen-

sation or reflection.

Therefore we signify nothing by the word but an

uncertain supposition of we know not what.

51

He inserts his most ex-

treme attack on the notion of substance, as both incomprehensible and
useless, into the chapter dealing with simple modes of the idea of
space.

It is in this rather unlikely context that he tells us, when we

speak of substance we are committing the fallacy of taking the word for

a thing.

We are ’’making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct

significations."

5 ?'

In order to "discover to us the very great clearness

there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and show of what
-

use they are in deciding of questions of philosophy"

illustrations.

55

he gives three

First he compares the European philosophers, who say

substance is required as a support for accidents, with the Indian phi-

losopher who, imagining that the earth needed a support to bear it up,
explained that it rested on an elephant, v/hich in turn was supported by
glj.

a tortoise.

The implication seems to be that, just as the earth does

not in fact require a support , neither ao the accidents.

This little

story provides an interesting commentary on the remarks Locke addressed
to Stillingfleet.

In the last two analogies Locke maintains that to ex-
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plain accidents in terms of substance is comparable to explaining our
architecture to an aborigine by saying that a pillar is a thing

supported by a basis and a basis something that supports a pillar, or
to say of books that letters are things inhering in paper, and paper a

thing that holds forth letters.

"Would he not think himself mocked,

instead of taught, with such an account as this?" 55

The final illus-

tration is particularly startling since it cannot help but recall to
us the famous metaphor by which Locke had sought to elucidate the

nature of mental substance, that is to say, the identification of the

mind with a sheet of white paper , void of characters until imprinted

with the ideas of sensation.

Are we to regard ourselves mocked,

instead of taug'ht, by such an account as this?
3.

Mental Substance

The uncertainty and vacillation which becloud Locke's discussion
of substance in general, together with his seeming awareness of the

logical difficulties to which the notion is exposed, inevitably color
his discussion of mental substance in particular.

For we arrive at the

idea of mind, or mental substrate, in a manner exactly parallel to that

which yields the notion of material substance.

We put together the

simple ideas which we have taken from the operations of our own minds,
such as thinking, willing, power of beginning motion, etc., and join

them to substance, "of which we have no distinct idea."
we derive the complex idea of an immaterial spirit.

In this way

Throughout the

remaindei’ of the chapter on substance, Locke is concerned to emphasize

two points.

The first is that the idea of spiritual substance is at

,
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least as clear and well-founded as the idea of matter.

"The one is as

clear and distinct an idea as the other; the idea of thinking, and

moving a body, being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of extension, solidity, and being moved." 57 The two complex ideas contain among

their components simple ideas which do not differ in their clarity and
distinctness.

That this is so is reiterated again and again.

second point is expressed succinctly, thus:
is equally obscure, or none at all, in both."

Locke's

"For our idea of substance
58

That is to say, both

complex ideas contain as a component an idea utterly lacking in clarity
and distinctness, an idea of "a supposed I know not what."

So it is as

true to state that the two ideas are equally obscrire and ill-founded as
it is to say that they are equali.y clear and well-founded.

This point,

too, is driven home again and again in the course of the next seventeen

paragraphs, the constant alternation of the two kinds of statement pro-

ducing a very comical effect.
Does no superiority of status attach to the idea of immaterial sub-

stance?

In two or three passages Locke fleetingly suggests that it

For example;

does.

For whilst I know, by seeing or hearing, etc., that there
is some corporeal being without me, the object of that
sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is some
spiritual being within me that sees and hears. 59
But the over-whelming burden of this long section, monotonously repeated
is that the two conceptions of mental and material substance are equally

incomprehensible to us and equally fraught with difficulties.

Locke brings the discussion to a conclusion with the following re-

marks

:
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We are no more able to discover wherein the ideas
belonging to body consist, than those belonging to spirit.
From whence it seems probable to me, that the simple ideas
we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever
efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor
can it make any discoveries, when it would pry into the
nature and hidden causes of those ideas.
So that, in short, the idea we have of spirit, compared with the idea we have of body, stands thus: the
substance of spirits is unknown to usj and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us. D<^

Substance, both mental and material, has become a kind of Kantian thingin-itself.

The point at which Locke has arrived is summed up by Gibson

as follows:

Starting with the realistic conception of the mind as a
substance, having its own definite nature and constitution, Locke had found himself compelled to relegate this
substance to the region of the unknowable, and to treat
the mind as empirically cognisable, through and in relation to its definite thoughts or experiences. °-*In the final book of the Essay Locke put forward a still more radi-

cal suggestion regarding the nature of mind.

This was a proposal which

outraged his contemporary theological critics, and was regarded by them
as the most serious threat to accepted religious beliefs contained in a

generally heterodox work.

The cause of the uproar was Locke's statement

that it is net logically necessary to assume that a distinct immaterial

substance exists at all.

The passage occurs in the context of a sec-

tion emphasising the narrow limits of human knowledge, and urging upon
philosophy a suitable modesty in refraining from magisterial pronouncements where evidence is lacking.
have the ideas of matter and thinking , hut possibly
shall never be able to know whether any mere material
being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the
contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to
discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some

V/e
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systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive
and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being in
respect of our notions, not much more remote from our
comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases,
superadd to matter a faculty of thinking , than that he
should superadd to it another substance with a faculty
of thinking ; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has
been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any
created being, but merely by the good pleasure and
bounty of the Creator, For I see no contradiction in
it, that the first Eternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain
systems of created senseless matter, put together as
he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and
thought , b ~
Of particular* interest is Locke's statement that we are ignorant as

regards the nature of thinking, as well as regards its substantival
underpinning.

In a later part of this section Locke repeats his previ-

ous assertion that we cannot doubt that there is something within us
that thinks (thinking implies the existence of a thinker), but we are

ignorant as to the kind of being it is.

This would suggest that it is

logically necessary for thought to inhere in some kind of substance.
But the dependence of thought upon an immaterial soul , if it is indeed
the fact, is contingent merely,

O'Connor sums up:

In other words, the evidence of our* ideas of reflection
does not logically imply the existence of a substantial
mind. 3

The active powers of the understanding, such as comparing, compounding, abstracting, recalling, etc., may simply be powers of the body.

Such

a.

position opens up for Locke the logical, possibility of a monistic

conception of substance.

Gibson suggests:

Since the idea of substance is in both cases alike
(i.e. matter and mind) merely that of "a supposed Iknow-not-what" to which the attributes revealed in experience are referred, we cannot set aside the possi-
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bility that one and the same substratum or substantial
basis may be involved, both in that which we experience
as solid and extended and in our own conscious life. b ^

That such a view would possess great advantages for Locke is made
evident by the numerous passages, both in the Es say , and in his other

writings, in which he expresses himself as utterly at a loss to find a

solution to the problem of interaction betv/een mind and body, conceived
of as separate substances differing radically in kind,

Thus, in the

little work entitled An Examination of Pc Malebranche s Opinion he says
1

Impressions made on the retina by rays of light, I
think 1 understand! and motions from thence continued
to the brain may be conceived, and that these produce
ideas in our* minds, I am persuaded, but in a manner to
me incomprehensible. This I can resolve only into the
good pleasure of God., whose ways are past finding out, “5

how inconceivable it is to me, that a spiritual,
an unextended substance should represent to the
,
mind an extended figure ,
i,e.

Perhaps most striking of all is the statement of the problem in the

Essay ;
Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to
strike and affect body, and motion, according to the
utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce
nothing but motion; so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound,
we are fa in to quit our reason , go beyond our ideas,
and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our
Maker

This is virtually to say that mind-body interaction, conceived of as
talcing place between substances of radically different kinds, is a

logical impossibility.

At the same time, Locke rejects as equally in-

comprehensible the kind of solution to the problem through the inter-

vention of God that was proposed by Malebranche,

Under these circum-

stances, it would not be surprising to find him attracted by a funda-
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mentali^/ monistic position, according to which all substance is mate1

rial in nature and mental activity is a kind of epiphenomenon of the
body.

On this basis we can make sense of his earlier claim that think-

ing is not an essential attribute of the mind.

If there is no

distinct kind of substance which is mental in nature, if all substance
is material, and yet thinking is an activity of substance, then to say

that the mind is sometimes without ideas is merely to say that the
/TO

body, or the brain, does not always engage in the activity of thinking.

The thesis that the mind does not always think is far more compatible

with a theory that identifies the mind with the body or the brain than
with a view that regards it as a separate immaterial substance.

We can

begin to understand the reasons for Locke's singular attachment to this
thesis.

We have already pointed out that identification of the

miiid

with the brain is also the way to render sensible Locke's contention
that the real essence of the mind is to be found in its constitution,

that is to say, in the "putting together" and patterning of its insen-

sible parts.

Further evidence that Locke rejected the notion of a simple, indivisible, immaterial soul as the substrate of ideas is provided in his

Exami nation of M al ebranch e.

Here he takes up for discussion the doctrine

that ideas (sensible qualities, sentiments) are modifications of the

soul.

Locke objects to this teaching on two grounds.

The first is

identical with the ground of his attack on substance in Book II,

Chapter 13 of the Essa^, namely, that the word, "modification,"

"

is only a new sound brought in without any new conception at all."

...

69
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So that though they say sensations are modifications
of the mind; yet, having no manner of idea what that
modification of the mind is, distinct from that very
sensation, v.g. , the sensation Gf a red colour or a
bitter taste, it is plain this explication amounts
to no more than that a sensation is a sensation ...
1

One explains nothing by the assertion that accidents inhere in substance;
the claim that sensations are modifications of the soul is equally unin-

formative.

We see that the charge of philosophical emptiness directed

against this kind of view is something of a leitmotiv in Locke's thinking.

The second criticism of the "modification-of-the-soul" theory is even
more serious, for it attempts to show that the doctrine leads to contradiction.
Different sentiments are different modifications of the
mind. The mind or soul that perceives is one immaterial
indivisible substance. Nov; I see the white and black on
this paper, I hear one singing in the next room, I feel
the warmth of the fare I sit by, and I taste an apple I
am eating, and all this at the same time. Now I ask,
take modification for what you please, can the same unextended indivisible substance have different, nay, inconsistent and opposite (as those of white and black
must be) modifications at the same time? Or must we
suppose distinct parts in an indivisible substance, one
for black, another for white, and another fox’ red ideas,
and so of the rest of those infinite sensations which we
have in sorts and degrees; all which we can distinctly
perceive, and so are distinct ideas, some whereof are
opposite, as heat aid cold, which yet a man may feel at
the same tirae??^

Thus the teaching that the

soiil

constitutes one immaterial, indivisible

substance is, Locke argues, logically incompatible with the variety of
distinct, and sometimes opposite, sensations which we experience simultaneously.

The argument which he here presents is not altogether un-

like that offered by Plato in the Republ ic to prove that the soul has
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parts.

It would bo interesting to know if Locke had seriously consid-

ered the possibility of a divisible soul.

In the passage just quoted

he appears to dismiss the idea as an absurdity.

It is likely that he

inherited and accepted the Cartesian conception of the soul as neces-

sarily one and indivisible.

Material substance, however, is charac-

terized according to Locke by separability of parts.

So it is clear

that a theory which regarded thinking or sensation as inhering

in or

annexed to the body would not be subject to the difficulty here adumbrated.

This may be another ground for guessing that Locke's real

sympathies lay in that quarter.
We have seen, then, that Locke regards the terms "immaterial sub-

stance" and "modification of the mind" as sounds without signification.
He has successively characterized mental substance as unknowable in

principle, as a useless and empty principle of explanation and finally
as leading to logically insoluble problems and hence to contradiction.
At the same time he has braved the "ugly mutterings of the drum ecclev

siastic" 7 ' to put forward the daring suggestion that there is no logii

cal impossibility in supposing that thought may be a property of matter.

This is powerful evidence for the thesis that Locke rejected the idea
of an immaterial soul as a logical absurdity.

Yet it will be urged

that there are many passages in which Locke not only fails to disavow

belief in the existence of the soul, but in which he indicates that he
positively inclines toward such a conviction.

In the chapter on iden-

tity, for example, we find him saying that he regards it as "the more

probable opinion" that "consciousness is annexed to, and the affection
of, one individual, immaterial substance,"

7A

He emphasizes, however,

s

l?8

that nis theory of personality is in no way dependent upon the correct-

ness of this opinion.

Nov/

how is it possible that a first-rate philos-

opher who thinks the notion of mental substance is both meaningless
and contradictory should regard the view that consciousness depends

upon such a substance as a probable opinion?

The answer to this riddle

may be garnered from certain historical facts regarding the public reac-

tion to the publication of Locke’s philosophical and theological,
writings.

Despite his cautious way of presenting his views, Locke

found himself bitterly attacked by representatives of orthodox religion.

His book, The Reasonableness of Christianity , was placed under legal
indictment, apparently because it taught, among other things, that

immortality is only contingently a property of the soul, and as such is
dependent upon the pleasure and goodness of God.

The assault upon the

Essay was led by the formidable Bishop of Worcester, who clearly recognized its subversive tendencies.

Stillingfleet charged Locke with

having "almost" read substance out of the world.

But Locke, who no

doubt had anticipated the possibility of just such an attack, had his

defensive positions already prepared.

criticism by seizing upon the Essay

*

He answered Stillingfleet 's

most conservative statements re-

garding substance, casting them into an even more orthodox mold, and
cheerfully ignoring those of his own utterances which pointed straight
in the opposite direction.

It is fashionable today to say that the

Bishop understood the implications of Locke's doctrine better than ne
did himself.

It might be more prudent to confine oneself to the

comment that in his replies to Stillingfleet Locke did not admit to

an understanding of the consequences of his own teaching.

As it was,
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the Essay , although never placed under legal indictment, was for a time

banned at Oxford because of its allegedly heretical doctrines.

Had

Locke taken an openly agnostic position regarding the soul, it seems
certain that the Essay would have suffered at least as severe a fate as

The Reasonableness of Christianity .

Parenthetically, it is of interest

to note that the article on Malebranche, which probably contains Locke's

most explicit condemnation of the idea of immaterial substance, was not

published by Locke during his lifetime.
l?06c

It first appeared in print in

Locke left it unfinished, he says, "lest I should be tempted by

anybody to print it."
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Against this background, it comes as little or no surprise to dis-

cover that when Locke discusses the topic of personal identity he is at

pains to divorce the concept of the self from

tlxat

of the soul, and to

establish criteria for the persistence of a person which are logically
independent of those for the persistence of mental substance.

In the

history of the philosophy of mind he is famous as the first thinker to
deny that the self is a substance, and hence he may well be regarded as
the pioneer in whose footsteps followed such later theorists of the self

as Hume, Russell, C„ D„ Broad and A. J. Ayer.

If Locke was unwilling to

identify the self with the soul, he was equally reluctant to equate a

person with his body.

Hence he was forced to develop a psychological

criterion for the persistence of a person, not dependent upon the persistenee either of body or of soul.

At least one commentator regards

his treatment of the self as "one of the most original and revolution-

ary of the positions developed in the Es say .

It is even more fatal to

the traditional realistic dogmatism ... than his criticism oi its use

of the general conception of substance."
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CHAPTER

IV

BODY, SOUL AND PERSON

Locke's famous statement that it is one thing to be the same substance, another to be the same man and a third to be the same person

takes on additional significance when we come to examine his teaching

concerning the nature of human beings.

In the context of this discus-

sion he uses the term "substance" to designate spiritual!, substance.
be the same substance is to be the same finite soul.

To

According to

Locke's official view, a human being is composed of three distinct elements, an organic body, an immaterial soul-substance and a person.
"P erson , man and substance , are three names standing for three different

ideas" and "such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the

identity,"

Not only does each of these three entities have an Aristote-

lian essence not shared by either of the other two; each has its unique

persistence criterion, which is in some sense determined by its Aristo-

telian essence.

This is the way in which we shall ultimately be obliged

to understand the "such as is the idea ... such must be the identity"

doctrine.

The fact that the different entities making up a human being

have different persistence criteria opens up the possibility that their
life spans may, not be wholly coincident.

This in turn renders it con-

ceivable that the same soul may be associated with different bodies,
the same body with different souls, the same person with different souls

and bodies and so on.

But it may be somewhat misleading to say that

Locke has a conception of

a.

human being having a body, a soul and a

person as its component parts.

As we shall see, he sometimes uses the
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term "man" to refer to the compound of body and soul, but he never

employs that or any other designation as a name for the tripartite

being composed of body, soul and person.

So perhaps he did not think

of this tripartite entity as a real being, although there seems to be
no reason, given his views, for it to possess less reality than, let

us say, the compound made up of body and soul.

It is the person who

will emerge as overwhelmingly the most important member of the human
triad.

In the sphere of material substance, Locke, as we have seen,

tends to identify the real or ultimate individual with a mass of matter.
In the human realm he will designate the person as in some sense the

real individual, although not in the same way as that in which he
identifies the mass of matter as the most ultimate of material beings.

The special importance of the person is that it, rather, than the soul,
is the being which experiences happiness and misery.

It is the moral

agent and the bearer of moral responsibility! it alone is the proper
subject of reward and punishment.

Consequently, of all the components

mailing up the human being, it is the person whose actions and whose

fate is a matter of ultimate concern.
1.

The Man

Locke uses the word "man" in at least two different senses.
times it designates the human body.

Some-

At the beginning of the discussion

in which this term figures he says that "the identity of a man" must

not be placed "in anything else, but, like that of other animals, in

one fitly organized

body."''"

Locke gives a reductio

argument to show

why a man cannot be identified with anything except a human body.

It
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is based on the assumption that the only alternative to identifying a

man with his body is to identify him with his soul.

Locke intends to

show that this alternative leads to absurd consequences*

His next

assumption is that one and the same soul may be united to different

human bodies.

Nothing in the nature of matter, he says, forbids this.

So a single soul might by turns inhabit the human bodies that we associate with Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Austin, and Caesar

Borgia.

In that event, Locke concludes, these individuals would "be

the same man," i.e., be temporal parts of the same man.

But it is hard

to see why Locke thinks he has generated an absurdity.

If "soul" and

"man" have one denotation, then it is no more paradoxical to say that
the sane man is united to different bodies at different times than it
is to make the assumption which Locke did not find ridiculous, namely

that the same soul may be united to different bodies.

If, on the

other hand, the conclusion of the argument had been that the bodies
of these different individuals constituted the same human body, or

were temporal parts of the same human body, this would indeed have
been ridiculous.

But Locke can draw no such conclusion.

The key

premise of his argument is that the man and the soul are identical,
and by implication, that a man is not identical with his body.

So if

the souls of Seth, Ismael and company are all parts of a single soul,
it follows that these individuals also constitute a single man, but
it most certainly does not follow that their bodies constitute a

single body.

Locke now tries a second reductio.

He cites the opinion of phi-

losophers who have believed in transmigration "that the souls of men
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may, for their miscarriages, be detruded into the bodies of beasts."

If the soul is identical with the man, and if the soul of Heliogabalus

were detruded into the body of one of his hogs, then the man,
Heliogabalus, would be the hog.
that no one would say.

as the first.

And this, Locke says, is something

The second argument suffers from the same defect

If the man is identical with the soul and not with the

body s then the detruding of Heliogabalus* soul into a hog no more makes
the man, Heliogabalus, identical with the hog than it makes his soul the

same thing as the hog.

Perhaps sensing the weakness of these arguments, Locke begins to
shift to a linguistic consideration.

It would be "a very strange use of

the word man," he says, if it were "applied to an idea out of which body

and shape are excluded."

stronger assertion.

A little later on we find him making a much

"... the idea in our minds, of which the sound man

in our mouths is the sign, is nothing else but of an animal of such a

certain form."

2

This statement sets the stage for the long anecdote

about the talking parrot which is intended to show that the mere posses-

sion of

rationality is not sufficient to make an animal lacking a

human shape a man.

We may well grant that we would not classify an

intelligent parrot as a man, but this serves to show only that possesIt does

sion of a human shape is necessary to qualify a being as a man.

not show that having a human form is sufficient to make the thing which

has it a man, and it most certainly does not establish Locke's strong

claim that the word "man" means "animal having a human form."

Locke

may have realized this, for the conclusion that he draws from the
narrative is much weaker than the one he had origi nally sought to esvab-

3
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lioh.

For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational
being alone that makes the idea of a man in most people's
sense: but of a body, so and so shaped, joined to it; and
if that be the idea of a man, the same successive body not
shifted all at once, must, as v/ell as the same immaterial,
spirit, go to the making of the same man.
It is clear that Locke is now using "man" to designate the compound

composed out of animal body and immaterial soul.

The term is unequiv-

ocally employed in this second sense at least once again in the later
discussion.

"... there can, from the nature of things, be no absurdity

at all to suppose that the same soul may at different times be united

to different bodies , and with them make up for that time one man ..."

There is no passage, so far as

I

4

am aware, occurring after the talking

parrot story in which Locke clearly identifies a man with a human
body.

So there may be grounds for thinking that in the course of

writing the chapter Locke came to abandon that original, identification.
As the chapter wears on, Locke becomes ever more liberal about
the permissible uses of the word, "man."

Both in Section 21 and in

Section 29, the latter being the final paragraph of the chapter, he tells
us that "man" may be used in one cf three ways.

It may designate either

a soul, an animal body or a compound of the foregoing two.

Locke has

apparently forgotten or abandoned his earlier arguments against iden-

tifying the man with his soul.

He even briefly considers the possi-

bility of "making human identity to consist in the same thing as personal identity" but finds a difficulty.

Anyone who takes this view

will be unable to "make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates
after the resurrection."

But Locke concedes that few are agreed as

^
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to

tv

hat "makes a man and consequently the same individual man."'’

In

these passages he indicates that virtually any usage is acceptable if
it is employed consistently.

After all, everyone does and must con-

struct his own abstract general idea or his own nominal essence of
"man."

The important point is the following:

... whatever be the composition whereof the complex idea is
made, whenever existence makes it one particular thing under
any denomination, the same existence continued preserves it
the same individual under the same denomination.

This is the last sentence in the chapter of the Essay which is devoted to
the topic of identity.

It certainly is a baffling one.

But I believe

that the key to understanding it is provided by Locke's earlier,

simpler statement, that those properties which make a man, by virtue of
so doing, also make the sane individual man.

I interpret both state-

ments as confused attempts to say that the specification of the properties which determines the kind to which a thing essentially belongs

also determines or shapes the persistence criterion which is applicable
to it.

Accordingly, when "man" is taken as designating a human body, the

persistence criterion for a man will be the same as for any organism:
But if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union
of parts in a certain shape; as long as that vital union
and shape remain in a concrete, no otherwise the same but
by a continued succession of fleeting particles, it will be
the sane man.
''

Naturally this criterion will be subject to the same difficulties ana
will require the same supplementation as did the persistence principles for organisms that we discussed in the last chapter.
If, on the other band, every man is compounded out of a particular
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body and a particular soul, then the continued existence of
a man will
be subject to a general rule governing the persistence of
compound sub-

stances, of which the criterion for masses of matter was a special
case
v/hatever compositions of substances begin to exist, during the

union of those substances, the concrete must be the same ...»®

It will

be necessary and sufficient for the continued existence of a man that

his body continue to exist, that his soul continue to exist and that
they remain united to each other.

The test of their remaining united

to each other might be their continued occupation of exactly the same

places.
2.

The Soul

The soul, Locke has told us, is "a substance that thinks, and has
a power of exciting motion in body, by willing or thought. n °

Thinking

and having the power to excite motion in the body are the properties

making up its Aristotelian essence.

The question we now must try to

resolve concerns the properties which must be retained by any soul if
it is to continue to exist.

souls?

What is the persistence criterion for

The only textual passage I am aware of in which Locke even

alludes to this question occurs at II, 27, 10b.

The chief difficulty

with his discussion here is that he is not primarily concerned to
specify the properties essential to the continued existence of a
spiritual substance.

Instead, his focus is upon the causes operating

to prevent a person from knowing whether the soul with which it is

presently associated is the same soul as that to which it was annexed
at some point in the past.

We have to figure out the nature of the
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persistence criterion from the reasons Locke gives for our inability
to apply it.

Another difficulty results from Locke's insistence upon

stating the problem as though it were one of a soul's assuring itself

concerning its own self-identity.
to worry about that.

But no being of any kind ever has

The soul may wonder what its past life was really

like* but that is not the same as wondering if its past really was its
In attempting to interpret this passage, we shall make the

past.

necessary reconstructions.
But it is further inquired, whether it be the same identical
substance. This few would think they had reason to doubt of,
if these perceptions, with their consciousness, always remained
present in the mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be
always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently
the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty
is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by
forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we
have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes
in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of
one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes,
and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on
our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and
in sound sleep having no thoughts at all, or at least none
with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts,
I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts
are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e, the
same subs tance or not . 1

Locke suggests that if the person had a perfect memory record of
every instant in the life history of his soul, he would have no reason
to doubt that the soul to which he found himself attached today was the

same as the soul with which he had been associated in the past.

has no such perfect memory record.

But he

The reason for this is twofold.

In

the first place, there are intervals of time, periods of dreamless
sleep, for example, in vrhich the soul simply has no thoughts or experi-

ences.

Then there is nothing for the memory to record.

Secondly, our

.
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memories are imperfect; many of our soul's past experiences are

swallowed up by a forgetfulness which puts them beyond our powers of
recall.

But how would possession of a perfect recollection of all his

soul's past experiences enable a person to recognize his soul of today
as his soul of yesterday?

How could he conceivably assure himself that

the memories he possessed were memories of experiences actually had in

past times by his present soul?

Locke says that if past perceptions

always remained present in the mind, then the soul would be always
consciously present to itself and would be "evidently the same to itself."
But a few pages later Locke recognizes that "consciousness of past ac~
tions" is not the same thing as the actions or experiences themselves.
It is a representation of past actions, and as such it may always be

delusive.

"... that may be represented to the mind to have been which

really never was ..." and "the consciousness of past actions can be
transferred from one thinking substance to another.""^

If the soul can-

not tell whether its memories truthfully reflect its own past experiences, then the person surely cannot know whether his memories reflect

the actual past of his present soul.
It seems clear that possession of an "uninterrupted consciousness"

of a chain of past experiences would not in itself enable a person to

know that these experiences were all those cx a single immaterial substance, that is, the substance with which he presently finds himself

associated.

What sort of memory, what sort of consciousness of things

past would be helpful?

Sydney Shoemaker attempts to elucidate the

oi
Lockian text we are considering by means of the metaphor of a string

beads

Imagine that we have before us a number of glass beads strung
on cords, and that we wish to determine whether two of the
beads are strung on one and the same cord. Since both the
beads and the cords are visible, we can start with one of our
beads, follow along the ccrd on which it is strung, and see
if we come eventually to the other bead. But what if' our
vision is obstructed and part of a strand of beads is hidden
from us? Then we may see bead A, and the section of cord on
which it is strung, and bead B, and the section of cord on
which it is strung, and yet be unable to see whether A & B
are strung on one and the same cord. Now let us compare
seeing a bead and the section of cord on which it is strung
with remembering a mental object, say an image, and the subject to which it belonged. To say that two different beads
are on one and the same cord will correspond to saying that
two different objects (say an image and a pain) occurring
at different times, belong to one and the same subject.
What will then correspond to having an unobstructed view of
the strand of beads, presumably, will be having an uninterrupted memory, i.e», being able to remember every moment of
a certain interval of time. . .. And then, it appears, there
would be no difficulty about his knowing of two remembered
mental objects that they belonged to one and the same subject;
it would be like the case where one has an unobstructed view
of a strand of beads, and can thus see that two different
beads are on one and the same cord.-*-2
,

The beads correspond to the remembered experiences; the cord on which
they are strung is analogous to the soul which is the subject of the
experiences.

The assumption on which Shoemaker's metaphor is based is

that the cord itself, i.e., the soul, is visible.

For if it were not,

our perception of a row of beads in which there was no break or gap

would not suffice to tell us that the beads were strung on a single
cord.*

They might be strung on two or more cords that were in some in-

visible fashion joined together.

Just so the chain of remembered ex-

insenperiences might be supported by a plurality of souls which haa

sibly succeeded each other.
seem to make the
In the passage we have been discussing Locke does

observation or
assumption that the soul is directly accessible to

m-

"
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spection.

Because of his tendency to view the problem as one of the

soul's assuring itself concerning its own self-identity, this assumption is expressed in terms of the visibility or presence of the soul to
itself , rather than to the person with which it is associated.

Thus

Locke speaks of the "thinking thing" (the soul) being consciously
present to itself, and, most revealingly, of our "losing the sight of
our past selves" due to forgetfulness, etc.

(In this passage, although

not usually elsewhere, "self" is a synonym for
sight of our souls, unless at one time

v/e

"soul..-"

)

Vie

cannot lose

had such sight of them.

Now

this teaching concerning the "visibility" of the soul, either to itself
or to the person associated with it, seems to contradict the familiar

Lockian doctrine that substances, or at least the real essences of substances, are unobservable.

Locke has been at great pains to inform us

that this doctrine applies equally to mental and material substances.
V/e

observe, not our own mental substance but, at most, certain of its

operations, namely, thinking, willing, etc.

We form our complex idea of

an immaterial spirit , not on the basis of any observation of such an
entity, but by putting together the simple ideas taken from the opera-

tions of the mind and joining them to substance, "of which we have no
distir. at idea „

For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its own operations, those simple ideas which it attributes to spirits,
it hath, or can have no other notion of spirit but by
attributing all those operations it finds in itself to a
sort of beings

The existence of the soul is inferred.
perception, either visual or intellectual.

The soul is not a datum oi
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... it seems probable to me, that the simple ideas we
receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries
of cur thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts
it would make, is not able to advance one jot

Only the beads are visible.
thuss

"... the idea we have of spirit ... stands

the substance of spirit is unknown to us ..."

5

1

The cord is

totally invisible.

There appears to be no way to 1'econcile the assumption in II, 27, 10b
concerning the "visibility" of the soul with the main line of Locke's

teaching about the unobservability and unknovability of substance.

It

is not the first time we have been obliged to notice that Locke’s state-

ments about spiritual substance are loaded with inconsistencies.

This is

a particularly blatant one.
For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that Locke could

consistently maintain that a person is able to observe, not only his
soul, but the causal, connection between the state of his soul at any

given time and the thoughts and perceptions which he experiences at that
time.

Let us further assume that he forms a complete and uninterrupted

memory of the activities of his soul in this respect.

Would even this be

enough, to assure him that the soul whose activities ha had continuously

observed was one soul and not a plurality of souls?

If by constantly

keeping his soul "in sight," he is able to be certain that it is always
the same soul, he must possess a way of detecting whether- there has been

any substitution of a new soul for the original one.

He must possess a

criterion that enables him to recognise that the soul he perceives at any
given time is the same as the soul that he perceived in the past, and
also, if occasion, arise., to recognise that it is not the same.

He needs
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to know what sort of changes or discontinuities would be a sign that the

old soul had vanished and been replaced by an interloper.

terion would be a persistence criterion for souls.

Such a cri-

But Locke gives us

absolutely no hint as to what such a criterion would consist of.

This

omission contrasts strikingly with his serious effort to provide such a
test for other entities, such as masses of matter, organisms, men and

persons.

The only other case of a neglected stepchild is that of simple

material substance, although some commentators believe that he does give
a persistence criterion for atoms, namely, spatiotemporal continuity.

Perhaps there is a special difficulty in providing a persistence criteriOr perhaps Locke was not very interested in

on for simple substances.
the concept of the soxil.

The Person

3.

a.

Locke offers the following definition of a

Nature of a person .

person.
... a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same
thinking thing, in different times and places; which it
does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from
thinking, and, as it seerns to me, essential to it: it
being impossible for any one to perceive ’without •perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell,
taste, feel, meditate, or will anything, we know that we
do so. Thus it is always as to our present s€-nsations
and perceptions; and by this every one is to himself that
it not being considered, in this
which he calls self :
case, whether the same self be continued in the same or
divers substances. For, since consciousness always
accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes everyone
to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i»e„, the sameness of a rational
being: and as for as this consciousness can be extended
backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches
the identity of that person: it is the same sell: now as

—

•
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it was then; and it is by the same self with this present
one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. 10
It is clear that Locke wishes to reject the identification of self with

substance, and instead to define a person in terms of consciousness.

However, some of the language he employs may well be a source of confusion.

He successively refers to a person as a thinking being, a think-

ing thing and a rational, being.

It may be asked what meaning can be

assigned to those terms if they do not refer to a substance.

In fact,

Locke himself, in the paragraph immediately succeeding this one equates
a thinking thing with a substance.

himself.

Superficially, he is contradicting

Nevertheless, the subsequent paragraphs make it so plain that

Locke wishes, above all else, to avoid the identification of a person

with a substance that we must, I think, regard this as a case of verbal
confusion and imprecise use of language.'"

Whether the verbal incon-

sistency may not reflect a genuine philosophical!, difficulty is a more

interesting question.
I think we may render

Locke's account of the Aristotelian essence of

a person as follows;
(1) A is a person

if and. only if
(a) A thinks (is intelligent, has reason, has reflection)

and
(b) A is conscious of its thinking.

In view of the fact that Locke asserts it is impossible to think without

being conscious of one's thinking, the second clause may be redundant.
If wo wish to take cognizance of Locke's remarks in the first sentence of

the quoted paragraph, we should, perhaps, add as further clauses:
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(c) A is conscious of itself

and
(d)

(3 1

(3t)

'

)

(3p)

(iJp

1

)

(i) t'

is later than t

(ii) p

/

p’

(iii) A exists in p at t
(iv) A exists in p* at t'
(v) At t'

in p' A is able
to recognize that he
himself was in p at t.

It may be that (d) should not properly be considered as stipulating

a part of the Aristotelian essence of a person.

Because it deals with

identity over time, it may be more appropriate to regard it as part of
the persistence criterion for persons.

Whether (c) asserts anything

different from that which is asserted by (b) is one of the chief un-

settled problems in Locke's philosophy of the self.

It is hard to tell

whether "A" in (a) refers to a subject which has the property of thinking
or whether (a) and (b) should be rewritten to read:
(s '

)

A is a thought
and

(b')

(

x) (x is a thought of A).

The reader may think this issue was settled by Locke’s remarks in
the opening chapters of Book II concerning the inferribility of a
thinker

from,

the fact of a thought.

It must be remembered, however, that

the thinker there referred to was a thinking substance, a soul.

But the

person, according to the teaching Locke will now put forward, is not to
he identified with the soul or the thinking substance.

So even if we
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assume that such a substantial thinker does indeed exist as the neces-

sary substratum of every thought, "A" in (a) cannot have that thinker
as its referent.

Indeed, if "A" in (1) is taken to refer to a subject

which is a thinker, a puzzling situation is bound to result.

For then

there will be two thinkers, one substantial and one non-substantial,

and presumably they will be the subjects of exactly the same thoughts
and experiences.

Locke has told us nothing that would enable us to

l8
conclude that they have these experiences in different ways."'

Hugh S.

Chandler has attempted to rescue Locke from this unpromising psychological theory in the following way.
Consider this triad; (l) When anything rings, a bell
rings; (2) Telephones are not bells; (3) Telephones ring.
Does it follow that when a telephone rings, two things ring?
Obviously not. When a telephone rings, only one thing rings.
It is the telephone, or more specifically, the telephoned
bell.
Locke need not, and should not, suppose that each of
our thoughts is thought by two subjects. A person thinking
by virtue of a component in him which, is doing the thinking,
but which is not that person, does not add. up to two
thinkers. -*-9

The solution which Chandler suggests depends upon the assumption
that the soul is a component of the person, in the way that the bell is
a component of the telephone.

It is difficult, however, to see how the

soul, which is a substance, can be a part of an entity which is not a

substance.

Furthermore, ringing is merely one of the things that a

telephone does; ringing does not exhaust the "essence" of a telephone.

But according to Locke thinking and consciousness of thinking (itself a

species of thought) do exhaust the whole essence of a person and com-

prise its entire activity.

If the soul is the thing that does the

thinking, it would seem more reasonable to identify the soul with the
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person than to conceive oi it as a component of the person.
It seems to me that there are only two methods by which we can

extricate Locke from the infelicitous consequences of the double subject theory,,

One is to say that, explicit avowals notwithstanding,

Locke never believed in the existence of an immaterial soul.

The other

is to hold that Locke's person is not a subject of experiences, but

rather is identical with the experiences themselves.

Ultimately, per-

haps, it will turn out that both of these claims are correct.

First

appearances notwithstanding, it may be that Locke i3 more accurately

characterized as a no-subject theorist of the person than as a subscriber
to the doctrine of a dual self.

The chapter on identity and diversity

teems with statements in which Locke comes very close to identifying the

Thus we frequently find him saying

person with states of consciousness.

that consciousness is that "whereby X am now myself" and "whereby

myself to myself."

20

I

am

"Nothing but consciousness can unite remote

2*
x
existences into the same person ..."
1

"In all which account of self,

the same numerical substance is not considered as making the same self;

but the same continued consciousness ..."

22

"... it is the conscious-

ness that goes along \;ith the substance ... which makes the same person,

and

c onsti tutes

this inseparable self ..."

He explicates the rela-

tion between the person and the soul by saying:

"I agree, the more

probable opinion is, that this consciousnes s is annexed to and the

affection of, one individual immaterial substance."

2k

But the no-subject theory, that is, the view that a person is

identical with states of consciousness, is also beset by problems to
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which Locke was not insensitive.
as follows.

The chief difficulty may be summed up

At any given moment of time, I have, or I am aware of a

set of sensations.

To refer to Locke's earlier example, I see white

and black colors, I hear singing, I feel warmth and
tart.

I

taste something

If we eliminate the expression, "I," we are left with the state-

ment that there is a color, a sound, a warm feeling and a taste.

But

Locke displays at least an initial awareness that it will not do simply
to equate the person with the total ity of these sensations.

If we say

that the self is no more than a bundle of perceptions, there may not be

any way to "bundle" them.

We may not be able to explain how it is that

they are orgsnized into some kind of a unity and distinguished from the
set of sensations belonging to another person.

Anticipating many of

the problems besetting the so-called "bundle" theory of selfhood, Locke

apparently saw the need for some kind of cognitive subject to unify the
experiences of a given person.

And so the statements in Chapter 27

which seemingly identify the self with consciousness are interspersed

with others in which the self is said to be a subject of consciousness,
a being which has the property of thinking, feeling and being conscious
"Self is that conscious thinking thing, whatever substance made up of,
... which is sensible or conscious of pleasure and pain, capable of

„25
happiness or misery ..."

,

.

.

Locke did not wish to abolish the self as a subject of experiences
bxit

he did desire to disengage it from logical dependence upon what he

must have believod to be the discredited notions of soul and substance.

Consequently he did not want to postulate as a subject of consciousness
something different in kind from the perceptions themselves.

For to
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take that course, he must have felt, would inevitably lead to identify-

ing the person either with an immaterial soul or with a material body.
Now Locke believed that in the concept of consciousness he had dis-

covered a surrogate for the substantial ego, which would yet perform
the necessary synthesizing function.

"... consciousness always accom-

panies thinking, and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls
self ..."

The crucial importance to Locke of the doctrine that to think

means to be conscious of thinking is now apparent.

It is the second-

order consciousness of thinking that is intended to play the role of the
subject of experiences.

Thus the subject of experience will itself be

constituted out of experience.
However, Locke gives no adequate analysis of the nature of this
-

second-order consciousness.

Does "perceiving that one perceives" mean

merely that each particular sensation is accompanied by a sort of mirror
image, a double, so that the sensation of warmth has annexed to it the

sensation of the sensation of warmth?
differ from the former?

In that case, how would the latter

And why should there not be still another sensa-

tion, attached to the second one, and to that still another, and so on

indefinitely?

If consciousness consists merely in this curious double or

multiple nature of each perception, it is clear that it cannot play tbo
role of organizing the totality of sensations into a whole, nor can it
give rise to the idea of self or personal identity.

For the sensation

of the sensation, of warmth will no more be connected with the sensation
of the sensation of color than were the original first-order perceptions

connected with each other.

The doctrine that each perception is accom-

panied by a second-order perception of the original perception converts
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the atomic sensations (of warmth, color, etc,) into strings of percep-

tions, but does nothing to provide a bond between these strings, nor to

explain how the person having such perceptions is able to compare them
and relate them to each other.
If consciousness is to be "that which makes everyone to be what he

calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking
things," it must rather be understood as a comprehensive awareness of
the individual perceptions.

Plato makes this point in the Theaetetus .

Yes, it would surely be strange that there should be
a number of senses ensconced inside us, like the
warriors in the Trojan horse, and all these things
should not converge and meet in some single nature
a soul., or whatever it is to be called
with which
we perceive all the objects of perception through the
senses as instruments. °

—

—

Would the Platonic account of perception be acceptable to Locke?

Does

he mean to put forward an account of consciousness similar to Plato's?
It is difficult to know.

Certainly he would refuse Plato's suggestion

that we identify the being which is the meeting point of the senses with

the soul, the mind or any kind of substantial entity.

He would insist

that the agency which unifies a person's sensations is itself an item of

consciousness.

Is this possible?

Can the "common power" by which,

according to Plato, individual perceptions are organized and united, be
understood as being itself no more than a perception, a single comprehensive perception of the individual sensations and thoughts occurring at
any particular moment cf time?

The tenability of Locke's solution to

the problem of personal identity requires an affirmative answer to this

question.
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Let u3 say that a state of consciousness is a set of contemporane-

ous experiences such that all the members and only the members of that
set belong to a given person at a given time.

How, at any particular

moment, does one distinguish the set of experiences belonging to one

person from the set of experiences belonging to another?

Locke at first

suggests that a set of contemporaneous experiences belongs to a person,
A, if and only if A is conscious of every member of the set.

That is to

say, a set of contemporaneous experiences qualifies as a state of con-

sciousness if and only if there is a person who is conscious of all and

only the members of that set.

However, this reply presupposes that we

already have a definition of a person, while in fact it seems impossible
that such a definition could be provided withoxit making use of the concept of a state of consciousness.

Following some of Locke’s sugges-

tions, let us transa.ate his proposal as follows;

A set of experiences,

S, is assignable to a single person just in case there exists a compre-

hensive perception of every member of S.

That perception will be

another set of experiences, S’, such that, for every E which is a member
of S, there is a member of S’ which is a consciousness of E.

The diffi-

culty is that Locke has taught us that consciousness is inseparable from
thinking.

It is impossible that there should be any thought or experi-

ence which is unaccompanied by a reflexive awareness of that thought.

So every set of experiences will meet this criterion and will qualify
as a state of consciousness.

To prevent this consequence it would be

necessary to specify that S* itself is a set of experiences belonging
to a single person.

In order to do this, we should need to postulate

another set ox experiences, S", such that for every E* which is a mem-
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ber of S', there is a member of S" which is a consciousness of E'«

Obviously this would lead to an infinite regress.

The only hope of

stopping that regress would be to claim that the comprehensive perception of every member of the original set of experiences, S, is not a
set of distinct experiences, but a single, unitary experience.

how could such a claim be justified?

But

Let us say that a sensation is

atomic just in case there is no part of it which is capable of being

experienced in isolation from any other part.

would be an example of an atomic experience.

Hearing a musical tone
Now it is plain that the

comprehensive perception, which includes within itself consciousness of
the many atomic experiences which make up the first-order state of con-

sciousness, cannot itself be an atomic experience.

If it is possible to

experience a feeling of warmth without experiencing a tart taste, then
it is presumably possible to be conscious of the first-order experience

of warmth without being conscious of the first-order experience of a tart
taste.

But if the second-order comprehensive perception is molecular in

nature, then we face the same problem that we faced in connection with
the original first-order state of consciousness.

What is it that makes

the atomic experiences which compose it the experiences of one person?
Is it possible, within the framework of Locke's theory, to discover
a workable criterion for determining the experiential boundaries of a

given person at a given time?

Let us experiment with a solution that
27
"
1

has been proposed by H„ P. Grice.

That experiences E and E

the same state of consciousness means, according to Grice

,

5

belong to

that "E and

E' would, given certain conditions, be known, by memory or introspec-

pO

tion, to be simultaneous."

We have already had occasion to remark
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that if a definiens contains a stipulation that a state of affairs

occurs or will occur given certain conditions , the definition utilizing
that definiens will suffer from vagueness and emptiness.

Experiences

which do not belong to a single person would be known, by memory or
introspection, to be simultaneous, given certain conditions whi ch do
not in fact prevail , i.e.

ences of one person.

,

given the condition that they are experi-

But let us see if Grice's suggestion can be

adapted in a way that suits our purposes.

and E

8

Perhaps we could say that E

belong to the same state of consciousness if and only if there

is an E"

such that E" is an experience of the relation of simulta-

neity which holds between E and E'.

If we think that there are any

ex^*

periences such as we have described E" to be, this approach might hold
out some hope.

However , the workability of the solution is dependent

upon the assumption that no experience may belong to more than one
person.

For if the assumption does not hold good, then the existence

of E" will guarantee only that there is some person who experiences E

and E* as parts of a single state of consciousness.

It will not

exclude the possibility that E may also belong to another person who
fails to experience either E' or E".

And hence it will not insure

that E and E* are invariably co-personal experiences.

Now it is a

feature of Locke's theory of the person, as we shall reconstruct it,
that distinct persons may have temporal parts in common and hence that
a given experience may be an experience belonging to more than one

person.

Consequently a Grice-type solution is not feasible for Locke.

Given Locke's assumptions, I must confess myself unable to discover any way of determining which, experiences may properly be said co
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belong toa particular state of consciousness.
merely to my shortcomings.

This failure may be due

But unless it can be made good by some more

ingenious commentator, it is apparent that Locke's theory suffers from a
fatal weakness.

We shall be forced to understand a state of consciousness

as being simply a non-empty set of experiences.

What, then, is the property or properties making up the Aristotelian,

essence of a person?

Locke began by defining a person as a thinking being,

thereby failing to make the distinction, later so important to him, between
a soul and a person.

But the doctrine that "it is that consciousness which

always accompanies thinking, which makes everyone to be what he calls self"
teaches us that it is Locke's real intention to define a person as a thought,
or set of thoughts, attended by a consciousness of those thoughts.

V/e

may

say that a temporal slice of a person is a state of consciousness charac-

terized by

first-order thoughts together v/ith a second-order awareness of

them.

The persistence criterion for persons .

b.

No one in his senses would

want to say that the lifetime of a person was no longer than the duration of
a particular thought or a state of consciousness.

the rule.

Locke was no exception to

A person, conceived of as a temporally extended entity, is not a

single state of consciousness but is, rather, composed of a series of such
states, each of them characterized in the way just mentioned.

By what

principle is a series of states of consciousness bundled into a personal

whole?

What sort of relation do the later states in such a series need to

bear to the earlier ones if they are to be parts of a single person?

The

key to the unity of a person at any given time, according to Locke, is his

consciousness of his present thoughts.

The unity of a person across time
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is constituted by his continuing consciousness of his past thoughts.
is by the consciousness it has of its present
thoughts and actions, that it is self to itself now,
and so will be the same self, as far as the same
consciousness can extend to actions past or to come ... ^

Foz' it

Locke’s most succinct statement of his persistence criterion for persons
is as follows:
... as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea
of any past paction with the same consciousness it had
of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has
of any present action:
so far it is the same personal

self
Locke, of course, conceives of this persistence criterion as a criterion of identity for persons picked out as existing at different times.

this he has been followed by all of his commentators and critics.

In

So the

standard way of rendering his criterion is as follows:
(2) B at tp is the same person as A at t^

if and only if
(a) A and B are persons
(b) It is possible for B to remember at t^

having performed some act or having had
some experience which A performed or
experienced at t^.31
It is this formulation of Locke’s persistence principle, certainly a

natural one in view of the language he employed, that has been the source
of most of the paradoxes associated with his theory.

Ultimately we shall

reconstruct it as a criterion stating the necessary and sufficient conditions for the co-membership of temporal segments in a series of states of

consciousness composing a person.

But for the time being and for purposes

of exposition we shall employ the "personal identity" terminology.

Locke

uses the terras "memory,.?! "consciousness of past actions," and "ideas of
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past actions," interchangeably.

To repeat the idea of a past action with

the same consciousness one had of it at first is to remember oneself per-

forming the action in question.

When Locke says that B at

t

is the same

self as A at t^ if B can repeat an idea of A's action at t^ , by "can" he

clearly has in mind something stronger than mere logical possibility.

The

test of whether I can remember a past experience is whether , under appro-

priate circumstances and with appropriate stimulation,

I do

remember it.

If I am in fact unable to recall events in which my childhood body partici-

pated, or the recent actions committed by my adult body while drunk or

drugged, I am not the same person as the one who participated in those

events or committed those actions, although, because of the continuity be-

tween my body as it existed at those times and as it exists now, I am the

This is a consequence of which Locke was fully aware and which

same man.

he vras prepared to accept.

Locke next raises the question as to whether personal identity is dependent upon or entails identity of substance.
substance,

It is clear ly immaterial

the soul, that he is referring to here, although it is equally

true that he would refuse to base personal identity on sameness of body or

material substance.

His answer is;

thing, i.e.the same substance or no
all."'''

2

"... whether we are the same thinking
»<><,

concerns not personal identity at

Locke's reason for refusing to equate the person with his soul is

based upon his contention, which we have already discussed at length, that
no one can know with certainty whether his soul of the present moment is

the same as the soul which was the subject of the past experiences he now

remembers.

But everyone can know that he is the same person as the person

who had the experiences he now remembers.
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For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man
be himself to himself , personal identity depends on
that only ...5-5
•

The conclusion, not drawn explicitly by Locke, is that the soul and the

person are not the same thing.

In an alternative version of the argument,

Locke says that it is always possible that an intellectual substance have
represented to it "as done by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps
done by some other agent
made to the person.

But such false representations cannot be

"For the same consciousness being preserved ... the

34
personal identity is preserved."''
c

„

Person and soul .

For Locke the relationship between the self and

the soul, is exactly parallel to that which is ordinarily conceived of as

prevailing between soul and body.

Hence it makes sense for him to ask

whether the self (the person) can retain its identity even although the
soul does not.

This is a question which he answers affirmatively.

Inso-

far as I retain my memories, my consciousness of my own past experience, I
-

remain myself and am the same person I was before, even although these
memories have been grafted upon a different soul.

Conversely, if the

memories properly belonging to another soul, let us say the soul of

Lucretia Borgia, are grafted upon my soul and conjoined with my memories,
then that lady and I become the same person.

Insofar as I remember her

misdeeds as though they were my own, 1 am punishable for them, even although my soul was in no way responsible for their commission.

It is

logically possible that transferal of this sort might come to pass, Locke
thinks, because of the fact that memories are not self-certifying in the

way present sensations
may always be delusive.

are..

Because of their representativ e nature, they

Consequently my soul may be decieved into be-
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lieving that it committed the poisonings, etc. that were actually not its
actions, but the actions of Lucretia's soul, and it may even be deluded
into believing that it remembers those actions as its own.

For assurance

that such terrible events will not occur, we must trust to the goodness of
God, Locke says, "who, as far as the happiness or misery of any of his

sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not, by a fatal error of
theirs, transfer from one to another that consciousness which draws reward
or punishment with it."

35
^

If, then, divine intervention does not prohibit

it, there is no logical, reason why one person may not be constituted out of

the experiences of several souls.

Having attempted to show that the person-soul association may instantiate a one-many relation, Locke next seeks to demonstrate that there is no

logical absurdity in assuming that several distinct persons may be associated with a single soul.

If a soul should be stripped of all its memories

and its consciousness of its past existence, and in this state should then

commence a new life, it would "make" a new person.

If my soul is numeri-

cally identical with that once possessed by Lucretia Borgia, but I have no

recollection whatsoever of her acts and experiences, then

I

am not the

same person as Lucretia, nor am I punishable for her wrongdoings.

Moral

responsibility is a function of personality and is determined by memory.
If an individual commits a crime which later he is wholly incapable of

recollecting, he is the same man as the wrongdoer; his soul is identical

with that of the wrongdoer; but he is not the same person as the wrongdoer.

Hence divine justice will not punish him.

Human laws hold such an

individual responsible, because they have no way of determining whether
His plea of forgetfulness is genuine or spurious.
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But in the Great Day, wherein the secrets of all hearts
shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to think, no
,
one shall be made to answer for what he knows nothing of „.. >0
If a limb is amputated from the body, says Locke, the original owner
no longer regards it as a part of himself and is indifferent as to what be-

comes of it.

But if it should be the case that when a finger is cut off,

consciousness goes along with the finger and leaves the rest of the body,
then one would be concerned only for the finger and not for the remainder
of the body.

This every intelligent being, sensible of happiness or
misery, must grant
that there is something that is
himself that he is concerned for, and would have happy ...
In all which account of self, the same numerical substance
is not considered as making the same self; but the same
continued consciousness ... Person , as I take it, is the
name for this self.37

—

,

... happiness and misery being that for which every one
is concerned for himself , and not mattering what becomes
of any substance, not joined to, or affected with that
consciousness. kS

The soul has exactly the same instrumental status as does the body.

Should

consciousness be severed from its original spiritual substance, then the
fate of that substance would be of no interest to the self.

We see now

that Locke was inconsistent in speaking of the transfer of guilt and lia-

bility to punishment from soul to soul as a tragedy which God would surely
wish to prevent.

Locke's position should be that it is a matter of indif-

ference as to which soul is punished for any particular misdeed.

The only

thing that matters is that a person be held responsible exclusively for
his own actions.

Is it any wonder that this doctrine was responsible for

much anger in theological circles?

Does the concept of a soul or an immaterial mental substance serve
for Locke any philosophical purpose whatever?

I think it is evident that
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the answer must be in the negative.

inal with me.

This conclusion is by no means orig-

Laird points out that "his account of the soul shows how
39

useless that conception may be, if understood as Locke understands it."

Gibson appears to be one of the few commentators actually to subscribe to
Locke’s doctrine of personal identity.

Hence his view on the status of

mental substance is of interest, since presumably he views the problem in
an authentically Lockian way.

He says:

Here, moreover, in the identity of self-consciousness,
Locke has found a concrete unifying conception, in
place of the empty thing-in-itself into which the idea
of substance had finally resolved itself .... But a
mental substance which is not only unknown, but has
been shown to stand in no essential relation to the
self of consciousness, can only be retained so long as
it is not challenged. Nothing could show more conclusively than the mere statement of such a position,
the entire uiselessness of the traditional conception
of substance for the interpretation of our self-conscious
life."10
I am inclined to think that this was exactly what Locke intended to show.

,
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CHAPTER

V

RECONSTRUCT ING LOCKE
PERSISTENCE CRITERION
FOR PERSONS
'

le

Difficulties with the Standard Interpretation
of Locke's Criterion of Personal Identity

Locke's principle that B at

t

2

is the same person as A at t

only if B at t^ can remember some experiences of A at

t,

if and

is open to grave

logical objections when it is construed as asserting necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of persons..

It appears to generate- at

least three paradoxes.
a.-

of B g

A may b e identi cal, with B without possessing al l of the properties

Locke apparently believes that becoming identical with a person does

not entail the acquisition of all of his properties.

His utterances on

this subject are not always free from ambiguity, but in general he seems to
think that while B's recollection of any action or experience of A is
sufficient to insure the identity of B with A, it is not sufficient tc

guarantee that all of A* s experiences are B's experiences.

That with which the consciousness of this present thinking
thing can join itself, makes the same person, and is one
self with it, and with nothing else; and so attributes to
itself, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own,
as far as that consciousness reaches, and no further; as
every one who reflects will perceive. -It is not altogether easy to knew what Locke intends to say in this passage,,

Does he wish to adopt the position that if A joins himself to B

end becomes one self with B, then A owns all the actions of B as his own?
Or does he wish to say that if A is the same person as B, A owns those

actions of 3, and only those actions, to which. A's consciousness reaches?
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Presumably the latter; otherwise the phrase "as far as that consciousness
reaches, and no further" would be otiose.

This interpretation is borne

out by the following passage.
For, whatsoever any substance has thought or done, which I
cannot recollect, and by my consciousness make my own
thought and action, it will no more belong to me ... than
if it had been thought or done by any other immaterial being
anywhere existing.^
It is central to Locke's thinking that at any given time a person

bears moral responsibility exclusively for those actions which he is able
to recollect at that time.
... whatever past actions it cannot reconcile or appropriate to that present self by consciousness, it can be no
more concerned in than if they had never been done; -and
to receive pleasure or pain, i.e. reward or punishment, on
the account of any such action, is all one as to be made
happy or miserable in its first being, without any demerit
at all„^

"Person," Locke says, "... is a forensic term, appropriating actions and
their merit ..."

4

Actions are appropriated or assigned to a person, B,

at t just in case B is morally responsible for them at t.

morally responsible for an action at
having performed it.

t

But B is

if and only if at t he can remember

It follows that at any given time the only actions

of B are actions which he can recollect at that time.

At the same time it

suffices to make 3 identical with A if B becomes conscious of

airf

action

Thus B may be the sane person as A and yet there may be actions of

of A.

A which are not actions of B.

Locke appears to be claiming that B may bo

identical with A and yet fail to possess some property that A possesses.
b»

that

A and B may become identi cal and c ease to be ident ical.)

It seems

individual may become identical, v/ith some person from whom he has

previously been distinct, and he may become distinct from someone wicn

,
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whom he previously has been identical.

Locke tells us that someone might

possess the same soul as that possessed by Nestor, but if he had no consciousness of any of Nestor's actions this would not suffice to make him
the same person as Nestor.

But should such a being, possessing Nestor's

soul but non-identical with Nestor "... once find himself conscious of

any of the actions of Nestor, he then finds himself the same person with
Nestor." 5

Conversely, as long as he retains the memory of Nestor's

thoughts and actions, he is Nestor.

But if he should lose this memory

beyond the possibility of retrieving it, he would cease to be identical

with Nestor

said

would no longer be responsible for his deeds.

He is the

same person as Nestor as long as he can reproduce some of his experiences
in memory; let him lose this capacity and he loses his Nestor-identity.

g

This view appears to entail the consequence that an individual at one time
has, and at another time has not, all of the properties of Nestor.

this is impossible.

But

Let us assume that Nestor and I are identical.

Then

the dated property of participating in the siege of Troy circa 2000 B.C.

which Nestor possesses is a property which I have always possessed, and
the dated property which I possess of recalling circa 2000 A.D. the events
of that siege is a property which Nestor has always possessed.

properties can be neither acquired nor lost.
have always been identical.

Dated

Thus if we are identical, we

It is impossible, not having been the same

that we should become the same.

The same argument establishes that, once

having been identical, we cannot cease to be so.

If it has ever been the

case that Nestor and I have possessed all of our dated properties in
common, we shall always do so.
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£«

Denial of the transitivity of identity .

That Locke’s theory of

personal identity apparently committed him to a denial of the principle
of the transitivity of identity was a consequence first pointed out by

Thomas Reid,

There are three kinds of cases which seem to involve a

failure of the transitivity of identity.

Reid’s example is as follows;

Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy
at school for robbing an orchard, to have taken a standard
from the enemy in his first campaign, and to have been
made a general in advanced life? suppose, also, which must
be admitted to be possible, that, when he took the standard,
he was conscious of his having been flogged at school, and
that, when made a general, he was conscious of his taking
the standard, but had absolutely lost the consciousness of
his fi.ogging. These things being supposed, it follows,
from Mr. Locke's doctrine, that he who was flogged at school
is the same person ’who took the standard, and that he who
took the standard is the same person who was made a general.
Y/hence it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the
general is the same person with him who was flogged at
school. But the general's consciousness does not reach so
far back as his flogging; therefore, according to Mr. Locke's
doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. Therefore
the general is, and at the same time is not, the same person
with him who was flogged at school.
In order- to make the example intelligible we should assume that the term "a

brave officer" which is applied to the individual who is successively a
schoolboy,

a junior officer and a general designates a man (a body or

body-soul compound) rather than a person.

Then the schoolboy,

officer and the old general will all be "the same man."

the young

But Locke

teaches us that it is possible for A and B to be the same man and yst be
o

distinct

J

xjsrsoIls

“'

If this is so it will make sense to inquire if the

general and the schoolboy
son*

are, under these circumstances,

the same per-

More nrecisely, we want to know if the person associated with the

general's body is identical with the person associated with the schoolboy's body.

Even although the general's body is identical with the
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schoolboy's body, it is possible that distinct persons are associated

with different temporal phases of it.
s.

single person

question.

s

If "a brave officer" had designated

however, it would not have been intelligible to raise this

In order to make certain that this example tells against Locke

we should further assume that the general is not able to recollect any
experiences contemporaneous with the flogging.
Another version of the puzzle is provided by the case of an individual
(a body-soul compound) who retains his memories of the earlier part of his

life but loses his ability to recollect a subsequent segment.

Let us alter

keid's example so that the general recalls the flogging but, perhaps owing
to the receipt of a head wound, is unable to remember the capture of the

standard, or any of the events surrounding this episode.

Then the person

associated with the general's body is identical with the person whose body

was flogged, but not with the person whose body was wounded, although the
latter two persons are identical with each other.
tn

= B at tp, B at t ? - C at tj but C at

t_,

= A at t^ and B at

t_,

-

A at

t.,

are not identical with each other.

,

/ A at

In the first case, A at
t^

,

In this case, C at

but C and B, both identical with A,

The same situation might be brought

about if the memories properly attaching to a given soul, let us say the
souk of Lucretia Borgia, were inherited by a plurality of distinct persons.

There seems to be no reason why, on the basis of Locke's principles such
a state ex affairs could not come about.

If the persons, Golda Heir and

Indira Gnandi, each acquire Lucretia' s memories, then each of them becomes the same person as Lucretia.

But since Golda s Lucretia -memories

would be accompanied by experiences different

'

fx*orn

those accompanying

Indira's Lucretia-memories, this circumstance, it seems, would hardly
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suffice to make Golda and Indira identical with each other.

So once again

the transitivity of identity would be violated.

An example of the third kind of case in which transitivity fails is
afforded by the man (body-soul compound) who suffers a temporary loss of
his ability to recall an earlier part of his life, but subsequently regains that power.

Giving to the head injuries, he does not recall the

events of his school days during his young officer phase, but he subse-

quently recovers, so as an elderly general he is able to recollect the
events of both his schoolboy period and his young officer period.

Under

these circumstances, the person associated with the elderly body is iden-

tical \vith the person associated with the boy's body and also with the

person associated with the young officer's body, but the latter two persons are distinct.
at tp

C at t. = A at t n and also C at t, = B at tp, but B

/ A at
Let us return to the first case.

If we interpret the key singular

terms, such as "the schoolboy of t^," "the general, of

etc. as ex-

pressions of the form, "the A which has P^," and consequently as referring
to temporally persistent entities of whose existence t is merely a segment,

then we must describe the situation the counter-example depicts in the
following way.
(1) There exists a person, A, who all through his life has the dated prop-

erty of being a schoolboy during t^.
(2) There exists a person, B, who all through his life has the dated prop-

erties of (a) being a junior officer during

t

p

and (b) remembering during

ip the experiences which were had by A during t 1

.

(3) There exists a person, C, who all through his life has the dated prop-
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erties of (a

1

)

being a general during

the experiences had by B during

and (b') remembering during

and (o') failing to remember (i.e.,

lacking the ability to remember) during t^ any experiences had by A during

V
Now it is clear that when we interpret Locke's theory as making the

strong claim that B's ability to recall some of A's experiences is the
necessary and sufficient condition for the identity of B with A, we
saddle him with the admission that C, through possession of the dated property (b

5

),

is identical with B and that B, through possession of the dated

property (b). is identical with A.

It is a logical consequence of this

admission that C is identical with A.

Reid assumes that Locke's theory

compels him to deny the logical consequence of his own admission.
this really true?

But is

If C is unable to recollect any of the experiences of

A, then indeed it follows from Locke's theory that C is not identical with

A.

But is it so clear that C is unable to recollect any experiences of

A?

On the contrary, on the basis of assumptions (1), (2) and (3), it

follows that C does remember A's experiences, for C is the same person as
B, and B remembers A's experiences.

events of

at

t..

The fact that C dees not remember the

does not prove that he fails to remember them at ail.

He does remember them; he remembers them at

It appears, then, that

when we interpret expressions such as "A at t" as names for temporally
persistent entities, Reid's counter-example fails.

Locke is committed to

saying that "A," "B," and "C" name a single person, but it is not immediately obvious that he is committed to denying that proposition.
However, Locke would regard than refutation of Reid's criticism as
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a Pyrrhic victory.

Let us consider why.

According to Reid's original

example, A robs an orchard at some point during t

point in t^ he is flogged for that offense.

and at a subsequent

Let us alter the example

slightly by making the assumption that A does rob the orchard during t^
but that he is not punished for it during

during t^.
able at

t

nor is B punished for it

The question that now arises is whether or not C is punishfor the offense that was committed by A during

t
1

no longer is able to recollect at t^.

but which C

We have already noted that Locke

believes no one should be punished for offenses that he is unable to recall at the time of the punishment . Therefore it is clear that Locke would
not agree that C is punishable at t_ for the offense committed by A at

t.

2

of which C has no recollection at

1

_t ,.

Locke could have reconciled this denial of C's liability to punishment at

with the admission that A, B and C constitute a single person

simply by adopting the moral principle that no person has the dated property of being punishable at

t

for an offense committed by him at t - n,

unless he has the dated property of remembering at
ted by him at

t - n.

t

the offense commit-

3ut this is to say that Locke need not have held

the conception of a person which in fact he did hold; he need not have

founded personality on consciousness and memory.

Locke chose instead to

say that a person is responsible for all of his earlier actions, and

hence that actions he cannot remember are not his.
... personality extends itself beyond present existence
whereby it
to what is past, only by consciousness,
becomes concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to
itself past actions ...9

—

Consequently he would not have been able to grant that A, B and C of

.
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Reid’s example constitute a single person without admitting that C is
punishable at t^ for the offense committed by a at

t.,

But it is impossible to reconcile the doctrine that a person is

responsible for all of his earlier actions with the teaching that no one
is punishable for actions which he is unable to recall at the time of

the punishment.

existing at t.

Let us consider a person (a state of consciousness)

What earlier states of consciousness may be assigned to

that person at t?

Part of the time Locke's answer seems to be, all those

and only those which the person is capable of remembering at t.

A person

must be such that at any given time his state of consciousness is potenti-

ally a memory cf all his earlier states.
any experiences of A at t 1
son.

,

So if B at t^ cannot remember

then A and B cannot be states of the same per-

Yet if at t^ C remembers experiences of both A and 3, A, B and C

will make up a single person.

This is a contradiction which no recon-

struction of Locke's theory can resolve.
Perhaps feeling the tension between his incompatible principles,

Locke may have been seeking a way out by relativizing the relation of
identity to a particular time.

Accordingly, his full criterion of the

identity of persons does not stipulate that B is identical with A if and
only if B at some point during his life can recall any of A's experiences.

Instead that criterion specifies that 3 is identical with A at a c ertain
time , namely, that time and only that time, at which he is able to

recollect A's experiences.

3 at t^ is the same person as A at t^ if

and only if B possesses the ability at

by A at

t^

.

t_

to remember an experience had

The theory that A and B are identical relative to a particu-

lar time is merely an alternative formulation of the contradictory

pnn-
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ciple, which Locke did accept, that a person may become identical with

someone from whom he had previously been distinct and vice versa.

When

its singular terms are interpreted as names for temporally persistent

entities, Reid's counter-example has the effect of forcing Locke to accept

this consequence and its attendant absurdities.

If "A," "B," and "C" are

thought of as naming a single person, Locke is obliged to say that at t^
that person is identical with the schoolboy, but that at t^ he has become

distinct from the schoolboy.

Reid's argument merely shows that a theory

which is enmeshed in that contradiction will also be compelled to deny
the necessary truth that identity is a transitive relation.
dc

Veridical and non-veridi cal memory .

Now let us consider another

cluster of difficulties attending Locke’s attempt to define the identity

Depending on the sense

of persons by means of the criterion of memory.

given to "remember," this attempt appears to lead either to circularity or
to paradox.

When we say, "B at t^ is the same person as A at t^ if and

only if B can remember at

some experiences had by A at t^,"

using the word "remember" in one of two ways.

vre

may be

We may be defining it in

such a manner that it is logically impossible for anyone to remember any
experiences other than those he himself actually had.
the veridical sense of "memory."

word.

This we may call

It is certainly the primary sense cf the

When we are using "remember" in this

’way,

it is logically correct

to refer to certain memory-like experiences as merely spurious memories,

if in fact

v/e

liave

grounds for believing they do not mirror past events in

the life of the individual.

Let us assume that through hypnosis or other

means , I am put into a delusional state in which it seems to

use

that I
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remember the experience of standing at a storehouse window in Dallas and
gunning down President Kennedy.

Given the sense of "remember" which we

are new employing, it would be logically, as well as psychiatrically,

proper for someone acquainted with my actual whereabouts on the day of

Kennedy’s assassination to inform me that I do not remember any such experience?

merely think I remember it.

I

If we define "memory" in this

narrow sense, however, its usefulness as a criterion for establishing

personal identity becomes questionable.

if and only if B at t_ can remember

tity holds that B at t„ = A at
some of A's experiences at

t.,

„

The definition of personal iden-

The deflation of memory stipulates:

-L

(1) B at t 0 remembers some of A's experiences at t n

if and only if

has ideas of some experiences had by A at t.with the additional idea annexed to them that these
experiences have been had by B at t^

(a) B at t

and
(b) the experiences of which B has ideas at t 0 were actually
had by B at

Clauses (a) and (b) imply that the experiences had by B at

t..

,

of which

he has ideas at t^, are identical with some experiences had by A at t^.

According to our ordinary ways of thinking, A and B cannot have identical
experiences unless they are identical persons.

If this is so, then

(a.)

and (b) imply:
(c) B at t. = A at t 1

.

The definition of personal identity is thus rendered circular, for whe
defi-niendum , "E at t„ = A at

t^"

is in fact contained in the aefiniens.

Let us now consider the attempt to define personal identity through

229

a memory criterion when the word "remember" is allowed to include in its

meaning what we would ordinarily call non-veridical memory experiences,
that is to say, when clause (b) of the definition of veridical memory is

simply dropped.

When the word is used in this sense it is no longer

logically proper to inform a person that he merely thinks he remembers
an experience.

The status of memory becomes exactly like that of a

feeling of pain.

If I seem to feel a pain, I do feel a pain.

Similarly,

if I think I remember an experience, I do remember that experience.
v/e

Thus

make it possible for a person to remember experiences he never had.

It is possible, for example, for me to remember the experience of assas-

sinating President Kennedy, even although such an action was never committed by me.
However, if we combine a memory criterion of identity with this sense
of the word "remember," we shall be faced with the paradoxes we have just

been discussing.

V/e

shall be compelled to admit that persons, previously

distinct, may become identical (and vice versa) and we shall be obliged to

deny the transitivity of identity.
V/e

have noted that if one assumes it is impossible for distinct per-

sons to share the same experience, the definition of personal identity in

terms of veridical memory is circular.

If one does not make that assump-

tion, the definition is freed from circularity but leads to the same

bizarre consequences that flow from combining it with a non-veridical con-

ception of memory.

If B forgets the experiences he shared with A, then

he ceases to be identical with A.

If he remembers them again, he is once

more identical, with A.
V/e

are now in a position to appreciate the ingenuity of Locke’s aevic
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of a double subject, constituted out of the distinct entities, the self

and the soul.

This machinery enables him to employ the veridical and the

non-veridical senses of memory simultaneously.

When he discusses the rela-

tion of the soul to its memories, he is clearly using the word "remember"
in what we have been calling the non-veridical sense, namely, to denote

the present consciousness of

event that represents itself as having

an.

occurred in the individual's past, but which in fact may not have done so.
... why one intellectual substance may not have represented
to it, as dene by itself, what it never did, and was perhaps
done by some other agent
why, I say, such a representation
may not possibly be without reality of matter of fact, as well
as several representations in dreams are, which yet whilst
dreaming we take for true
will be difficult to conclude from
_LlJ
the nature of things.

—

—

Thus Locke is enabled to discuss the possibility of memories being transferred from one soul to another, and of a mind remembering experiences it
never had.

He does not fall into the contradictions we have just described,

however, precisely because he does not employ a memory criterion to estab-

lish the identity of a soul.

The soul is a substance, and the criteria

for determining the identity or persistence of a substance, whatever they

may be, have nothing to do with memory.

It is entirely possible for a soul

tc be "wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence" and

yet remain the same soul.

Conversely, if two souls each acquire all of the

memories of the other, they yet remain numerically distinct as souls.
A man is related to his memories in precisely the same way as is the
soul to its memories, but once again contradictory consequences do not
follow, because the identity of a man is not determined on the basis of

memory, but rather by the criterion used to establish the sameness oi

physical organisms.

So even if Locke were to eliminate the soul from his

231

conceptual scheme, he would be able to employ the concept of non-veridical

memory without falling into paradoxes.

When Locke turns to the identity of persons, where he does employ the
criterion of memory, he shifts without warning to the veridical sense of
"remember."

For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of
any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at
first ... so far is it the same personal self .-Li
Let us assume that an intelligent being has an idea of a past action which
in fact it did not perform, although it thinks of this action as being its
own.

Under these circumstances it cannot have a consciousness of the

action which is the same as the consciousness it had of it at first, since
there was no such prior consciousness.

It seems, then, that where persons

are concerned, only veridical remembering qualifies as remembering.

member an experience means to remember one's own experience.
a past action which one has not performed is not a memory.

To re-

The idea of
On the assump-

tion that a given experience can be had by only one person, the paradoxical consequences which ensue from the combination of a non-veridical sense
of memory with a memory criterion of identity are thus avoided, but at the

cost of rendering circular' the definition of a person.

This circularity,

however, is masked in Locke's presentation by the role he accords to the

notions of the soul and the man, which function

cLS

alternate subjects.

By

focusing on the dramatic possibilities of non-veridical memory where the
soul is concerned, he obscures the fact that he is not using a similar

non-veridical sense of the word "remember" in his definition of a person.

Thus many readers have believed that they were in receipt

,

not only of a
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genuine piece cf information, but even a shocking piece of information,

when told that person B's ability to remember some of person A's experiences is a sufficient condition of the identity of B at
2.

a.

t0

with A at t,.

The Reconstruction of Locke's Theory

Another conception of m emory .

The preceding account of Locke's

theory of personal identity is somehow too simplistic.

Is the Lockian

definition condemned either to circularity or to paradoxical consequences
of the sort we have been portraying?

I

shall argue that the theory is not

to be so readily dismissed.

No difficulty exists in making a distinction between veridical and

non-veridical memory so long as we are talking about a substance, whether
spiritual or material in character.

A veridical memory is a representation

of an experience which the being in question has actually had, or of an

action which it has actually performed.

A non-veridical memory represents

to a subject as though it were its own an experience which that subject has

not actually had.

But in the case of a person, as conceived of by Locke,
Is the

how does one determine what is and what is not a veridical memory?

notion of a non-veridical memory even intelligible in this context?
stance is capable of performing actions and of having experiences.
stance can have experiences because it is possible to distinguish
of the experiences from the experiences themselves.

A subthe-

haver

It makes sense to ask

whether certain memory-like experiences had by a substance at
ine reflections of experiences that substance had at

A sub-

are genu-

precisely because

there is in principle a way of deterrn: ning whether the substance at t^ rs
the 6ame as the substance at t^, and the method of determining the ident^i-y

2J4
How are later states assigned to earlier states?

Let us assume that at

t^ we have a certain state of consciousness, C^, characterized by ideas

of swimming, perhaps with the additional idea of "presentness" annexed to

them.

At t^ we have another state of consciousness,

characterized by

ideas of drying off on a beach, with the additional idea of presentness

annexed.

is also characterized by ideas of swimming to which there is

annexed the idea of pastness, that is to say, the idea that the swimming
ideas, or ideas very much like them, have been previously experienced.

How do we know whether

belongs to the same series as C^?

How do we

determine whether the C2 ideas of swimming, to which there is annexed the

additional idea of pastness, genuinely reflect the

which are accompanied by an aura of presentness?
be that if the

ideas of swimming,

Clearly the answer must
ideas, then

memories are appropriately similar to the C
^

CL

and C~ form parts of the same series of states of consciousness, and

thus "belong to" the

sarnie

person.

Perhaps we should also require that the

degree of pastness attached to the

memories accord at least roughly
It seems clear that,

with the Hength of the interval, between t^ and

given this conception of a person, the distinction between genuine and

spurious memory has been robbed of its significance.

Let us assume that

in the past there existed a state of consciousness which included ideas
of administering noison to an enemy.

Let us further assume that this

state of consciousness inhered in the particular spiritual substance to

which we refer by the name of Lucretia Borgia.

Suppose that in the

present there exists a state of consciousness which includes, with the

appropriate degree of pastness annexed, exactly similar ideas of administering poison to an enemy.

It follows from Locke's theory that the
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of the substance is independent of the question of the similarity between
the memory experiences at
t

2

and the experiences at

t^

precisely matches an experience had at

t^

If a memory at

one can still sensibly in-

quire whether these conscious states belong to the same substance.

Only

if the answer is in the affirmative does the memory count as veridical.

But if a person is no more than consciousness, or consciousness of con-

sciousness, as most of the time Locke would have us believe, then in-

quiries of this sort are no longer intelligible.

We cannot then

the states of consciousness existing at

are states that both

and

t
1

ask if

belong to an entity for which there is an independent criterion of identity, and hence we cannot inquire if that entity actually had at

periences which the memory experiences of
resemble.

t

?

t^

ex-

may be said truthfully to

Locke might wish to reply that he has, indeed, provided for a

subject of conscious experience, a subject which has experiences, but that
this subject is itself a conscious experience.

ences existing at

existing at

t

A set of conscious experi-

is a genuine memory of a set of conscious experiences

just in case both sets are perceived by the same overarch-

ing consciousness, the same consciousness of consciousness.

The diffi-

culty which any such answer would have to confront is that there is no

criterion of identity for consciousness, even for consciousness of consciousness, apart from the existence of similarities between the sets of

conscious experiences which are alleged to be perceived by the same supercon sc iousn-353 .

On Locke's account, a person is simply a finite temporal series of
states of consciousness.

By what principle is this series constituted ?

,
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earlier and later states of consciousness constitute a single person.
One can ask whether the soul-substance in which the later state of con-

sciousness inheres actually performed the act which was performed by the
soul-substance we call Lucretia; but from the standpoint of Locke's con-

ception of personal identity, it makes no sense to inquire whether the
later state of consciousness is a genuine reflection of the earlier one.

The definition of "remember" so far as persons are concerned must
be recast as follows.

"B at

t.,

remembers some of A's experiences at t^"

means "B at tp includes memories of some experiences included in A at

V
(2) B at t ? includes memories of some experiences included in

A at

^
if and only if

(a) A and B are both states of consciousness

and
(b) B at tp contains ideas of experiences, with an idea of

pastness annexed to them, that are relevantly similar to
some of the experiences, with an i.dea of presentness
annexed to them, that are contained in A at t^.
b.

Potential memory

«,

Unfortunately, we are in need, nor merely of

a definition of "remember," but also of a definition oi

" can

remember.

Locke has specified that the ability on the part of B to include in its

consciousness ideas of A's experiences or actions is a sufficient condition for the identity of B with A; it is not necessary that B actually

include memories of experiences included in A.

It is wholly understand-

in this
able that Locke should frame his definition of personal identity

way.

He naturally wants to say that a person inherits responsibility

moment he is conscious of
not merely for those actions which at any given
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having performed, but for all those acts and experiences which, with
appropriate stimulation, he is capable of recollecting.

However, it is a

grave question as to whether the notion of ability to remember can be

made intelligible in the context of Locke's phenomenalist conception of a

person.

It seems that the ability to remember, or to produce conscious

states of a certain kind, is a property that can belong only to an agent
capable of performing causally efficacious actions.

sciousness such an agent?
say that there are

lav/s

Is a state of con-

Perhaps, taking a clue from Berkeley, we can

determining that certain states of consciousness

will be followed by certain other states and, moi-eover, that some states
are such that they will follow others if and only if those others have

been preceded by still earlier states of a certain definite kind.

In

other vjoras there may be a state of consciousness, C, such that if it has

been preceded by a state of consciousness, B, then it

followed by C, then C will be succeeded by D,

a

t^

succeeded by

That is to say, B is such that if it is

a state of consciousness, D.

mental state occurring at

v/ill be

,

Let us assume that A is a

and A consists of the experience of having

conversation with Professor Feldman.

At

there occurs another mental

state, B, which consists of the experience of reading the New York Times .
B contains no memories of A.
I

V/e

want to know if B can remember A, or, as

shall put it, if B is potentially a memory of A.

Let us further assume

that some states of consciousness, while not themselves including memo-

ries of earlier states, have under certain circumstances the tendency to
produce, or be followed by, states which do include memories of those

earlier states.

We may think of these states as being appropriate stim-

uli to the recollection of the earlier states.

Thus a state of conscious'
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ness which includes the experience of hearing the question, "Do you remember the conversation you recently had with Professor Feldman?" might be

considered to be a stimulus to the recollection of the earlier state which

consisted of the experience of having that conversation.

When we ask

whether the mental state, B, consisting of the experience of reading the
New York Times , is potentially a memory of the mental state, A, which was
an experience of a conversation with Professor Feldman, we are asking

whether there is any state, C, containing an appropriate stimulus to the
memory of A, such that if B is followed by C, C will in turn be followed
by a state, D, which includes a memory of A.

It is obvious that a state

such as C which is a stimulus to the memory of A need not always be

followed by a

1>

which is a memory of A»

If B is such that there is no

state, C, such that if C immediately succeeded B it would produce a state,
D,

which includes a memory of A, then we may say that the state, B, is

not a potential memory of A,

Abandoning the stilted language which

phe-»

nomenalism forces upon us, we may say, if my mental state when reading the
New York Times is such that no stimulus whatsoever is capable of awakening in me the memory of the conversation with Professor Feldman, then I
cann ot remember that conversation.

Let ns attempt to define "can remember."

"B can remember at t

of A s experiences at t, " we paraphrase as "B at
s

^

some

potentially includes

memories of some experiences included in A at t^." The main structure oi
the def iniens is that of a conjunction, having (I) and (II) as its members,,

(II) is a disjunction which has as its disjuncts (1)

ar.d

(2).

(l)

provides that if B actually contains memories of A, then B shall count as
a potential memory of A, that is to say, E has the ability to remember A.

'
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The situation where B does not actually include any memories of experiences included in A, but nevertheless potentially includes them, is dealt

with in (2)„

C is the state containing the stimulus to recollection of

the experiences included in A.

It may be identical with B or it may in-

stead be an immediate successor to 3.

Those two possibilities are dealt

with in (a) and (b) which lay down the conditions which the stimulus
state, C 5 must meet.

Clause (ii) is included in the antecedent of both

(a) and (b) since it is possible that B or C might be the terminal state

in the life of the person and hence not be succeeded by any state at all.

Yet we should wish to say, and indeed, given Locke's conception of a person, we need to say, that this terminal state potentially includes memo-

ries of earlier states in the person's existence.
(3) B at t ? potentially includes memories of some experiences included in
^
A at t

if and only if
(I) A and

B are states of consciousness
and

(II) (1) B at tp includes memories of some experiences included in
A at t
1.

or
(2) There is a state of consciousness, C, such that
(a)

J.f

(i) C is identical with B

and
(ii) C is succeeded by .any state at all
then C is immediately succeeded by a state
of consciousness, D, which includes memories

of some experiences included in A

and
(b) If (i) C immediately succeeds B

and
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(ii) C is succeeded by any state at all
then C is immediately succeeded by a state
ox consciousness, D, which includes memories
of some experiences included in A.

One great advantage to these phenomenalist definitions of "remember"

and "can remember" is the fact that they no longer contain the stipulation that A at t^ be identical with B at t£»

Hence the definition of per-

sonal identity in terms of memory is freed from the circularity by which
it was crippled when "remember" was taken in its ordinary veridical sense

and we assumed that an experience could be had by only one person.

In

order to make this new definition of memox-y viable, however, we have to

regard "A" and "B" as replaceable by names of states of consciousness, or
temporal slices of experience.

Now it is plain that B's remembering the

experiences of A (B's being a memory of A) is not the necessary and sufficient condition of B's identity with A.

Indeed, since (2) in the defini-

tion of "remember" requires B to differ from A in attaching the idea of

pastness to experiences which in A were accompanied by a sense of being
present, it is obviously impossible for A and B to be one and the same
state of consciousness.

What is to be defined in terms of the memory

criterion is not a x-elation of identity, but the relation of genidentity

which holds between distinct temporal parts belonging to a single whole.
c.

Resolving the -paradoxes .

The fact that Locke is apparently

committed to the theses that (1) A may be identical with B while failing
to possess all ox B's properties and (2) A and B may be identical at one

time and non-identical at another constitutes strong evidence that he is

using the wox'ds "same" and "identical" in a sense which is different from
that of the contemporary logician.

It indicates that he does not always

regard statements of the form "B at

t

2

= A at t^' as genuine assertions of

identity, and hence that he does not always interpret "A at t" as "the A

which has P

."
t

If this is not the case, his theory is simply incoherent.

But if the assertion that B at
as

a.

t

?

is identical with A at t

statement that B at t^ and A at t

1

is understood

are parts of a single temporally

persistent whole, the door is opened for a reconstruction of his teachings
on a more sensible basis.

So it may be that, after all, he is not vulner-

able to the charges, which have hitherto seemed most potent, that his

theory entails a violation of the laws of logic.
We are now in a position to give at least an initial answer to the

criticism that Locke allows B to be identical with A, and yet to lack some

property belonging to A.

When he maintains that, merely through remember-

ing some action of A, B becomes identical with A, Locke is in reality

claiming only that this act of recollection on the part of B is a sufficient condition for the inclusion of B in a personal whole having A as an

earlier temporal part.

There is no apparent contradiction in asserting

that B may be joined to A in this way while at the same time recognizing

that there are many properties belonging to A which B fails to possess.

The charge that Locke allows distinct persons to become identical (and
vice versa) may be met in a similar way.

When Locke says that

I

become

the same person as Nestor upon acquiring consciousness of some of

Nestor’s actions, all he is maintaining is that my recollection of a
Nestor-action suffices to include me in a personal whole which has Nestor
as an earlier part.

But although joined together in this very special way,

Nestor and I would remain non-identical.

Should 1 subsequently lose my

memory of Nestor's actions, the result is not to make previously identical
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persons non-identical, but to terminate the existence of the person having
us both as parts and to initiate, instead, a

nev;

person whose earlier seg-

ments, at least, consist of my states of consciousness, shorn of any capac-

ity to recollect Nestor-experiences.

It may indeed conflict with our

ordinary ways of thinking to maintain that there are persons with temporal parts like this, or that they can be created and annihilated in such

a fashion.

But so far as I can see, the view entails no logical absurd-

ity.

Let us turn now to Reid's transitivity paradox.

reconstruction of Locke's theory which
lar terms, such as "the schoolboy at t^

I

On the basis of the

have been proposing, the singumust bo interpreted as names,

not for temporally whole persons, but for temporal segments of persons.

So Locke is no longer committed, by the transitivity of identity, to

maintaining that the general at t^ is the same person as the schoolboy at
t

1

.

Indeed, when "A at

t^"

"B at t

,"

2

and "C at

ty

are regarded as re-

placeable exclusively by names of temporal segments of persons, each of

them existing at different times, such an assertion would be unintelligible.
A.

Therefore, Locke is not obliged to hold that C is identical with

Instead he is left with the assertion that A and B belong to a single

temporal series constituting a person, that B and C are members of another

such series, but that A and C are not co-members of any one such series,
and that consequently there is no person having A, B and C as its temporal segments.

In the second of the three cases that we previously dis-

cussed, B at t^ recalls the experiences of A at t^ and C at t^ likewise

remembers A's experiences, but is unable to recollect any
ences.

oj.

B s experi-

Under these circumstances there will be a person composed of A
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and B, and another person composed of A and C, but B and C will not make
up a person, and once again there will be no person having as its segments, A, B and C.

For reasons that will subsequently become apparent,

we shall postpone consideration of the third case until Locke's defini-

tion of a person has been reconstructed.

The situations we have been describing may well present themselves as
strange in the extreme, but are they contradictory?

To raise this ques-

tion is to ask if the relation of co-membership in a single temporal
series of mental states constituting a person is necessarily a transitive
relation.

If A and B are co-members of such a series, and B and C are sim-

ilarly related to each other as co-members, does it follow that A and C
are so related?

If one ans\\rers this question affirmatively it is because

one believes that under the specified conditions it is necessary that A, B

and C constitute a single series.
way.

We may pose the problem in another

Let the series composed of A and B be called

composed of B and C be called

"ft."

"<*"

and the series

Then the question becomes one of

whether a single temporal slice of consciousness, B, may be a member of
two distinct temporal series, ck anaf?

,

each making up a person, and yet

that it not be the case that there is any more comprehensive series, b

such that

constitutes a person and d" and P are both parts of &

.

,

Some

philosophers might wish to deny that the situation just described is a

possible one on the grounds that experiences and states of consciousness
are necessarily private, i.e., that they cannot be shared by more than
one person.

But this claim is debatable.

Some philosophers have held it

possible that a person might undergo fission and divide into two persons.

This statement, if not contradictory, must be understood as
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asserting that two persons, always distinct, have for a period of time a
part in common, and subsequently proceed to go their separate ways*
a state of affairs would not seem to be logicalD.y impossible.

Such

So given

this view of what it is to be a person, there does not appear to be any
compelling logical reason for regarding the relation of co-membership in
a single personal series as a transitive one.
It may be objected that if we allow a temporal segment of conscious-

ness to figure as a component in distinct personal series, we shall violate Locke's dictum that there cannot be more than one thing of a given

kind in the same place at the same time.
For we never finding, nor conceiving it possible, that
two things of the same kind should exist in the same
place at the same time, we rightly conclude, that,
whatever exists anywhere at any time, excludes all of
the same kind, and is there itself alone. 3-2

To return to Reid's example, there is a person composed of the schoolboy
of

and the junior officer of t^, there is a second person, distinct
and

from the first, having as his temporal parts the junior officer of

the genera.! of t„, and these two persons are not co-members of a more com-

prehensive personal series.

Thus it may be argued

that,

the reconstructed

version of Locke's theory demands that the space occupied by the body and
the soul of the junior officer be occupied by two things of the same kind,

namely by two distinct persons.

The objection, however, depends on the

premise that persons are entities that occupy space, and it seems likely
that this is a premise Locke would reject.

exists into two fundamental categories;

substances occupy space.

Locke divides everything that

substances and modes.

13
"

All

According to Locke, all modes or relations are
l4

"ultimately terminated in substances,"”

but it seems that termination

in a substance. is not the same thing as occupation of the place which the

substance occupies.

Locke allows, for example, that an indefinite number

of ideas, or modes of thought, may terminate in a given finite spiritual

substance at any one time.

These ideas are, all of them, inodes of

thought, that is, modes of the same kind, but this circumstance is pre-

sumably no bar to their being terminated in the same substance at the
same time.

a substance.

It is one of Locke's cardinal teachings that a person is not

Since everything which is not a substance is a mode, it

follows that persons must be regarded as modes.

And hence there seems to

be no reason why an indefinite number of them should not be connected with,
or tei’minate in, the same bodily or spiritual substance.
3.

a.

The Definition of a Person as a Temporal Whole

Persons as relativized to time .

We have seen that Locke shows some

inclination to conceive of the relation of identity as relativised to a

particular time.

This suggests that we might most effectively capture his

intent by defining a person as relativized to a time.

We may sketch such a

definition along the following lines.
(4) P is a person at t

if and only if

P is composed of a series, S, of states of consciousness such uhat the
state coinciding with t potentially includes memories of some lor
all) experiences included in each state.
But this definition is fundamentally unintelligible.

It sufiers from the

same incoherence as did the notion of identity relativized to a time.

and P' cannot be identical at one time and distinct at another.
of states of consciousness cannot constitute

a.

Jr

A series

temporally whole person at

one time and fail to constitute such a person at another.

series makes up a person or it does not.

Either the

Constituting a personal whole

is a property that belongs to the series, and not to any of its temporal

parts.

It is not a dated property of the series.

So the effort to con-

ceive of a person in this way is best abandoned as fundamentally contra-

dictory in nature.
b.

New attempts at a definition .

(5) P is a person which is a temporal whole

if and only if

P is composed of a series, S, of
states of consciousness such that
(a)

the last state potentially includes

memories of some experience
included in some earlier state
and
(b)

S is not itself a proper

part of any series meeting

requirement (a).

This rendition accords with Locke's intentions insofar as it makes it
possible to say that B at

t0

and A at

t

1

are later and earlier segments of

rhe same person provided that B can remember some experience of A.

other respects it is a glaring failure.

But in

It makes any state of consciousness

whatsoever assignable to a person simply on condition that he has had
assigned to him some state of which his final state potentially includes a
memory*

Thus a person would be obliged to claim as his own an indefinite

number of experiences which he was totally unable to recall.
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Let us make another attempt.

tute (a
(a

1

)

1

For clause (a) in (5) let us substi-

).

the last state potentially includes memories of some experiences in-

cluded in each earlier state.

This definition also fails to carry out Locke's intentions, for it,
too, has as a consequence that an action or experience may be attributed
to a person as his own even although he lacks the capacity to remember it.

All that is required for an experience to be an experience of person A is
that it be a part, possibly an unremembered part, of a state of consciousness, some fragment of which is included as a potential memory in his last

Thus it would be possible for a person to be held culpable for an

state.

action of which he has totally lost consciousness.

This strikes at the

center of Locke's intentions.

Earlier we pointed out that if "identity" is to be understood in its

ordinary sense, then Locke is surely contradicting himself in claiming
(a) that B becomes the same person as A merely by remembering some exper-

ience of A and (b) that at any given time an experience is an experience
of B only if B remembers, or can remember, that experience as his own at

For if B is truly identical with A by virtue of recollecting

that time.

some one of his experiences, then, necessarily, all of A's experiences

belong to B
ber.

,

including those that B at any given time is unable to remem-

We suggested that this contradiction could be avoided by reinter-

preting "identity" as

".joint

membership in

a.

single temporal series.

1-

Now we see that a parallel problem continues to plague the reconstructed
theory.

It is surc-ly intelligible to say that A and B are earlier and

later parts of the same person even although the xater part cannot recalx
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all of the experiences had by the earlier part.

constituted out of A and B?

But what of the person

If he is to be such that an experience is his

experience only if he is capable of recollecting it, then we cannot allow
a later state of consciousness to be joined in a personal whole with an

earlier state merely on the ground that the later state is potentially a

memory of some experience included in the earlier state.

For if that

later state is the final state in a temporal series constituting a person,
the consequence may be that there are experiences belonging to a person

which he cannot remember.

The inconsistency between (a) and (b) cannot,

after all, be disposed of merely by substituting the concept of co-membership in a temporal, series for that of identity.
(b) represents the very core of Locke's position regarding person-

ality and moral responsibility; we can be certain that he would be unSo it seems fairly clear that it is

willing to give up this thesis.
(a) that must be surrendered.

V/e

may wonder, in any case, why Locke was

willing to allow B's remembering some action of A to be a sufficient condition of the identity of B with A.

Doubtless he was concerned that a

recmirement that the last segment of a person remember all the experiences
of the earlier segments would result in the life span of a person being

short indeed.

A consideration of this sort would be of tne utmost

importance if Locke's person could be identified with the being which
the name "nerson

1

’

denotes in our ordinary discourse and thinking.

But by now it is apparent that a person, according to Locke's conception,

bears little similarity to the persons with which
in our every day lives.

v/e

are acquainted

It follows from Locke's theory that a

248

person is annihilated at the moment that there ceases to exist a state of
consciousness which potentially contains memories of experiences in each
of his temporal states.

We shall see, however, that it is possible that

he may be reborn at a later time if such a state of consciousness should

subsequently come into being.

All that is achieved by the retention of

(a) is that this annihilation will not occur as long as there exists a

state of consciousness potentially including memories of some experiences

included in each of A's earlier temporal states.

But if even a single

temporal slice of A's experience becomes totally unrecollectable, then A

disappears from existence.

No limit has been set to the size or width of

temporal slices; presumably a temporal slice of consciousness may be of

extremely short duration.

Even when (a) is retained the life span of a

person is extremely precarious, to say the least.

Human beings, as we

understand them, are inevitably composed of a great multitude of Lockian
persons.

This being so, Locke loses little in surrendering the contradic-

tion-making thesis that B is joined in a personal, union with A merely by
the ability to recall some of A's experiences.

The heart of his concep-

tual scheme is the thesis that an experience, E, is assignable to a person, A, if and only if the last state of consciousness in the series which

constitutes A either includes a present awareness of E or potentially includes a memory of E.

The preservation of that conception requires the

following substitution for clause (a) of (5).
(a 11 ) the last state potentially includes memories of each experience

included in each earlier state.
It may seem that this definition permits a person to escape respon-

sibility for actions or experiences which he does have the capacity to
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remember, if those experiences belong to a state of which there is a part
that he cannot recollect.

It will be recalled, however, that we were

obliged to say that any non-empty set of contemporaneous experiences is
a state of consciousness.

Hence any experience qualifies as such a state

and is assignable to each temporal series, constituting a person, whose
final member contains a potential memory of it.
No series of states of consciousness which constitutes a segment of

a person itself qualifies as a person.

Furthermore there is no require-

ment that each state of consciousness which is a member of a personal

series potentially include memories of every earlier state.

This makes

it possible for a person to include among his past experiences amnesic

states in the course of which he was oblivious of all or part of his past.
For these states of consciousness to count as his it is necessary only that

they should be reflected in the memories of his final state.

This seems

to accord with Locke’s intentions, for Locke clearly believes that any

experiences which a person remembers as though they were his own are his
own.

15

On the other hand, it compels him to sacrifice the inconsistent

claim that if B at

t

p

does not remember the actions of A at t^, it is not

possible that those actions were performed by the same person as B, or by
a part of a person belonging to the same personal whole to which B
belongs.
4.

a.

Persistence and Identity Criteria for Persons

The p ersistence criterion .

Given the definition of a person

which we have accepted, it is now impossible for us to continue to says
(6) B at tp and A at t. are states of consciousness belonging to the same
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person if and only if B potentially includes memories of all the experiences included in A.

The problem comes to view when we consider the third type of case
which, under the original formulation of Locke's theory, constituted a

violation of the transitivity of identity.
tj recollects all the experiences of A at

This is the case where C at
t,

and also of B at t^, but B

lacks the power to remember all of A's experiences.

According to the

definition of a person, A and B are both segments of a single person constituted by A, B, and C.

This is because the final state in the temporal

series, namely C, includes memories of all experiences in both A and B„

But (6) makes it impossible for A and B to be regarded as segments of

one person, since the later state, B, does not potentially include memories of all the experiences included in the earlier state, A.

In order

to avoid the inconsistency we must further amend Locke's persistence cri-

terion to read:
(?) B at t 0 and A at t^ are states of consciousness belonging to the same

person if and only if there is a C at t, or at a

t

later than t^ such that

C potentially includes memories of every experience included in A and

every experience included in B.
0. of course, may or may not be identical with B.
b„

The identity cri terion.

Following the pattern that was estab-

lished for masses of matter and organisms, we can transform the persistence

criterion for persons into a test of identity for temporally extended
wholes.
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if and only if
(3a) (3E) \ {k is part of
and
B is part of P ) and /T3C) i (C is a
state of consciousness and C potentially
includes memories of every experience
included in A and every experience
included in B_)7] .
c.

Can the self divide ?

Given the definition of a person that we

have constructed for Locke, is it possible that a person might divide?
is, of course, impossible that a person, P^, existing from t

should be succeeded by two distinct persons, P and P x
p
tp until tj, and each identical with

(Figure 1).

,

It

until t^,

each existing from

To affirm the possi-

bility of such a state of affairs would be to deny that identity is a
transitive relation.

But might it be the case that a temporal part of a

person, A, exists from t^ until

t

son-parts, B and C, existing from

p

,

and is succeeded by two distinct per-

until t^, and that A is an earlier part

of a person, P, ’which has both B and C as its later parts?

(Figure 2).

Then there would be just one person, P, but from t^ until t^ P would
possess two distinct branches.

For this situation

ter

exist, it would be

necessary either that the last state of B or the last state of C include a
potential memory of every experience in every state that belongs to A
and C.

,

B

Under these circumstances, however, contemporaneous states of B

and C would simply be simultaneous states of a single person.

B and C

would not constitute distinct person-parts or distinct branches.

There

would be one undivided person, who had ail the experiences of A between

t

and tp , and all the experiences of B and all the experiences of C between
t- and
c

t-j..

J
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Something resembling the division of A could take place if the last
stage of B did not include potential memories of all experiences in C
and the last stage of C did not include potential memories of all experi-

ences in B.

Then B and C would not only be distinct person-parts; they

would not even be parts of the same person.

But suppose the last stages

of both B and C include potential memories of all experiences in A.

Then

there is a person, P 1? such that A and B are its earlier and later tempo-

ral parts, and there is a person, P

2

,

such that A and C are its earlier

and later temporal states (Figure 5).
in common, but they are distinct persons.

and P

2

have a temporal part, A,

A, B and C are all of them

proper temporal parts of persons, and so do not count as persons in their
own right.

But strictly speaking, A has not divided, for at all times it

has belonged to two distinct temporal wholes.
However, there is another way in which a more authentic form of divi-

sion might occur.
_gart of

The last stage of B might have the ability to recall

each state of consciousness included in A.

B might be able to

recollect, for example, all of the visual experiences of A.

The last

state of C, on the other hand, might include potential memories of all the

auditory experiences of A, but not any visual ones.

Then the visual

experiences of A would constitute an earlier temporal part of a person,
Pn

,

having B an its later temporal stage and the auditory experiences of

A would constitute an earlier temporal part of another person, P~, having
C as its later part.

Since the last stage of A is assumed to include

potential memories of all experiences had by A, and since A, taken as a
whole, is not a proper part of any one series constituting a person, it

seems reasonable to say that A counts as a person in its own right
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(Figure 4).

Yet there is a part of A (= P^) which belongs to

another part that belongs to P^, and P^ and
other.

are distinct from each

Thei e is no point in time at which A( =Pp) divides.
,

an impossibility.

and

That is truly

A person-part can no more become identical with

another person-part than a person can become identical with another person from whom he has been distinct.

But P

,

in addition to being a tem-

porally whole person, is genuinely divided between two persons, each
distinct from

and each distinct from the other.

Can Lockian persons fuse?

Is it possible that there are two distinct

temporal person-parts, A and B, existing between
t^ until

t

j

there exists a person-part

person and B and C make up another?

,

C

,

t

and

tn

and that from

such that A and C make up one

(Figure 5).

For this state of

affairs to come about it would be necessary for the last state of C to
contain potential memories of all experiences had by A and B.

But if that

were the case, A and B would simply constitute simultaneous states of a
single person and would not be distinguishable as temporal parts.

fusion does not seem to be a possibility.

So

Figure

Figure

1

5
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d«

Conclusion .

I

believe that Locke's theory of a person, when re-

constructed in the way attempted here, is free from contradictions.
Since, however, we have found no principle by which we can determine

what experiences belong to a given person at a given time, it remains a
conceptually inadequate account.

If we do not know what experiences make

up a person at any one time, it is obvious that one cannot know what con-

stitutes a person considered as a temporally extended whole.
Furthermore, the very process of reconstructing the theory in a way
that renders it logically coherent has made manifest the fact that there
is little resemblance between a person, as Locke has conceived of him,

and what we take to be a person in ordinary life and discourse.

con-

V/e

ceive of a person as a subject of experiences, and not as the experiences
themselves.

Consequently most of us find unacceptable the view that re-

membering his past experiences is essential to the continued existence of
a person.

In addition, we think that the life of a person is roughly co-

extensive with the life of his body.

If we believe in personal survival

after the death of the body, we consider that the lifetime of the person
includes as a part of itself the lifetime of the body.

But Locke is

committed to the view that a person can endure only so long as there is a
state of consciousness that is potentially a memory of every item of ex-

perience in each of his earlier states.

It is clear that, under this

conception, persons would be extremely short-lived, and that every human

body would have associated with it a host of distinct persons.

Finally,

Locke's view permits persons to share numerically the same experiences,
while we tend to believe that an experience is something that can be had
by one person only.

Locke is therefore obliged to accept the result that
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persons may overlap or have temporal parts in common.

While not consti-

tuting a logical absurdity, this consequence is one that, from the standpoint of our ordinary outlook, is very strange indeed.

Locke's version of a phenomenalist theory of personality can be
rendered logically consistent.

But it cannot be denied that his concep-

tion of a person is a highly novel one.
false?

Does that mean that it is simply

The important issue, it seems to me, is not whether Locke is

using the term "person" in a way that conforms to our ordinary usage.
Clearly, he is not.

What we need to know is whether there really are any

entities such as the ones that his definition of a person picks out.

Whether we, in the course of our daily discourse, call these things
"persons" is not of primary importance.

The critical question is, rather,

do the series of states of consciousness that Locke's principles serve to

unify into wholes constitute real individuals?

I think we

would normally

regard organic bodies, whether vegetable or animal, as real entities that
exist by nature, so to speak., and not by mere convention or fiat.

Following a suggestion of Plato's in the Statesman, we may say that there
are natural lines or "cuts" which mark the temporal beginning and end of

individuals of this sort.

A definition ox an organic body that serves to

demarcate its temporal boundaries may properly be expected to conform to
these natural "cuts."

To find a case where it does not so conform is to

produce a counter-example to the definition.

Does Locke's definition of

beings or are the cuts

a person conform to natural, cuts delimiting

real,

which it makes merely invented by Locke?

suggest that our ultimate

I

assessment of the value of Locke's theory will depend on an answer to
this question,

•

,
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Footnotes to Chapter V
J.

II, 27, 17.

2

II. 27, 24,

5

II, 27, 26

4

Ibid.

5

II. 27, 14.

6

II, 27, 2C.

7

Thomas Reid
Chapter Ill

Essay
8

II, 27, 20-;
Locke sometimes says that the same m an can "at
different times make different persons" and that we "must allow it possible for the same man to be two distinct persons." This suggests that
he intended to legitimatize statements of the form "A is the same man
(human organism) as B, but A is not the same person as B," where the implicit assumption is that A and B are both bodily organisms and both
persons. If such is the case, Locke was truly confused. The claim that
A and B, both of them F and both of them G, are the same F, but not the
same G, cannot be made intelligible when "F" and "G" are replaced by
expressions designating the kinds, body (man), soul and person. This is
because nothing which is a temporal slice of an individual belonging to
one of these kinds can be a temporal slice of an individual belonging to
smother of these kinds. If "F" is replaced by an expression designating
the kind, man (organism), said "G" by an expression designating the kind,
person, then any A and B which are both F (i.e., segments of a man) cannot either
her of them be G (i.e., a segment of a person).

II, 2

10

<

,

26.

II, 27, 13.
II, 27, 10.

12

II, 27,

-L a

11, 27, 2-3

14

II, 27, 3.

15 ,

II, 27, 17 and 25
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